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CHAPTER 1 
CLASSIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 
Like any science, sociology must somehow effect a marriage between 
explanation and evidence. However, since sociology has not outlined a 
single vision of the world, we have no one way to perform the ceremony. 
Here I am proposing a standardized typological format for examining the 
various relationships we now permit between our theoretical ideas about 
some social event and our strategies for supporting these ideas. The for-
mat includes a series of typologies--individual theoretical works classi-
fied according to research approaches, subject matter, and other variables 
--along with a procedure for evaluating the system. With the classifica-
tion I have examined several hypotheses about both internal relationships 
between components of a theory-research combination and the effects of 
outside, non-theoretical forces. Finally, I have indicated some implica-
tions for theoretical reformulations, resolution of controversies, and 
other possibilities suggested by the classification system. 
Clearly no one variable dimension would be sufficient for inspecting 
theory-research relationships and assessing their importance in theory 
building. For example, we could rate sociological theories according to the 
degree of concern they display for interpreting subjective elements--ranging 
from theories that do not even allude to the existence of norms, values, and 
other social-mental constructs to theories that explicitly consider these con-
structs as cause and effect in social life but still remain "positive" only 
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because they preceed interpretive analysis with some description of 
objective behavior. We could develop a sc~le of subjectivity by simply 
counting the number of subjective components in each theory. A typology 
with such a scale based on increasing concern with subjective elements 
could prove very discriminating, assuming that each new concern adds to 
the sum of all the others; to illustrate, that a theory incorporating 
values also considers norms, that a theory including socialization also 
includes norms and values, that each incorporation includes all pre-
vious ones. Often, however, reality does not arrange itself so neatly. 
A theory might include a number of subjective elements without respect 
to order. Counting the number of variables in this manner might pro-
duce a scale of increasing subjectivity which groups Parsons and Marx 
in one category simply because both observed a relationship between 
values and structures. Most sociologists would not accept such a 
classification. Furthermore, given an interest in theory-research 
connections, we might want to ask questions outside the scope of such 
one-dimensional typologies: Do interpretive sociologists examine cul-
tural values as part of a sequence in social change or a construction 
in stable reality? Do they prefer to arrange their evidence to build 
an inductive theory or to substantiate deductive models? Or--a more 
~roubling question--Does the whole interpretive-positivistic framework 
relate to other facets of their work at all? Thus, the simple inter-
pretive-positivistic classification may prove so broad, so inclusive, 
so heterogeneous that it does not really tell us anything. 
On the other hand, detailed classifications often lead directly 
to conceptual overload thus undermining any rationale for a typology. 
As Bailey (1972; 1973a; 1973b) noted about the mini-max dilemma in 
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typology construction: in order to be truly useful, a concept should 
have a minimum number of types and each type should have a maximum 
amount of homogeneity. Perhaps 192 types of theory exist in "reality" 
or could be coaxed from a computer. But it is easier for us to under-
stand two or three. 
As the first step toward choosing a proper course, we must con-
sider how a typology may be used in further analysis (Weber, 1905:164-
88; 1918:141). Distinguishing between rational, traditional and 
charismatic legitimacy, for example, enables us to explore different 
kinds of behavior among those who exercise authority. Further, these 
types help us to investigate the link between patterns of legitimacy 
and other social features like religious perspectives or levels of 
economic development. It would be impossible to adequately understand 
patterns of authority if we either exa~ined authority as a unitary con-
cept or looked at each authority figure individually. In the first 
instance, authority could relate to all other group variables indis-
crtminately since some kind of authority exists in all stable groups. 
In the second situation, it is likely that authority figures would each 
display a unique set of concomitant variables. Clearly we need typolo-
gies to dispel the conceptual confusion. 
Applying Weber's basic principle to theoretical typologies, I 
suggest there are two general kinds of analysis that can be performed: 
1. An examination of formal elements within a theory system 
--for example, the links between inductive arguments and 
systems models; 
2. An exploration of outside forces affecting theory con-
struction--an ideology, the introduction of a new tool, 
other possible influences. 
In sum, I am presenting a system that can contribute to teaching, 
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theoretical reformulation, and exploration in the sociology of knowledge. 
The typology should identify clusters of similar works thus providing a 
map of the theoretical terrain simple enough for beginners, detailed 
enough to interest those of us more familiar with the territory. 
Analysis of the internal properties of each type should suggest missing 
ideas, new conceptual combinations, extended arguments. Inquiry about 
the social background of various thinkers should tell us whether similar 
backgrounds inspire similar ideas. Such analysis, however, requires 
many variables, far too many for a single-dimension typology. It also 
requires a fairly mechanical, standardized technique for assigning 
theorists to categories based on these variables and for reducing the 
categories to a mini-max classification. Toward this end, I have 
developed a classification system--not a simple typology--designed to 
deal successively with limited sets o~ variables and limited number of 
theorists selected according to whatever questions one may choose to 
address about the various relationships between explanation and evi-
dence. 
I will begin my classification system in this chapter by enumerat-
ing other approaches to theory-typology construction. Chapters II and 
III outline the mechanisms of my approach, first the rationale for 
chosing specific trait variables, next some specific hypotheses argued 
from the sociology of sociology, finally some technical problems of 
systematics based on numerical taxonomy. The next two chapters detail 
types of sociological theory described by numerical taxonomy. In 
Chapter IV I use the system to look for Kuhn paradigms in sociology 
and, in Chapter V, I explore theory reformulation possibilities for 
s 
stratification, religious asceticism, and other topics that happened 
to appear in the works used here. Chapter VI examines the ties between 
theory types and social influences both in specific tests for hypo-
thetical influences and in reformulations of works by members of 
"opposed" social groups. In the final chapter, I speculate briefly 
about the future utility of numerical taxonomy in theory construction. 
Trends in Theory Classification 
To date, typologists have devised classifications rather than 
classification systems and used artistic judgment rather than a more 
mechanical apptoach both for the creation of the taxonomy itself and 
for the assignment of theorists to various categories. Their work 
naturally reflects the changing orientation of the field: when Sorokin 
wrote Contemporary Sociological Theories in 1928, he classified Emile 
Durkheim as a sociologistic theorist; recently Turner (1974) discussed 
Durkheim as a forerunner of modern functionalism. But, historical 
differences aside, typologists also illustrate long-term theoretical 
interests by using similar kinds of categories for their classifica-
tions. 
Without trying to outline a typology of typologies, I would 
suggest that a classifier's personal definition of theory, however 
·vague, shapes his categories. Many define theory as some sort of 
formal construct, perhaps a set of propositions logically derived from 
some basic axioms. Of course, sociologists have not agreed on what 
these formal properties might be (Ward, 1973), but many look for some 
underlying logic, some model of science, some perspective or view of 
the world, distinguishing the types of theory. Others define theory as 
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a way to describe the "guts of the phenomenon" (Stinchcombe, 1968:15) 
and may prefer to classify theory according to its content rather than 
its formal properties. These typologists would be more apt to group 
theories about community or power phenomena than theories who use a 
positivistic approach. But, with either conceptualization, classifiers 
often look outside of sociology itself for explanations of why theorists 
chose a particular model of science or subject matter at a particular 
time. 
Sorokin (1928), an example from the first group, identified key 
variables for various "schools:" mechanistic sociology used the con-
cepts of physics, chemistry, and mechanics; biological-social demography 
described social life as the effect of population increase or decline. 
Martindale (1960) traced the philosophical roots of positive organicism, 
formal (Kantian) sociology, and other branches with a distinctive set of 
intellectual origins. Timasheff (1967) used similar basic reasoning 
but changed his classification variables from political ideology (social 
Darwinism) to national background (Russian subjectivism) to scientific 
strategy (analysis) to independent variable (psychological sociology). 
More recently Turner (1974) named four key perspectives or "paradigms" 
(without ever defining his use of the term) along with one alternative 
perspective. In a systematic rigorous fashion, he then examined the 
common assumptions and strategies of functionalism, conflict theory, 
interactionism, exchange theory, and ethnomethodology. Nisbet (1966) 
illustrates the "guts" orientation. In The Sociological Tradition, he 
identified five key nineteenth-century concerns (community, authority 
status, sacredness, alienation) and discussed how interest in these 
topics has informed sociology to this day. Using logic and research 
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practice rather than tradition to define the crucial subject matter, 
Boskoff (1969; 1972) listed generic concerns explored by sociology, 
problems like group formation, deviation, control, and change. 
Traditional classifiers have also looked beyond the subject 
matter and formal properties of sociology to the historical forces 
shaping the intellectual life of an era. In other words, the 
sociology of sociology is not a creation of the 1970s (Curtis, 1972). 
Barnes (1948), for example, named both the industrial revolution and 
scientific reformation as instrumental causes of early sociology. In 
his own work (1948) and in the three volumes he co-authored with Becker 
(1938; 1961), he identified political ideologies, economic reverses, 
national traditions, and other variables that could encourage different 
formations of sociological theory. Reviewing the American scene, 
Hinkle and Hinkle (1954) described three eras. Before World War I, 
sociologists shared a societal belief in progress, melioristic inter-
vention, and the powers of positive science. After the war, a less 
optimistic America produced sociologistswho examined irrational forces 
behind human behavior, oppressive structures in urban society, and the 
disruptive forces of technological change. After the Second World War, 
sociologists, like other Americans, stressed utilitarian values: they 
· wanted their science to be "useful." 
Two movements within sociology seem particularly important for 
theory classification during the 1970s. First, the growing interest 
in philosophy of science. Comte and Spencer built their theoretical 
eastles on the foundation of an organic analogy. If society was like 
an organism, then •••• If social groups developed as species do, we 
could expect . . .. During the 1960s Kaplan (1964), Brown (1964), and 
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others articulated a much more technical model for social science based 
on philosophical views of natural science along with examples already 
set in social studies. They outlined the logical structure of science, 
the links between concepts and measures, the assumptions behind mathe-
matical tools, the need for different analytic strategies. In accord 
with these interests, sociologists like Blalock (1961; 1969}, Gibbs 
(1972}, Reynolds (1971}, Stinchcombe (1968}, Zetterberg (1954; 1965), 
and others have written books specifically instructing students in the 
art of theory construction with logic, with calculus, with linear 
graphs, with other technical tools. The way we explain a phenomenon is 
becoming as important as what we explain. 
Second, sociologists have become increasingly concerned with 
identifying the particular social structures that affect theory develop-
ment just as they have become ever more interested in the technical 
details of the theory itself. This concern grew from early efforts in 
the sociology of knowledge. Comte's typology of societal consensus, 
Durkheim's formulation of how social organization creates collective 
consciousness, Marx's hypotheses about the relationships between class 
and ideology all foreshadow the modern interest in links between social 
structure and scientific thought. Weber, who spent his lifework detail-
ing the growth, correlates, and implications of rationalization in 
Western thought, focused on rational science in "The meaning of 'ethical 
neutrality' in sociology and economics" (1917}. Weber feared, even 
detested, certain aspects of rationalization. On the other hand, he 
believed his hope for civilization should not affect his use of data 
or his interpretation of empirical reality. This is the thrust of 
Weber's famous plea for value-free sociology; not that values asso-
9 
ciated with our position in society have nothing to do with our choice of 
a problem, but rather that we must separate our dreams from reality, our 
preferences from the facts, our political commitments from the identifi-
cation of truth. To this day, sociologists continue to debate whether 
science should be--or can be--"value free," often, however, without 
properly considering what Weber meant by the term in the first place. 
Moral issues aside, sociologists have also studied the empirical 
problem of identifying where and how the social situation affects the 
scientific enterprise. Merton (1938) pioneered such empirical work 
when he documented the ways religious-cultural values encouraged the 
growth of science among seventeenth-century English Puritans. More 
recently, especially since the late 1950s, sociologists have examined 
their own science, frequently by using the Marxist perspective and show-
ing the ways scientific concepts reflect the interests of dominant 
societal groups. In his survey of the sociology of sociology, Curtis 
(1972) reviewed four key trends: first, a long tradition of intellectual 
histories such as those of Barnes (1948) detailing the impact of his-
torical events on scientific thought; second, the studies of Becker and 
Barnes (1938; 1961) and others who contrast intellectual trends in 
different countries; then, a new but growing body of research about the 
work styles, political preferences, publishing records, and sundry other 
peculiarities of American sociologists; and finally, inquiry into the 
specific areas where non-scientific values seem most likely to affect 
the research process. 
Thomas S. Kuhn has provided a natural framework for a combined 
interest in philosophy of science and sociology of sociology. In The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962; 1970) he explored the nature 
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of paradigms (which he defined roughly as general frameworks delimiting 
a subject matter, explanatory outline, and methodological strategy appro-
priate for some science). He then described why a discipline may aban-
don one paradigm for another. Contrary to our traditional view, this 
shift is less gradual evolution than abrupt revolution. The success of 
a challenger depends partly on its ability to attract numerous pre-
tigious adherents. Thus, Kuhn defined science as a political activity 
dependent on the social structure of its practitioners. 
How do these developments affect theory typologies? To begin, 
instead of simply categorizing theories according to a basic framework 
which they exhibit or from which they developed, typogists now use 
the analytic properties of theory (enumerated by the work in technical 
theory construction) as variables for developing categories. 
Walter Wallace provides two examples of this new trend. First, 
consider the loosely defined typology of "positivistic" and "inter-
pretive" theories already mentioned. I choose these types because they 
highlight problems that have informed sociology from the beginning 
~agner, 1963). However, additional variables could sharpen the typology 
considerably by increasing homogeneity within categories at the cost of a 
slight increase in the number of types. Wallace (1969) expanded this 
typology by distinguishing motor behavior from dispositional states, 
independent variables from dependent variables, social causes from 
non-social ones. All sociological theories, he noted, explain social 
behavior. But some, the subjective theories, stress dispositional 
behavior--motives, aspirations, sentiments, meanings. Others, 
the objective theories, stress motor behavior--writing, speaking, 
fighting, eating. This distinction separates Parsons, who pointed to 
11 
economic values as one of the defining features of a society, from 
Marx, who identified class consciousness as an observable effect of 
economic behavior and a prelude to further action. To this division 
Wallace added the differences between sociological subject matter (as 
defined above) and several categories of variables theorists use to 
account for this subject. The added dimensions distinguish Marx, who 
argued that economic situations affect behavior, from Cooley, who 
showed how symbolic-meaningful exchange with others shapes a "looking-
glass self" which later serves as a social conscience for the indi-
vidual's economic (and other) action. With this framework Wallace 
sketched a ten-cell table. His use of the logical structure of the 
theory itself transformed a simple exercise in cataloging into an 
analytical tool: besides exposing real differences between theories, 
Wallace could point to an empty cell (the study of physiological 
effects), a logical possibility not yet developed in sociology. 
More recently, Wallace (1971) has developed a model depicting 
various stages--or in Kuhn's terms, the various components of a 
paradigm (1971:24nll)--for theory construction and testing. He 
recommends that we list possible strategies appropriate to each 
stage, classify theorists within each according to their methodologies, 
and then compare the different groups that form for different stages. 
We could compare the data-gathering stage with the research-design 
stage to ask if there is a tendency for participant observation 
researchers to favor "grounded" or "emergent" theory building (Glaser 
and Strauss; Huber). Or we could look for variables outside the theory-
research sequence, for example, the influence of "schools" on various 
approaches. Wallace advocates typologies explicitly developed to 
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examine such hypotheses about sociological theory, although he has not 
applied the idea in his own research. 
New trends in the sociology of sociology also affect the ways we 
think about theory and, therefore, the ways we classify it. In The 
Coming· Crisis of Western Sociology, Gouldner (1970) hypothesizes that 
the political nature of knowledge defines basic categories of theory. 
Scientific knowledge, he argues, is possessed by the dominant groups in 
society and formed in response to their needs. According to Gouldner, 
a functional-systems framework developed within American sociology to 
provide the rationale for a stable political regime while 11arxist 
analysis developed to support changing regimes of Eastern Europe. He 
predicts a growing crisis for academic functionalism created by the 
growing American welfare state. lve can resolve this crisis by incor-
porating Marxist change ideas into stable-system theories. Meanwhile 
the }~rxist-orientated sociology of political change prominent in 
Soviet-Bloc countries will experience a similar crisis as non-revolu-
tionary governments require a new ideology of stability. 
In A Sociology of Sociology, Friedrichs (1970) revised the para-
digm idea to make the social scientist's image of himself the essen-
tial paradigm-defining subject matter of sociology. Social scientists, 
he reasoned, chose a "prophetic" mission or a "priestly" one. This 
mission, in turn, forms the framework for their methodology, special 
subject concerns, theoretical models, and other features of their 
paradigm. Although we may not believe in the specific doctrines of 
this "theology of sociology" (Collins, 1974), we must seriously con-
sider its central tenet positing the existence of non-rational motives 
behind the rational enterprise of science. 
13 
Instead of ideology, Mullins (1973) examined the social structure 
of sociology for its relationship to theory formations. In Theories 
and Theory Groups in Contemporary Sociology, he divided the field into 
symbolic interactionists, ethnomethodologists, and other groups of 
theorists who cite common sources, who share a professional social 
circle (as colleagues or students), or who are considered similar by 
themselves and by others. Then he traced the structures of friendship, 
colleague relationships, and sponsorship to argue that these social 
forms affect the eventual success or failure of a theoretical framework. 
Without a spreading network of practitioners, a framework dies. 
The paradigm conception reappears in a very recent work by George 
Ritzer (1975). After reviewing Kuhn's various formulations, Ritzer 
defined paradigm as "a fundamental image of the subject matter" which 
forms the "broadest unit of consensus within a science" defining "what 
should be studied, what questions should be asked, how they should be 
asked, and what rules should be followed in interpreting the answers 
obtained" (1975:7). He then identified three basic sociological para-
digms, or broad units of consensus, clustered around social facts, 
social definitions, and social behavior. The social factists study 
structure and institutions, usually with questionnaire and interview 
data. Social definitionists often use participant observation to 
examine the evaluation process conducted by individuals in the social 
world. The social behavioralists favor experiments to probe indi-
vidual behavior forming around a reward-cost motivation structure. 
After defining his paradigms, Ritzer criticized each in detail, making 
two key points: first, no one of the paradigms adequately explains all 
of the phenomena we include within sociology even though some of its 
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practitioners may think it does; second, some practitioners within each 
paradigm seem peculiarly blind to the merits of contributions from 
another camp. Hence, social factists may denigrate the "soft" method-
ology of participant observation and definitionists retaliate with 
remarks about the "incomplete" nature of hard data (Ritzer, 1975:132-
37). Fortunately, other thinkers--most notably Marx, Durkheim, Weber 
and Parsons--bridge the paradigms. According to Ritzer, these giants 
who straddle different camps may also suggest the ways that sociology 
could,possibly, form a single scientific framework. 
Both Wallace and Ritzer raise some problems I address with the 
classification of theorists in this study. Both authors highlight 
important variables ranging from basic definitions of subject matter 
to basic research strategies. Both group theories by their internal 
properties rather than philosophical-intellectual origins. Ritzer 
actually named three groups each of which contained a distinctive 
definition of subject matter with a corresponding constellation of 
theoretical and methodological ideas. Wallace, on the other hand, 
listed important elements of theory along with questions one might ask 
about how these elements vary between different groups of theorists. 
Although Wallace considered the qualities comprising a paradigm, he did 
not attempt to demonstrate that such frameworks actually exist in 
sociology. Thus, Ritzer identified groups and then isolated the bridge 
theorists who might provide clues for a common framework while Wallace 
assumed these groups might be constantly changing as sociological 
thought formed and reformed around various possible frameworks. Both 
men focused on the relationship between theory and research. Both also 
specified extra-theoretical forces, items unrelated to the truth or 
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validity of a theory, that nevertheless shape the explanations we con-
struct and the evidence we choose to support these propositions. 
New Possibilities for Theory Classification and Analysis 
I have constructed a new typological system along the lines 
suggested by Wallace, a system to compare how authors who group 
together in reference to one dimension may or may not group together 
on another. 
To do this I have classified theorists on six separate dimensions 
(with four to eight variables each); 1) the abstract subject focus of 
sociology; 2) abstract methodological strategies; 3) groups used as 
units and objects of analysis; 4) group processes analyzed; 5) principle 
data-gathering techniques; and 6) observational categories. Examining 
the typology as a whole and comparing the similarities and differences 
between the six dimensions considered separately, I can discuss if there 
are indeed fairly cohesive paradigms (as Ritzer claims) or if sociology 
is still in a much more fluid state (as Wallace implies). This pro-
cedure also locates the mavericks--although the typology alone cannot 
tell us whether they are paradigm bridgers who transcend traditional 
broundaries or simple eclectics who have not developed a coherent 
thought system. To make that distinction, I have examined a few 
specific analytical problems as approached by mavericks and by main-
liners. 
Obviously one's choice of theorists (or more specifically theo-
retical works) constitutes another important set of variables. The 
classification begins with twenty-five works that appear to represent 
a cross-section of sociological thought to date. Some are classics 
commonly accepted within the discipline; some are typical examples of 
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trends we often cite as major directions in the field. With this 
initial group I have established a basic set of types locating both 
typical and atypical theorists. Later I can select additional groups 
of theorists who--according to the ideas of various other classifiers--
should belong to different types, for example, "priests" to compare 
with "prophets" (Friedrichs) and "causal analysts" to compare with 
"structuralists" (Mullins), and stratification theorists to compare 
with community researchers (Nisbet). But even with my initial group 
of twenty-five, I can discuss theoretical contrasts and continuities 
among theorists in terms of the trait variables used to identify types 
of theory. 
In sum, I am using a classification system to determine whether 
philosophy-of-science variables can define clusters of theorists, 
whether these clusters hold constant or 'Shift with different theoretical 
dimensions, and whether extra-theoretical forces {political ideology, 
structural group, substantive interest) affect these clusters. 
CHAPTER II 
VARIABLES FOR A THEORY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 
aefore examining the nature and significance of classifications 
in sociological theory, we face the critical tasks of choosing vari-
ables for the classifications themselves and determining what groups of 
theorists we should attempt to classify. Bailey (1973a; 1975) emphasized 
the importance of variable selection--an aspect of typology building 
which is still far more art than science. Nevertheless, in efforts to 
routinize the process, typologists have developed two approaches. Work-
ing from the data, Hadden and Borgatta (1965) could profile different 
kinds of American cities with a factor analysis of their structural 
properties. Udy (1958), in contrast, used the ideal traits of Weber's 
bureaucracy to discover related characteristics and to distinguish 
different kinds of bureaucracy that adhered more closely to one cluster 
of traits than to another. Both approaches have proved fruitful, but 
each has its limitations. The "data up" strategy presupposes a large 
supply of likely variables--a collection at least roughly approximating 
a "known universe" of variables from which we may select a sample (D. 
L. Wallace, 1968). And the "theory down" approach presupposes a well 
articulated theory in the area. 
Since we have not developed a listing for theoretical constructs 
!tan ideal type of the ideal theory, this typology will use a modified 
Version of the "theory down" approach by borrowing ideas about what 
various authors think--theoretically speaking--a theoretical construct 
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must be. To begin, if science requires both methods and observation, 
rule of procedure and events to observe (Wallace, 1971:13-24), then the 
typology should include ideas about the scientific strategy and subject 
matter of sociology. If we assume that extraneous factors--especially 
social-structural forces--affect the growth of all social knowledge 
including sociology, then the classification should also draw from the 
sociology of sociology literature for variables. 
In the next few sections, I will review some key issues in the 
philosophy of science which a theory typology should include and then 
outline some current ideas in the sociology of sociology to suggest how 
the typology could--in a limited degree--test these ideas. 
Traits of Sociological Theory: Implications from 
the Philosophy of Science 
During the nineteenth-century, both philosophers and sociologists 
debated the nature of sociology as a subject matter and as a research 
strategy, speculating whether such a discipline was intellectually 
legitimate, what its boundaries might be, how it could utilize scientific 
procedures. In an effort to avoid resurrecting the dead controversies of 
the past or pursuing the academic fads of the present, I chose some per-
ennial issues that have bedeviled sociology from the nineteenth-century 
to this day, issues like the nineteenth-century debate about the advan-
tages of "cultural" versus "positivistic" social science that recurs 
today in the work of ethnomethodologists and the rigorously "objective" 
technicians. Perhaps such issues live only in recurrent speculations 
about theory and in controversies among technical methodologists rather 
than in the work of research theorists. This is an important empirical 
question. As Rex (1961:1-3) noted, the philosophy of science should be 
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a descriptive discipline as well as a normative one; if procedures do 
not work in research, they should not be part of the philosophically 
respectable principles. For the purpose of establishing classifica-
tions in the first place, however, I assume the philosophy-of-science 
categories do describe practices widely used in sociology. Later, the 
presence or absence of empty cells in the data matrix can settle this 
empirical question. To supplement the philosophical categories for 
"cultural" science and other abstract ideas, I have also included some 
variables describing the actual practices of sociologists in more con-
crete detail. So this section will review several sets of variables: 
first, abstract ideas about the basic subject matter of sociology and 
abstract ideas about basic methodological strategies; then some more 
concrete qualities, namely, the principle social groups, key pro-
cesses within these groups, techniques for observing these processes, 
and the principle observational dimensions used in this observation. 
Dimension One: The Abstract 
Subject Focus of Sociology 
From its inception sociology has entertained controversy about 
its subject matter. Although they all agreed that sociology studied 
groups in society, nineteenth-century theorists disagreed, often 
bitterly, about the exact subject area of the new science, sometimes 
quarreling with all the grace of rival gang members eyeing two blocks 
of disputed "turf." These debates were not merely verbal squabbles. 
First, these disputes weighed the differences between natural sciences 
and cultural (unnatural?) ones. Second, they delineated sociology in 
its relationships with other social or cultural sciences. In both 
instances, they reflected the desire of sociologists to create a "real" 
science, a science that somehow adhered to the idea standards used by 
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Newton two centuries before. For my classifications, I have chosen 
four perennial issues that describe different directions in sociology: 
the "interpretive" versus "positivistic" approach; the use of socio-
logical explanations versus psychological ones; the view of the total 
social system versus relationships within the system; and the distinc-
tion between equilibrium and time dimensions. Each of these issues 
centers on a chronic tension in the field; in empirical work a researcher 
must often favor one position over the other even if he believes both 
are theoretically correct. Further, each of these issues has inspired 
controversial haggling like the old arguments about whether the "real" 
sociology must be quantitative or qualitative. But here we will con-
aider them simply as tensions that have informed our discipline from its 
beginning. 
Interpretive and Positivistic 
Conceptions of Social Life 
Helmut Wagner (1963) has identified the division between positiv-
iatic sociologists who stress objective, detached observation and inter-
pretive sociologists who emphasize·verstehen or some other "understand-
1ng" as the principle enduring division within the field. This dis-
tinction began when nineteenth-century historians questioned whether a 
scientific approach could hope to capture the essential geist of a 
social milieu. This doubt really probed the very nature of science. 
Is science a set of techniques designed to record, measure, and explain 
only those objects that we can reach directly through our senses? Or is 
it an approach to knowledge based on the interpretation of the meanings 
1n such data? If science is such a set of techniques, then we are con-
fined to studies that record and measure very concrete objects like the 
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composition of water and the frequency of church attendance. If it is 
an approach to knowledge, we are challenged by the difficulty of apply-
ing this approach to intangibles like the nature and meaning of religious 
beliefs. There is a third resolution to this controversy. If science 
must be strictly positivistic and if social behavior is incomprehensible 
without subjective interpretations, then there can be no science of 
society. 
Naturally, sociologists fought this third view--either by making 
their research as objective and "scientific" as possible or by recon-
ceptualizing scientific techniques to fit the peculiar data of social 
science. However, even while they argued one side of the issue, early 
sociologists often practiced more moderately. Comte proclaimed sociology 
to be the queen of the positive sciences but he also used this science 
to document (or attempt to document) the growth of a social-mental con-
struct called "consensus." Following Comte's dictums, Durkheim studied 
"things" called "social facts" but often explained these facts with 
interpretive understanding. For example, Durkheim used a Verstehen pro-
cess in Suicide to describe the different rates among divorced men and 
women in terms of what marriage must mean to members of each sex given 
the biases of contemporary society. A woman liberated from an oppres-
·sive marriage, he exp~ained, would be far less inclined to suicide than 
a man removed from his source of stability (Abel, 1970:102-06). Weber, 
in contrast, more fully accepted the challenge of cultural science and 
developed special research strategies to tease out the unspoken, half-
understood meanings inherent in human behavior. Nonetheless, he 
typically began his studies not with mental constructs of individual 
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people nor with cultural beliefs but with the objective activity defining 
the social structure. 
Modern versions of this interpretive-positivistic tension persist 
throughout sociology. However, we can understand their implications best 
by reviewing the extremes. The extreme positivists can depict a world 
determined by functional or causal forces. The group creates these 
forces and man simply responds, perhaps by committing anomie suicide or 
by choosing an ethnocentric circle of friends. In this perspective, the 
identification of subjective states can become an exercise in tautology: 
marginal man "feels marginal." Subjective sociologists can reverse this 
conceptualization to highlight personal input, existential drift, the 
process of experience. They often ignore group structure--revealing a 
subject's reaction toward a half-seen social world. They can tell us 
that people learn to adjust to total institutions without carefully dis-
tinguishing those inmates who enter by choice and those who enter at 
gunpoint. The extreme subjectivists ignore the "outside" world alto-
gether and describe-society as the product of an individual mind. In 
contrast, some objective technical experts avoid focusing on any subject 
matter by specializing in methodology. Their causal models, typologies, 
linear graphs,.and other tools are sometimes constructed and refined 
without explicit reference to the data they are designed to describe or 
explain. In effect the tool can become the subject. 
Social and Psychological Levels 
for Explanatory Variables 
Once they legitimized the concept of social science with a 
special subject matter to be explained, sociologists had to identify 
explanatory categories. Should they explain one group phenomenon in 
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terms of another or should they look for component behavior, for the 
actions of individual persons in social situations? According to Durk-
heim, the appropriate level of analysis must be social: he chose to 
study "phenomena which would not exist if this society did not exist 
and which are what they are only because this society is constituted the 
way it is" (1900:363). Tarde, in contrast, looked .for repetitious 
behavior, specifically, inter-mental communication within groups of 
people leading to imitation of accepted practices and eventually creat-
ing language, law, family structures, and all the other social forms in 
society (1904:137-39). Neither denied the joint importance of both the 
group and the individual. Rather they argued different positions on 
this one basic assumption: Durkhetm examined how individual behavior is 
informed by man's associations within groups and Tarde explored how 
individual behavior creates the group. 
The problem, then, resolves not around whether individual-psycho-
logical forces actually motivate real behavior but whether these vari-
ables should be used to explain social forms. When they use psychological 
explanations, sociologists generally follow one of two approaches: naming 
the kinds of people active in a situation or describing the activity in 
terms of individually motivated interaction. 
The first approach often leads round a circle. As Durkheim 
(1897:59-62) noted long ago, if we explain suicidal behavior by saying 
"these people have a suicidal monomania," we have explained nothing. 
This, in essence, was Pareto's fault when he compared the crafty, inno-
vative "foxes," who excelled in revolutionary times, with the brave, 
loyal, but plodding "lions," who could consolidate an empire but not 
create one. If the elites did not manage to retain their rule during 
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rapidly changing situations, then clearly they were "lions" in a situs-
i d "f II tion that requ re oxes. Similarly, the "foxes" could not hope to 
perform the painstaking tasks required for maintaining a stable regime; 
in such situations, "lions" would gain control of the administration. 
The other reductionist strategy cannot be dismissed so easily. 
Romans has combined reductionism with behavioralism for explaining social 
groups--and ultimately social institutions--as networks of activity per-
formed by individual humans who seek rewards and pay the costs. Logic-
ally, we must agree with Romans' main strategy (Webster, 1973). Just as 
thermodynamics can be reduced to statistical mechanics, so we may be 
able to reduce group behavior to reward-cost principles. Empirically, 
however, we may question whether this activity is worthwhile. Clearly, 
the "rewards" and "costs" vary with size, history, and other special 
group aspects. Discovering additional propositions to link individual 
reward-cost action with group properties may cost so much of our time 
that we will not value the reward of additional understanding. Consider, 
for example, how a national leader (a king like Henry II of England) 
might effect a major judicial reform. Romans suggests that Henry II 
must have borrowed heavily from his "social capital" when he deployed 
his own circuit judges to outlying baronial courts. Why else would the 
nobles allow the king to assume their power? Henry must have traded his 
social capital with individual nobles in exchange for conformity to his 
newly established norms (1974:365-66). 
This may be true. But whatever the personal exchange Henry may 
have effected between himself and each individual noble, he drew his 
basic capital from one source: he had won the war and he obviously had 
the ability to impose his peace on the country. In short, Henry could 
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make non-conformity prohibitively expensive. If we wish to explore why 
each noble decided to obey, we could resurrect local chronicles, court 
judges, and other records to examine the exchange between Leicester and 
Henry. However, if we wish to explore the perquisites of power or the 
prerequisites of judicial reform, we might find it more efficient to 
count bow often and under what circumstances a man like Henry gets his 
way. 
Holistic-Synthetic 
Conceptualizations 
and Relational-
Analytic Ones 
Like the two issues already reviewed, the choice between de-
scribing a social whole and separating it into parts, began in the nine-
teenth-century efforts to legitimize a science of society and continues, 
with a modern emphasis, in today's sociology. 
At first many sociologists hoped to use state-of-the-system as an 
explanatory variable. Comte and Spencer borrowed biological concepts to 
study a social "organism." Both hoped to explain social relations in 
terms of societal needs during a particular evolutionary stage much as 
we can explain heart action in terms of its contribution supporting 
higher forms of life. However, whole-to-part analysis breaks down 
several related areas. To begin, the Weltansicht of a large whole like 
society probably does not explain the values that inform daily practice 
in some local region, unless we can assume that the same ideals exist 
everywhere regardless of the local economy, regardless of the vicissi-
tudes of local history, local political customs, and all those other 
forces that may encourage regional differences. Furthermore, we cannot 
avoid circular reasoning if we insist on-understanding the parts solely 
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in terms of the whole. If, for example, we use Cooley's definition of 
primary group as a collection of people who engage in intimate face-to-
face contact and then hypothesize that intimate contact creates the pri-
mary group, we are really taking two parts of a definition and analyz-
ing them as if they were separate entities. If, by definition, we 
declare the whole to be a single piece understandable only as a whole, 
we have no way of comparing the relative importance of variables or con-
ditions which limit variables within this whole. We cannot judge, for 
instance, whether intimate emotional feelings depend more on how often 
people see each other or how many interests they have in common. Finally, 
when we choose large, complex wholes like the ones Comte studied, we must 
select from a limited number of cases. Biologists can look at thousands 
of one-celled animals, but Comte could only observe one.Western Europe. 
Bow could he judge which societal traits were important, which merely 
accidental? 
In order to avoid these problems many sociologists analyzed part 
of a social situation (much as an astronomer would isolate planetary 
motion from all the other facets of the universe). These analytic 
sociologists recognized group coherence, a cohesive force. So, instead 
of examining the entire situation at once, these sociologists looked at 
the patterns of cohesion, that is, at social interaction as a cause, a 
process, or a result linked to other features in the social setting. 
However, this analysis can abstract too much and focus on action far 
removed from a specific situation. When Park studied patterns of neigh-
borhood change, he was actually observing neighborhood change in Chicago 
during the 1920s. Later research on population shifts in other cities 
and other eras revealed how time and place affected this pattern 
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far more than Park had originally thought. 
Modern sociologists have often defined their subject matter both 
in terms of the system as a whole and the relationships within it. They 
have learned to escape tautological circles by either tracing the causal 
paths of specific relationships or by tying the system activities to 
extra-system forces. Furthermore, they have studied a variety of systems, 
not just society but primary groups, communities and formal organizations. 
Buckley (1967:38) called the modern system concept "organized complexity 
--defined as a collection of entities interconnected by a complex network 
of relations." Rex (1961:50-59) placed individual relations within such 
systems; the system provides "sustaining activities" to support inter-
personal behavior. Our daily relationships depend on expectations, norms: 
we pay our taxes; we do our jobs; we love our children in large part 
because we act within a network of institutional structures for govern-
ment, economy, family. In a different system, with different sustaining 
activites, we would act differently. 
Thus, "system" and "relationship" have become two complementary 
ways to conceptualize the subject matter of our research, not two inde-
pendent objects for study. We can concentrate on the "sustaining" 
mechanisms or on the relationships made possible because of this whole. 
One final point needs consideration. The holistic focus implies 
--butdoes not necessitate--certain corollaries. If we view the entire 
group, we tend to look for balanced relationships, for equilibrium. 
Thus we examine cooperation and define conflict as pathology or system 
disturbance. Similarly we concentrate on stability and define change as 
"growth" or rearrangement in the balanced system. Marx, however, studied 
total systems in rapid change powered by conflict. He identified the 
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economic institutions alternately as forces to maintain equilibrium 
through exploitation of lower-class groups and as forces for revolution 
when these groups inevitably rebel. 
The Study of Equilibrium 
and Development 
At root, change is the subject matter of sociology. The disci-
pline began when social thinkers tried to formulate an intellectual 
response to the problems of the Industrial and French Revolutions (Nisbet, 
1966). None of them could deny the fact of sweeping societal change. 
Comte traced the evolving patterns of intellectuality in a society shift-
ing from theological to metaphysical to positivistic modes of consensus. 
Spender described increasing complexity in a developing organism--or was 
it a changing species?--producing ever more sophisticated forms of coordi-
nation. Marx detailed economic pressures erupting in political upheaval. 
In a later generation Park studied changes--and patterns of similarity--
brought to a community by immigration. But somehow, while observing the 
small-scale recurrent changes of invasion and succession within each 
neighborhood, he lost sight of the changes that transformed the community 
as a whole. 
Herein lies the problem of research into social change: change must 
be studied as the "take off" from some equilibrium (Blalock, 1969:76-77). 
Consequently, sociologists often concentrate on the equilibrium itself or 
assume equilibrium while looking at one, limited facet of internal change. 
For example, Durkheim explored the correlates of mechanical and organic 
society in depth: two end points, one might call them ideal types of 
stability, flanking industrial modernization. And Park watched Jews, 
Poles, Italians, Irishmen invading Chicago neighborhoods without docu-
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senting the expanding job market, massive population growth, and other 
changes that made the situation of the 1920s immigrant from Europe quite 
dissimilar to the plight of today's arrival from the south, the reserva-
tion, or the islands. 
Blalock (1969:106-26) suggests that the difficulties of develop-
mental studies are less conceptual than empirical. Although we all 
recognize the fact of change and the technical sophisticates among us 
can even apply calculus, time-series analysis, or other mathematical 
tools to models of change, we cannot measure the changing situations 
themselves, at least not as accurately as Blalock's techniques would 
require. Discussing the study of development in anthropology, Nadel 
(1957:125-52) recommended longitudinal studies lasting over a generation. 
Only with long-term views can we separate the "changes" that are mere 
recurrent patterns in an equilibrium from the trends than actually 
rearrange the social structure. Hauser et al. (1975) demonstrate the 
yield we could expect from a developmentally oriented study of short-
term process in modern society. They assessed American social mobility 
studies in the light of United States history. Sociologists who simply 
concentrate on the patterns of father-son mobility find great change, 
a generation of sons climbing the stratification ladder. However, when 
Hauser and associates evaluated the occupations of each generation in 
terms of what occupations meant in the social systea of the day, they 
found much less "mobility" than appears when we assume an equilibrium of 
stratification lasting during the entire father-son process. Thus, the 
problem is not deciding if we want equilibrium or developmental studies 
but rather discovering how to combine the two for a proper assessment of 
social change. 
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The various issues considered here do not revolve around whether 
we should choose a subjective over an objective subject matter or prefer 
an equilibrium to a developmental viewpoint. They center, instead, on 
whether we ~ study social life as we wish. Polemics aside--sociologists 
seem to be making a series of compromises: some deciding that subjective 
states cannot be measured, leaving us to explore objective behavior; 
others naming subjective states as the true subject matter of sociology 
to be explored no matter how crude our measurements. 
Dimension Two: The Abstract Methodological 
Strategies of Sociology 
No matter how intangible or obvious the subject matter, whatever 
the group or its problems, in some way the sociological enterprise must 
tell us about the empirical world (Popper, 1958:40-41). For this 
empirical validation sociologists use a combined research strategy of 
find the social patterns that do occur and looking for those that do 
not. 
Verifying the existence of an empirical phenomenon can mean dis-
covering if it occurs anywhere. For example, Sumner asserted that 
almost any behavior, no matter how bizarre, will be sanctioned by some 
soeity, somewhere. Because the discovery of approved wife-swapping in 
eastern Utopia proves the existence of this practice as accepted behavior, 
Sumner could support his claim about bizarre norms by describing the 
sexual customs, dietary habits, kinship patterns, and other types of 
behavior routinely practiced in various societies. Thus, one illustra-
tive example of any approved custom or type of customs sufficed to prove 
its existence and support Sumner's hypothesis. However, we often want 
to verify a universal condition instead of a single example. For these 
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statements, when we are not in a position to survey the entire universe 
of possibilities, falsification (Popper, 1959:68-70, 112-13) often 
proves the better strategy. To verify the hypothesis "Wife-swapping is 
beyond the universal pale," we would need to search all groups for the 
absence of such approved behavior; to falsify, we need only find one con-
trary example. 
In actual practice (with problems considerably more complex) the 
two approaches shade into each other; we verify the existence of a 
theoretically important relationship; we falsify alternative explana-
tions; we try to falsify a critical point (Kaplan, 1964:35-39; Zerrer-
berg, 1965:104-11). Durkheim's Suicide provides the classic example. 
First, we traced a relationship between suicide and various "solidarity" 
measures. Then he falsified climate, nationality and other alternatives. 
Finally, he chose a special group, the urban, educated Jews, who accord-
ing to his solidarity hypothesis should have enjoyed low suicide rates 
but according to other measures should not. In short, he risked falsi-
fying a central tenet in his theory. When his solidarity predictions 
proved true, this attempt at falsification provided strong support for 
~his ideas (Madge, 1962). However, even if his ideas had failed this 
test, Durkheim would probably have sought additional ones. In sociology, 
with complex relationships and weak measures (especially of "interpretive" 
concepts), we cannot rely on either verification or falsification in a 
single test (Rex, 1961:18-22). 
Clearly, then, our research strategy requires a subtle combination 
of logic and fact-gathering--with no universal consensus on the one right 
way. Nonetheless, methods, or rules of procedure, have become a measure 
for judging scientific conclusions (Wallace, 1971:13-16). In this classi-
32 
fication, I will consider four recurring polarities that define the 
abstract nature of this procedure: analytic-inductive versus formal-
deductive approaches; categoric and propositional explanations; sampling 
from the average case or the universal example; prediction versus 
understanding. 
Analytic-Inductive and Formal-
Deductive Strategies 
Should science describe networks of relationships or should it 
list key principles along with deduced propositions? This question -
weighing inductive and deductive reasoning has puzzled sociologists 
from the earliest days of our discipline. Following Bacon's precepts 
many nineteenth-century sociologists hoped to build scientific prin-
ciples on a base of numerous simple empirical generalizations (Rex, 
1961:10). Spencer and Sumner, for example, built huge data collections 
(anticipating the Human Relations Area Files) to serve as sources for 
sociological theory. Others preached a doctrine of positivism: obser-
vation without philosophical preconceptions. Induction, however, is 
not an inference from data into the unknown. The scientist has some 
preconceptions about his planned research ranging from a general pre-
ference for some subject material to a tight-knit deductive system with 
very explicit predictions about what the empirical world will reveal. 
And, if the nineteenth-century heritage prescribed scientific induction, 
it also provided several overarching frameworks for analysis. Some 
frameworks specified the outline of the empirical world: "Society is 
like a large organism ••• " Coupled with the injunction to work 
inductively, this reasoning led to such contradictory conceptualiza-
tiona as "positive organicism" {Martindale, 1960:52-53). Other frame-
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works stressed the form of scientific statement: "Scientific generaliza-
tions should follow from basic principles." As we shall see shortly, 
this reasoning also leads to its own variety of distortion. 
But for the moment consider induction. In crude form, induction 
piles facts into an unordered collection of two-variable propositions 
or factor clusters (Reynolds, 1971:140-44). Properly executed it con-
structs concatenated theory (Kaplan, 1964:298-99) describing a configu-
ration or pattern of relationships, presenting explanation through our 
comprehension of these patterns (Kaplan, 1964:332-35; Hansen, 1958:4-
30). When Park observed intergroup relations in the city, he argued 
from migration patterns and life style to a series of propositions 
about invasion, succession and other process stages within "natural" 
areas. He began with a pattern of behavior--actually a pattern sug-
gested by his ideas about biological-social processes; no theory is 
totally inductive--then he used the observed pattern to describe natural 
areas and their changes within the city. As Park's work illustrates, 
induction always requires a non-logical act, a creative leap from the 
familiar data into ••• error? Glaser and Straus (1967:1-18) advocate 
"grounded theory," theory both generated and refined through contact 
with data during the course of research. Huber (1973), in contrast, 
·argues that "emergent theory" is peculiarly vulnerable to bias intro-
duced during research by both the worker and the people being observed. 
Hence the continual search for a complimentary deductive frame-
work--borrowed from biology, systems theory, classical logic, statis-
tics; with concepts ranging from organic analogies to Boolean sets. 
The goal is always explanation. Inductive analysis presents a pattern 
for our understanding. Deductive reasoning lists key principles, 
~ 
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derives propositions, and demonstrates how these propositions describe 
empirical life (including the patterns that originated the theory in the 
first place). In effect, it organizes our thought by specifying the 
form of our statements instead of the shape of the empirical world. 
When Simmel described the role of the poor, the patterns of conflict, 
and the interaction of the stranger, he outlined logical possibilities 
and then combined experience with historical examples to illustrate 
patterns: "Looking at the poor in a society which believes in equal 
justice, we find • Looking at the poor in a society which believes 
in charity to gain spiritual merit for the benefactor, we find •••• " 
Simmel deduced propositions from a rigorous listing of possible 
events. Sociologists have long employed more sophisticated tools of 
logic, mathematics, and other deductive methods with success. Durkheim's 
use of statistics, for example, enabled him to analyze deductive propo-
sitions about mortality in various areas (even though he did not run 
tests for significance as we would do with such data). Our problem is 
simply to avoid becoming so beguiled by these tools that we mistake the 
structure of thought for the structure of data. Combining statistics 
with classical logic, we might say: 
There is a one-hundred per cent probability that all men will die; 
Socrates is a man; 
Therefore, there is a one-hundred per cent probability that 
Socrates will die, making a true, if trivial, statement. But what if we 
change the second line to "God is a man"? This raises many, many issues 
about the existence and nature of something called "God," about the 
information value of formal propositions, about the relationship between 
formal correctness and substantive validity, even though we could com-
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plete the syllogism with a logically correct conclusion: "There is a one-
hundred per cent probability that God will die." 
In sum, models, formal reasoning, and other deductive tools can 
guide the logic of our thought, but cannot replace inductive "social 
theories" phrased in "ordinary language" (Movahedi and Ogles, 1973). 
Typical Sampling and Sampling 
from Universal Conditions 
Whether we proceed inductively or deductively, we must sample 
data from the universe of possibilities choosing either data "average" 
for its universe or data that fits some universal condition. The real 
problem is a choice between generalization and abstraction. As Willer 
(1967:97-115) notes, a survey of cows, even a cross-cultural survey, 
will yield a generalization that the "average" cow in this area, at 
this time has 3.999 legs. To explore the nature of cows, or religious 
beliefs, or economic structures, we could do better by developing an 
idea of group traits under certain universal conditions and then 
examining some occasions when the conditions hold true. In other words, 
he argues, we are not looking for a generalized description of life at 
a time and in a place but for a set of abstract universal conditions. 
We do not want to describe the path of an American billiard ball but to 
learn how billiard balls and rockets both behave as objects moved by a 
particular types of force (Willer, 1973:23). To research such universal 
problems we should list our abstract conditions and select samples that 
fit, first verifying if our idea has any validity, then falsifying the 
conditions outside of its scope (1967:97-115). 
Despite its limitations, the typical-sampling strategy seems very 
attractive. Working in a science without a single unifying theory --
often without theoretical agreement on a specific limited subject matter--
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we need to build from data, view the possibilities, and later, construct 
ideas based on those. Durkhetm argued for this strategy when he sug-
gested normal cases as a basis for all further comparisons with deviance, 
social change and other non-average events (Rex, 1961:8-10). This 
strategy identifies some particular situation as the normal one. But 
on what criteria? Durkhetm never satisfactorily answered that question. 
Instead he developed theories about "normal" types of society, "normal" 
levels of deviance, "normal" forms of law, "normal" modes of religious 
expression. Although Durkheim' s theory recognized changes in the normal 
mode, his research practice, with some exceptions like his analysis of 
suicide, measured the average at some point in time and assessed social 
change as an abnormal deviation. 
Weber and Simmel, in contrast, began with theoretical outlines of 
the special conditions under which an event might occur. In Stmmel's 
ideal-type flirtation, for instance, a couple interacts with ritualized 
patterns of mutual flattery, coy shyness, and other amorous tricks best 
plaed by those who do not have serious intentions. Simmel was not pri-
marily interested in flirtation, nineteenth-century manners, or even 
social interaction at parties. He wanted to examine interaction between 
two people in situations when the form took precedence over content; 
flirtation, aimless party chitchat, courtly rituals, all provided sample 
illustrations of interaction under this condition. 
The arguments for such abstractions over generalizations grow from 
the physics model of science: if we could only list the proper variables 
and control them, we could predict behavior (Rex, 1961:15-22). Sociolo-
gists like Lundberg, who favored the positivistic approach to subject 
matter assessed the problem in terms of measurement. When we learn to 
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aeasure economic pressure as well as the physicists measure wind 
velocity, we can make predictions about economic man (Lundberg, 1939: 
140). However, sociology is not physics. It is not just the complexity 
of our subject matter and the problems of measuring such complexity that 
vitiate a Lundberg-style analysis. We must also account for the non-
material forces within our subject. The subjective-interpretive 
sociologists like Weber could approach the problem by substituting 
ideal types (of subjective-human orientations) for a list of purely 
objective universal conditions. 
But even with ideal types, sociology has not developed the sys-
tematic theory needed to list universal conditions before we completely 
adopt Willer's analysis by abstraction to replace the more widely 
used analysis by generalization. 
Analysis with Type Concepts and 
Directly Propositional Analysis 
Scientific analysis must account for relationships between 
variables. However, the variables themselves often cluster within 
larger theoretical concepts, often concepts so broad we really cannot 
assess their relationship to other social features without subdividing 
the concept into type-combinations of variables. Or we may build types 
by combining variables; for example, in a two-by-two table "type A" 
could possess the first variable but not the second; "type B" could 
represent both variables in interaction; and so on (Stinchcombe, 1968: 
38-47). Either way the type provides a parsimonious summary of vari-
ables (Wallace, 1971:101-06). 
Such types prove useful in a variety of ways. First, by pro-
viding a handy label--saying "vertibrate" is easier than saying "a 
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member of the group of animals with segmented spinal columns or with a 
more primitive form of backbone;" discussing "bureaucracy" is easier 
than listing the hierarchy of control, written rules, and other vari-
ables associated with this type of authority. Beyond that, types 
become the variables in hypotheses. For example, we may analyze the 
tmportance of bureaucracy in contemporary life without separating each 
feature and considering it individually. Or we may use categoric 
analysis to bring ourselves to the conceptual middle-ground between &11 
authority figures and a particular one--like Nixon; knowing he exercised 
rational-legal authority (and knowing the characteristics of that type) 
helps us explain why he retained his ability to command long after his 
personal credibility had collapsed. 
Early use of subdivision classification demonstrates some of the 
problems inherent in this methodology. When Linnaeus outlined the 
biological world, he began with a finite universe of identifiable 
objects. True, some species had not been discovered yet and even today 
such life forms as the virus puzzle the classification experts. None-
theless, deciding whether the object in hand could be called a "bird" 
is considerably easier than determining if the behavior on the front 
lawn is a "social fact" or if a particular collection of people and 
.customs constitutes a society (Rex, 1961 :4-15). Furthermore, biological 
categories do not vary as much as social ones in their most interesting 
features. Once we have identified a cat, we can expect it to have the 
blood composition and musculature characteristic of cats. But inter-
personal behavior--the human trait that truly interests sociologists--
varies widely. Knowledge of the type provides an overview, perhaps a 
set of probabilities, but not knowledge of individual cases (Blalock, 
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1969:143-147). Comte misconceived this relationship between the indi-
vidual and the type when he tried to explain everyday life in terms of 
evolutionary stages. Proper understanding of the advanced theological 
stage, Comte might have told us, will illuminate most of the charac-
teristic behavior in a fourteenth-century French village. However, as 
Blalock would argue, the Weltansicht of an entire continent probably 
does not explain the values that inform daily practice in some local 
region, unless we can assume that the same ideals exist everywhere 
regardless of the local economy, regardless of the vicissitudes of 
local history, the local political customs, all those specific group 
features that encourage regional differences. Comte recognized this 
but hoped to investigate the whole thoroughly enough to delineate the 
parts. Durkhefm, who understood the problem more fully than Comte, 
eventually defined his types as very mixed bags indeed. For example, 
in the Division of Labor he used repressive and restitutive law for 
indices of mechanical and organic solidarity in his types of society. 
By the time he wrote Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, he had 
identified national loyalties as a necessary source of continued repre-
aive law and mechanical feelings even in the most organic society. 
Thus types provide a measure for a specific case against the 
·typical one, or for explaining a particular situation in terms of the 
typical pattern, but they do not yield predictions about the detailed 
specifics of any individual or subgroup fitting within a type. 
The variable-combination types also serve best as guides to 
possibilities rather than empirical predictors. One can always take 
two (or more) variables, list their possible combinations, and label 
the results a typology. But, without theory, these typologies tell us 
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little. In fact, some of the most informative ones were not developed 
empirically. Merton's "anomie" scheme, for one, maps out some possible 
ways people respond when society provides unequal access to treasured 
goals and appropriate means. On the other hand, he never calculated 
how many people will choose innovation over ritualism; he never truly 
explained why. Nonetheless, this typology has inspired research on the 
causes of delinquency (the "why" may be function of neighborhood oppor-
tunities) and provided one theoretical rationale for the War on Poverty 
(which attempted to restructure opportunities). Parsons also built a 
suggestive typology with his pattern variables. In theoretical com-
bination, the five pairs would produce thirty-two "types." In empirical 
reality a few type cells appear important while the others remain 
empty; the affectively neutra~ person tends to stress universalistic 
standards rendering the neutral-particularistic combination unlikely, 
and so on. 
In conclusion, categoric analysis is just a special case of pro-
positional analysis. We simply begin by building types for a parsimo-
nious summary of several variables and only then do we state proposi-
tions about the relationship of variables within the type or the rela-
tionship of the type-as-a-variable to other outside features (see Basu 
·and Kenyon, 1972, for a slightly different view of "causality versus 
typology" analysis). 
Prediction and Explanation 
We often think of prediction as a natural goal of science. With 
scientific procedures we should review past and present patterns in 
order to predict future ones. But as Dubin (1969:9-25) explained, pre-
diction often requires empirical variables precisely defined to calcu-
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late specific empirical results; in contrast, explanation uses theoreti-
cal constructs to elicit broad understanding about why events occur. If 
a settled, well-kept community wants to plan school buildings, shopping 
malls, and similar practical matters for the next twenty years, it can 
hire a demographer to estimate population changes likely with such givens 
as housing stock, migration patterns and birth rates. A community with 
large old houses peopled by elderly couples can anticipate an influx of 
young families whose children will overfill the schools, whose teenagers 
will overtax the police department, whose housewives will ignore the 
store's fine linen section and ask for toddler's clothes instead. Given 
these variables we can anticipate these results But, this pre-
dictive knowledge does not explain middle-class attitudes toward educa-
tion, the causes of juvenile delinquency, or patterns of concumption. 
On the other hand, understanding does not necessarily yield predictions. 
'When Homans said "liking increases with the frequency of interaction," 
he explained a phenomenon that occurs on the job, during courtship, in 
the army unit. He identified the broad relationship between two single 
variables in understandable terms. But as we add complicating variables, 
his predictions prove untrue. The partners in a marriage gone bad 
interact more than they did in the early days of courtship; hostile 
. racial groups often confirm their prejudices and increase hatred when 
. they encounter each other during riots, street incidents, and even on 
such neutral settings as the job. Clearly we need other variables--
like friendliness or equal-status contact--to predict an actual situa-
tion. Even though Homans' basic statement alone provides some under-
standing of the interaction. 
Sociologists are still trying to combine prediction with under-
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standing. Axiomatic theorists, among others, often combine prediction 
and process statements. Consider two of Zetterberg's statements about 
authority {discussed in Dubin's Theory Building, 1969:23-25). First, 
people in central positions, that is, people who interact more, get 
better knowledge. Second, people with better knowledge can more easily 
issue directives and, therefore, obtain authority. Dubin points out a 
critical distinction between Zetterberg's two statements. The first 
simply predicts a relationship between centrality and knowledge; the 
second predicts a relationship between knowledge and authority mediated 
by a knowledgeable person's ability to issue orders. This explanatory 
comment would be much more difficult to test than the predictive ones. 
In other words, Zetterberg's axiomatic theory lists easily testable 
predictive statements and empirically elusive explanatory ones. Start-
ing with data instead of theory, other theory builders are trying to 
find predictive variables {like the social-policy indicators used in my 
population example) that can be the operational definitions of explana-
tory constructs {Fox, 1974:1-5). 
In spite of these efforts, however, we must often choose between 
research that illuminates the mechanisms of social life and research 
that calculates the results. Since, at present, we must combine the 
.two approaches via separate projects, we must continue to perform 
research doing one or the other very well. 
The four abstract methodological polarities considered here mark 
strategy extremes. Few sociologists would plead for one position at 
the complete cost of the other. However, some would argue that certain 
approaches better suit different stages in scientific development, 
perhaps that deductive theory suits a mature science after it has 
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exhausted the possibilities of inductive reasoning. In my own opinion, 
such speculations re-echo the quantitative/qualitative debates of a few 
decades ago. Modern quantitative descriptions, statistical testing, and 
mathematical models do require more technical sophistication than the 
8 tmplest of qualitative descriptions used by many early sociologists. 
However, qualitative researchers have also become more sophisticated--
only now, instead of investigating all of social life, they prefer to 
concentrate on problems most suited to qualitative techniques. 
Furthermore, whatever their preferences on the abstract subject 
matter and methodology issues, all sociologists study "social impact 
• o • the ways in which the behavior and perceptions of persons are 
developed, changed, confirmed, or controlled by the demonstrable influ-
ence of other persons" (Bosko££, 1972:251-52}. Often we use different 
words--we may study the "functions" of the political machine--but the 
basic conceptualization is causal. If the machine functions to provide 
upward mobility for disreputable, disadvantaged ethnic groups, then, in 
some sense, the machine causes mobility to occur. We may also phrase 
our theories with the non-causal language of logic or mathematics. But, 
the chief axioms assume causal relations and the probability statements 
estimate the likelihood that a cause will operate in a given situation 
(Wallace, 1971:91-101}. 
Defining this term, however, is a difficult matter. Gibbs (1972: 
20-27} briefly reviewed just the sociological literature on causality 
and decided we would better spend our energy trying to study the rela-
tionship than define it. Indeed, even Blalock (1961} in Causal Infer-
ences in Nonexperimental Research did not define the term. Working 
inductively, he observed correlations between forms of objective 
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behavior and assumed the existence of a "cause" or "causal" sequence 
linking the actions. In other words, whatever the ontological reality of 
cause, we look for correlations between two (or more) variables with the 
measuring techniques of science. Then after discovering such correla-
tions, we apply the rules of logic to determine if our idea of "cause" 
seems to be operating in the situation (Hirshi and Selvin, 1967:114-41). 
For example, if certain ethnic groups dominate the upper reaches of the 
political machine, we may call "proper" group membership a necessary 
cause of success. 
Thus, our search for the causes and effects of "social impact" is 
circumscribed by the techniques and reasoning of science. In a later 
section, I will review a few methodological specifics of data gathering 
and observation. But first, a brief section on the places where causal 
impact may be observed and the particular causal problems that most 
interest sociologists. 
Dimension Three: Groups Used 
as Sites of Analysis 
Reviewing some concrete aspects of subject matter--if sociology 
examines the "social impact" of persons over each other, where does the 
impact occur and what form does it take? Social life must be empiri-
cally grounded, that is, it must occur within a group or aggregate of 
'interacting, interdependent people ranging from the dyad to the society. 
Once these groups have been identified, crucial theoretical elements 
may be abstracted for analysis. Group structure delimits the types of 
values people seek. Participation in a group creates the basis and the 
potential for achieving goals, and each social group carries unique con-
sequences for its members in their pursuit of values. 
Thinking of the total society as a system with sustaining activities, 
45 
ve can identify generic groups. Parsons (1959:17-21) located such groups 
when he analyzed society to find the organizational levels that sustained 
social life by filling system needs (as he had defined these needs in his 
AGIL scheme). The primary-technical level performs all functions but 
stresses adaptive ones. The managerial level coordinates primary units, 
thus serving pattern-maintenance and integrative functions. The societal 
level takes major responsibility for goal-attainment. Between society and 
the two lower levels lies the integrative institutional structure which 
legitimizes and coordinates the managerial level. Shifting from organiza-
tional levels to groups, we can easily identify the primary group, formal 
organizations, and society itself. But what is the group-equivalent of 
the institutional structure? I would suggest the community. In primitive 
times society was coterminous with community. Even today, the major insti-
tutional forms grow and operate within a community. It is here, in his 
community that the average man "integrates" with society. 
We can find empirical support for this theoretical speculation in 
actual research projects and in analysis of research work. For example, 
in his pioneering work on social disorganization. W. I. Thomas identified 
the familial primary group, the ethnic-immigrant community, and ethnic 
organizations as the institutionalized groups supporting--or failing to 
support--societal culture (1927:57-86). When Janowitz (1965:73-74) dis-
cussed social mobility, he identified it as one aspect of societal change 
which "at a minimum" also affects "primary groups, community structures, 
and large-scale or bureaucratic organization." Thorough analysis, he 
concluded, must include all four groups. Recently Boskoff (1972:254-55) 
reviewed the major trends in sociology and listed the same four groups as 
those that recur throughout social research. He also indicated that 
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theorists concentrating on the various group levels tend to emphasize 
different problems and to observe them with different variables. 
We can conclude, therefore, that whatever the social activity 
under consideration, we search these groups for variables either using 
the group as a source of independent variables (a unit of analysis) or as 
a source of dependent variables (an object of analysis): (1) the primary 
group; (2) the complex or large-scale organization; (3) the community; 
(4) the total society. 
In other words, I am suggesting, sociological ideas vary with the 
group under consideration. Furthermore, the theorist who uses the same 
group as both the unit and the object of analysis will produce quite 
different theories from those of a thinker who examines the relationships 
between different groups. 
Dimension Four: Group Process-
Problems Analyzed 
Regardless of the particular groups under consideration, most 
theorists recognize a core of key group processes, or from another point 
of view, key theoretical problems to be explained (Bosko££, 1972:252-61): 
1. Group formation--the establishment of boundaries with norms 
and goals; 
2. Differentiation--of specialized skills and values distributed 
in the group; 
3. Socialization--for the transmission of different patterns; 
4. Deviation--either applauded or deplored, in part of the result 
of inadequate socialization; 
5. Coordination--to repress some deviation, to sustain some 
patterns; 
6. Stratification--systems of rewards and opportunities segregating 
different segments of the population; 
7. Innovation--technical, valuational, associational; 
8. Social change--the collective result of innovation. 
Each of these problems works through social processes within a social 
structure: socialization requires the process of internalization often 
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enacted within peer groups; coordination requires power exercised in 
some authority system like bureaucracy. Further, the problems link 
together. Inadequate socialization helps foster deviation which requires 
coordination expressed in a stratification system that, in turn, invites 
innovation • 
Dimension Five: Principle 
Data-Gathering Techniques 
In his analysis, Ritzer (1975) listed four general data-gathering 
techniques: comparative/historical studies; interviews; questionnaires; 
observations; and experiments. Modifying this schema slight, I would 
begin with direct studies of institutional structures--accounts of economic 
practices, for example, but not attitudes toward laissez faire; or analyses 
of crime rates in relation to other institutional features but not accounts 
of how the criminal perceives moral reality. Thus, we use four basic data-
gathering approaches: we examine information about institutional struc-
tures; we assess the thoughts and characteristics of people (as these are 
recorded in interviews, questionnaires, and other individual documeats); 
we observe the behavior that occurs during normal interaction; and we 
manipulate group situations (often in artificial groups) to determine the 
impact of various preconditions on activity within the group. Each of 
these techniques works more efficiently toward different research. goals. 
When Weber traced the economic consequences of the Protestant Ethic, he 
did not conduct a national survey asking people how they applied Sunday 
sermon principles to the market place. He observed the patterns and 
results of capitalistic practices, looked for the causal principles, 
counted whether Protestants also tended to be capitalists. But, Ritzer 
notes, many sociologists interested in similar problems about structure 
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collect data about individuals and many researchers interested in indi-
vidual perceptions collect data about behavior. In other words, socio-
logists with certain overall perspectives tend to prefer certain data-
gathering approaches--but not necessarily the most appropriate ones 
(Ritzer, 1975:67-80). The approaches: (1) direct studies of institu-
tional structures; (2) interviews/questionnaires; (3) observations; 
(4) experiments. 
Dimension Six: Observational 
Categories 
Given the subject matter and general strategies of our discipline, 
how do we find data and decide what data properties to observe? I am not 
asking about the specialized tools--path analysis, latent structure analy-
sis, and the like. These will vary with growing technical proficiency in 
the profession. Instead, I am concerned about the type of methods; the 
problem is not whether an astronomer uses the most powerful telescopic 
equipment to measure light waves from distant stars but whether he tries 
to observe the age and distance of the stars .at all. 
To study the social processes occurring within the between groups, 
we must select a set of observable criteria, conditions that indicate the 
events and states of social relationships. These conditions may be 
specified in terms of the following observational categories: 
1. Material environment (available materials, limiting climatic 
conditions); 
2. Spatial location (ecological patterns, social distance); 
3. Population base (demographic variables as preconditions); 
4. Structural characteristics (technology level, age distribution, 
social mobility, power distribution, and other features of the 
group that directly affect routine patterns of interaction); 
5. Social characteristics (class, ethnicity, religious identifi-
cation, other background traits of individuals or groups); 
6. Cultural products (symbols, inventions, laws, beliefs). 
In sum, the typology will build on six variable dimensions: 1) the 
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abstract subject focus of sociology; 2) abstract methodological stra~egies; 
l) groups used as units and objects of analysis; 4) the group processes 
analyzed; 5) principle data-gathering techniques; and 6) observational 
categories. Using these six sets of variables, I will classify and con-
trast a number of major theoretical works in sociology comparing them 
across the entire sample of variables and making selected comparisons 
between different dimensions. With these comparisons, I hope to answer a 
series of questions such as: Do the people who share the subject-matter 
frameworks also share a research strategy? Are either related to the choice 
of group processes explained or variables observed? Do types of techniques 
correlate with the problems studied? 
Traits of Sociological Theory: Research HyPotheses 
To begin, the issues I have discussed include a few basic assumptio•s 
and lead to some elementary hypotheses about the nature and distribution of 
sociological paradigms: 
Assumption.--Science is selective; each theorist chooses from aspects 
of the available subject matter and methodology for a particular research 
project. 
Hypothesis !a.--Theory-research works can be classified according to 
their subject matter and methodology. 
HyPOthesis !b.--Natural classes or paradigms will remain fairly con-
stant even when separate dimensions of the typology are considered inde-
pendently. 
Alternative.--Since the variables have not been weighed, the most 
important dimensions (items that involve a theorist's overall perspective) 
have no more impact on the classification than the minor variables. If the 
different dimensions yield different classifications, this problem must be 
explored. 
so 
In a limited sense, I am asking: Do paradigms exist in sociology? 
Kuhn himself doubted this. When Masterman (1970:74) analyzed Kuhn's 
ideas, she remarked about "trivial," "narrow" frameworks that character-
ized sociology. However, some theory analysts already mentioned have 
divided the discipline into important cognitive categories. To review: 
wagner (1963) contrasted the "interpretive" and "positivistic" sociolo-
gists (along with the "non-scientific" or "evaluative" theories). 
Expanding this idea, Ritzer (1975) identified three paradigm groups--the 
positivistic social factists, interpretive social definitionists, and the 
positivistic social behavioralists. Other sociologists have independently 
chosen similar type perspectives. Abel's social realists, humanists and 
nominalists correspond roughly to Ritzer's factists, definitionists, and 
behavioralists (Abel, 1970:29-41; Ritzer, 1975:197-200). So do the 
theorists who prefer one of Boskoff's (1975:254) three "explanatory vari-
ables:" structured opportunities, motivations and perceptions, and social 
reinforcements. In other words, although Boskoff and Abel simply used 
one dimension for classification, their three groups would be almost co-
terminous with Ritzer's paradigms. Perhaps they have located real 
divisions within the field. 
Assumption.--Sociology is characterized by certain general perspec-
~ives, particularly the preference for explaining social life in terms of 
structural, definitional or behavioral variables. 
HyPothesis Ic.-- The classification will conform to the three-fold 
typology suggested by Ritzer, Boskoff and Abel. 
Alternative.--!£ these hypotheses, particularly lb and Ic, cannot be 
supported by the classification system, I must examine the possibility that 
sociology does not contain paradigms (Reynolds, 1971:21-43). 
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These hypotheses imply important additional considerations. If 
theorists who discuss certain problems tend to use a few basic strate-
gies and a few key variables, could they improve their theories by incor-
porating additional ones? Kuhn's basic argument denies this possibility: 
in his opinion, a scientist is usually locked into a paradigm, unable to 
even glimpse the world beyond. In contrast, Phillips (1975) suggests 
that paradigms are not "incommensural." A scientist can escape into a 
broader framework and still retain his memory of the first along with his 
ability to use its better facets. Indeed, a later paradigm may incorpor-
ate the earlier one as Einstein's physics included the special case of 
Newtonian physics. Ritzer (1975:212-19) actually named four "paradigm 
bridgers"--Marx, Durkheim, Weber and Parsons--theorists who worked beyond 
any single type combining the factist-behavioralist-definitional perspec-
tives. The classification system may locate other bridgers or highlight 
the specific component missing from a particular type of analysis. Con-
sider the bridger Marx. In much of his analysis, he neglects ecological 
variables. If he had incorporated these into his hypotheses about how 
groups form collective awareness, he probably would have analyzed inter-
action within a community as a possible source of group consciousness. 
Community consciousness, in turn, could have rivaled class consciousness 
as a possible source of political action. Following this line of analysis, 
Marx might have anticipated nationalism along with class rebellion. 
Nationalists of the world arise • 
Assumption.-- Theorists who combine dimensions in "unconventional" 
ways may be paradigm bridgers. 
Assumption.--Theoretical-methodological dimensions are normally 
combined in a few "conventional" ways. 
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Assumption.--Theorists who combine contrasting abstract subject 
focuses or constrasting strategy approaches may be paradigm bridgers. 
Hypothesis !I.--The classification system can identify theorists 
who bridge two or more categories by combining traits from each in a 
single theoretical work. 
In sum, the classification should demonstrate the existence of 
cognitive groups--possible paradigm groups--and provide clues about the 
•issing items in certain perspectives. In later discussions of the classi-
fication system, I will use these clues to suggest some possibilities for 
theoretical reformulations combining different aspects of the various per-
spectives. 
Influences on Sociological Theory: Implications 
from the Sociology of Sociology 
The sociology of sociology is but one variant on the sociology of 
knowledge, or as some prefer to call it, the sociology of culture (Crane, 
1972:129-42). This discipline builds from one key postulate: truth is a 
dependent variable (Bosko££, 1972:172-97). The independent variable, 
however, ranges from abstract ideational configurations to pure self 
interest. Sorokin (1947) identified dominant cultural themes and traced 
their effects in art, science, religion and other forms of thought. For 
Marx (1844:106-19) and Mannheim (1936:270-7~~ social organizations were 
the key independent variables. Marx explained that political ideology 
represents the interests of the dominant class. Therefore, we might 
expect, American ideology stresses rugged individualism, self-sufficiency, 
and other virtues convenient for capitalists who do not want their taxes 
spent on shiftless unfortunates. Mannheim explained how our position in 
society, even something as subtle as the historical experience we lived 
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through at an impressionable moment of our lives, shapes our outlook. 
Bence, American depression children value "materialism" more than children 
of the affluent 1960s. Against this background, we can easily understand 
Weber's interest in value-free sociology and the Hinkle's discussion of 
the development of sociology as a response to World War, the Depression, 
and other historical events. 
However, science provides a special kind of truth, a truth based on 
rational procedures designed to measure reality objectively. Even if 
values affect what we study and how we use the information later, must they 
also redirect the process of our search for this objective, rational truth? 
Within contemporary sociology, one group--the radical-critical theorists--
has been especially concerned about the ties between our extra-scientific 
allegiances and our scientific perspectives. 
The radical-criticals launch their methodological critique from the 
basic assumption that the social order can (and probably should) be changed. 
Sociology should study "the root relationships of the historically condi-
tioned--and therefore changeable--social order" (Horowitz, 1971:12); it 
should criticize society beginning "with the adumbration our historical 
secularities" (Birnbaum, 1971). This pervading interest in "life as it 
could be" instead of simply "life as it is" has led the radicals to 
certain methodological stances; they criticize interpretive sociologists 
for stressing individual reactions without revealing the structural con-
ditions that provoke such reaction. They castigate the systems analysts 
for providing ahistorical descriptions of current functions, functions that 
appear to be universal necessities. They condemn the methodological 
Pioneers for specializing in irrelevance, for contributing more to our 
knowledge of formal thought than to our knowledge of the social problems we 
should think about. 
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They have not, however, provided a methodological tradition of 
their own. T. R. Young (1971) suggests that a "conflict theory" requires 
a "conflict methodology," that is, a politically informed sociology must 
discover more than respondents are willing to tell. People often reveal 
their true position only when threatened or tricked by an aggressive 
interview, a devious maneuver, torture, legal action, or some other device 
that strips away usual excuses. He is quite correct: being nice to re-
spondents does not always elicit the full truth. Oo the other hand, there 
is no reason why any efficient methodology (including this one) cannot be 
used for both radical and non-radical purposes. So.e of the "conflict" 
techniques suggested by Young have long served to gather information for 
various established governments. A good marketing survey on the effects 
of advertising can tell the marketing expert how to sell his product and 
the consumer-affairs advocate how to promote sales resistance (Becker and 
Horowitz, 1972). For radicals, then, the real problem is not how we get 
information but how we use it. Nonetheless, they do demonstrate that our 
values may incline us toward certain methodological positions. 
Science: ~ Social Product 
Assuming for the moment that the scientific process does respond to 
social pressures, we may speculate about the structural mechanisms involved • 
. To begin, Znaniecki has described the "man of knowledge;" a social person 
acting within a circle of other people--fellow scientists, publishers, lay 
audiences, government agencies--who evaluate him in terms of his perfor-
mances as a scientist (1965:220-39). Roger Bacon may have labored in an 
isolated tower, monastic not ivory, preparing manuscripts that would not 
be appreciated for centuries. But most scientists prefer more intimate 
interaction with their social circle and seek guidaace from other members 
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about both the style and procedure of their science. The lone innovator 
who roams freely in search of the unexpected often becomes a tragicomic 
figure. His ideas do not "fit," however brilliant they may be; he does 
not solve the problems that are troubling other circle members (1940:55-
69, 164-99). 
Although he began with Weber's ideas rather than Znaniecki's, 
Merton provides several examples of research illustrating the power of 
the social circle. Reviewing historical data, he documented the ties 
~etween Puritanism and the growth of seventeenth-century English science 
(1938). The Puritan value stress on rational approaches, empirical 
studies, and utilitarianism could naturally foster a flowering of the 
"hard" sciences. If so, Merton reasoned further, then a disproportionate 
number of Puritan sectarians should have pursued physical-science studies 
and entered scientific groups like the Royal Society. And indeed they 
did. More recently, Merton has documented other ties between social 
values and scientific institutions. There is, even within the scientific 
community, a firm tendency to accept traditional authority: hence the 
Matthew effect--those who have, get--famous men get more credit for the 
same work than their lesser known fellows (1968). Finally, examining 
another value held within scientific circles, Merton (and Harriet Zucker-
man) have observed how age and the traditions of authority associated with 
age affect a scientist's reputation among his peers. In areas with a 
well-developed theory, the scientific community will quickly recognize and 
acknowledge the contributions of a newcomer. In contrast, recognition in 
less codified fields (like sociology) is accorded to the mature judgment 
of older scientists (1972). 
Merton's work suggests another problem: the existence of more than 
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one relevant social circle--at a minimum three possibilities including 
the scientist's particular subfield; the discipline as a whole; and the 
overall cultural community. How can these circles variously shape the 
process and procedures of science? Certainly a social circle of like-
minded astronomers describing the heavens with Newtonian principles will 
share formulas, techniques, discoveries. But what if half of them sub-
scribe to Einstein's principles instead? In Kuhn's terms, the discipline 
is undergoing a revolution with two competing paradigms struggling for 
control. If these two groups of scientists use different assumptions to 
find different truths, we may wonder if they also belong to different 
social circles. In sum, do paradigm affiliations depend on independent 
social networks? The next question, of course, is whether a discipline's 
internal networks affect its response to the wider community. Simmel 
hypothesized that people in routine, business-as-usual occupations reflect 
their position in society whereas those in turbulent, problematic occupa-
tions tend to concentrate on professional problems instead (1908b:l85-88). 
If this is true, we could expect the history of a scientific discipline to 
reveal a continuous cycle alternating between times of internal quarrels 
and periods when everyone seems to be asking: "What does astronomy do for 
mankind?" Others--Marx, Veblen, Mannhetm, to name a few--have suggested 
that occupational groups tend to form a peculiar ideology regardless of 
their internal condition. Finally, assuming that the outer circle does, 
somehow, affect a scientist's values and ideology, we come to another 
important question--Do these ideologies also shape the methods we use for 
finding scientific "truth?" 
Social Circles in Sociology 
In trying to develop a typology of sociological theory, I have 
57 
assumed the existence of identifiable cognitive types within the field. 
Whether these groups present opposing truths or variations on a universal 
theme is another issue. But, if theory types do exist, then we may ex-
amine them as dependent variables subject to pressures from the social 
circle. 
Researchers have already identified several possible social divisions 
which could be termed circles. Crane found "invisible colleges" among 
rural sociologists (and mathematicians)--not interest groups who formed 
ideologies but rather social circles united in a common network trans-
mitting the shared ideas generated by a few productive individuals (1972: 
43). Members of a "college" cite each other's papers, recruit new students, 
form a cognitive circle (1972:129-42). Crane (1967) also located a "gate-
keeper" mechanism: even with anonymous reviewing, a disproportionate 
number of authors in a magazine issue share a university affiliation and 
background in common with the editors. Whatever the reason for this 
phenomenon, it indicates some sense of cognitive purity. 
Therefore, we can assume at least a limited commonality among 
different groups in sociology, with scientists trying to perform for an 
admiring circle of like-minded colleagues. But de circle members share a 
paradigm? Mullins alone addresses this question. Unfortunately he 
answers it by fiat, giving only his word, for example, that his own group, 
the structuralists, differ significantly from the "standard American 
sociology; faith of our fathers, living still ." (Truzzi, 1975). 
However, as Mullins (1973:12, 14ft.3) himself explains, sociologists who 
can barely distinguish the major points separating distant camps perceive 
subtle nuances within their own--just as the college teacher can recognize 
a full professor and an instructor but often cannot explain the difference 
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between a mechanic and a machinist's helper. Indeed, theoretical groups 
_.1 be composed of people who only think that they have a special way to 
think alike (Mullins, 1968). In short, we do not know whether Mullins' 
structural groups also share cognitive paradigms or whether they just 
share a rather limited core of more minor ideas. (See Reynolds, et al. , 
1970 for a concrete example of a circle with a limited core of subpara-
digm ideas.) As one way of investigating this kind of possibility, I 
suggest looking for correspondence between various circles and cognitive 
types identified in the theory taxonomy. 
Assumption.--Paradigms, if they exist in sociology, delimit subject 
focus, explanatory principles and methodological strategy. 
Assumption.--Inner social circles exist in substantive areas like 
"rural sociology." 
Assumption.--Inner social circles form around core ideas like 
"structuralism." 
Hypothesis IIIa.--The members of particular substantive circles in 
sociology will produce works that are similar to the works of fellow 
circle members. 
Hypothesis IIIb.--The members of a social circle formed around core 
ideas will produce works that are similar to the works of fellow circle 
aembers. 
Assumption.--Inner social circles are composed of people sharing a 
communication network. 
Assumption.--Personal-communication networks create a more cohesive 
circle than networks bound simply by more formal communication in journals 
and other official platforms. 
Hypothesis IIIc.--People trained both in the same tradition and at 
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tbe same school will be more likely to produce similar works than 
theorists who simply share the same substantive interests. 
Alternative.--Even if different paradigms exist, they may not be 
limited to circle membership. Furthermore, the ideas I have chosen to 
define categories may be so general that they will be adopted by all cog-
nitive circles. 
The people who share similar ideas are not the only members of the 
scientific community engaging in communication. When discussing the func-
tions and dysfunctions of paradigms, Ritzer (1975:202-03) referred to some 
famous quarrels--Mead's attack on behavioralism, Romans' critique of 
social factism, and so on. In his view, such controversies (which he 
details elsewhere in the book) demonstrate our unreasonable tendency to 
view the limits of our own paradigm as the limits of scientific truth. 
However, Ritzer first defined his paradigms in terms of explanatory vari-
ables, methodology, and the like; then he reviewed controversies about 
these particular issues. Naturally, opponents fired the verbal shots 
from different battlements. Merton (1959b), in contras~ reviewed a 
series of "conflicts" in sociology that centered on a shifting variety of 
topical issues and involved a changing army of participants. In this 
situation quarrels would not identify members of opposing paradigm groups. 
·A classification of famous fighting pairs could evaluate these two views 
of . conflict by showing if the combattants tend to come from similar or 
different groups. 
Assumption.--Quarrels grow from paradigm perspectives, not just 
from specific issues. 
Hypothesis IIId.--Qpponents in famous substantive or methodological 
controversies will tend to belong to different classification categories. 
, 
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I!Plication.-- If Hypothesis IIId proves true we should explore the 
paradigm implications of controversal issues. These may reveal the points 
from which we should reformulate theory in the direction of one paradigm. 
Throughout the discussion so far, I have assumed static paradigms--
one mind set in the cognitive circle. However, those who prefer to think 
that change marks the history of the discipline may wonder whether this 
change affects the cognitive orientation of circle groups. Deutsch 
(1971) identified seven "major advances" in sociology between 1900 and 
1965, each of which bas inspired innumerable elaborations. As community 
studies, ecosystem theory, bureaucracy analysis, and other advances become 
common in the discipline expanding groups of researchers--similar to 
Crane's rural sociologists--would form to pursue each interest. A similar 
process must occur when new tools enter the cultural-cognitive network--
first an inventor, then a small group of pioneers, finally a large coterie 
of scientist~ examining the small details and perhaps a new inventor look-
ing at the insolvable problems (Wallace, 1971:104-05). As these groups 
form and grow, what happens to their cognitive composition? For small 
groups, Sbmmel predicted a doctrinal unity followed by a diffuse spread of 
ideas as the group compromised doctrine point by point in order to convert 
new disciples (1908a:94-95). With his structural sequence (of normal, 
.network, cluster, and speciality-discipline stages), Mullins (1973) des-
cribes the same process--first a small group of innovators and pioneers, 
then numerous disciples exploring the outer ramifications of "breakthrough" 
ideas. So, we may predict that the researchers who explored "community" 
or "symbolic interaction" during the 1920s and 1930s shared more common 
ideas than their counterparts today. Furthermore, the research strategy 
of a pioneering substantive group would stress exploratory approaches over 
theory-testing ones. 
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Assumption.--The inner circle changes over time. 
Assumption.--Circle changes are related to the cognitive composi-
tion of the group ideas. 
Hypothesis IVa.--In the early stages of a specialty, theoretical-
research works tend to be more similar to each other than they are in 
later stages. 
HyPOthesis IVb.--When a new tool is introduced to a discipline, 
its initial users will tend to be very similar to each other. 
lmplication.--The data may reveal that certain cognitive constel-
lations tend to mark early and late stages of a specialty. If this is 
true,/then perhaps we should plan to vary our theory-building procedure 
with the stage instead of seeking a comprehensive procedure to handle a 
substantive area or the entire discipline as a unit (Merton, 1959). 
Following Sorokin's (1947) thesis, we can expect the cultural com-
munity--the outer circle--will also exert its influence on science. Cer-
tainly that was the thrust of Merton's (1938) argument when he studied 
the Puritan cultural community with its stress on utility and then 
examined utilitarian values in the writings of Puritan scientists. 
Sociology is not immune to such influences. The twin horrors of lower-
class misery beginning with the Industrial Revolution and lower-class 
rebellion beginning with the French Revolution combined with the hope that 
science could extinguish the fires (or at least teach us to bank them) 
formed the cultural constellation behind sociology. (See Bramson, 1961; 
Durkheim, 1890; Nisbet, 1966:21-44.) The tools developed in other sci-
ences also shaped the direction sociology would take--a flirtation with 
biological analogies, a serious pursuit of statistical analysis, a con-
tinuing interest in causality. (See, for example, Douglas, 1971). 
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Drawing from Marxian ideas, the radical-critical sociologists identify 
dominant-group ideology as one of the more pervasive cultural influences 
over sociology, the substance if not the methodology as well (Becker and 
Horowitz, 1972). Although the classification system does not offer any 
way to test the relationship between culture itself and the corner of it 
called sociology, the system can evaluate works written by people with 
different political perspectives (using.Friedrich's "prophets" and "priests") 
to see if these perspectives also affect cognitive perspectives. 
Assumption.~-Political ideology shapes other cognitive perspectives. 
Assumption.--Sociologists tend to assume "conservative" or "radical" 
stances toward society. 
Assumption.-- The "prophetic" stance is basically "radical" and the 
"priestly" stance basically "conservative." 
Hypothesis V.--"Priestly" and "prophetic" sociologists will form 
two cognitive groups producing two different types of sociological works. 
Sociology of Sociology: In Conclusion 
In sum, we know that cognitive social circles exist within scien-
tific disciplines. These circles form around networks of communication; 
they do not necessarily presuppose physical interaction or common self-
interest but, instead represent a tradition of shared perspectives spread 
_through scholarly communication. The fundamental question here is whether 
these perspectives are broad enough, deep enough, pervasive enough, and 
inclusive enough to be called paradigms. 
Once we have identified such circle paradigms--or satisfied our-
selves that they do not exist--we may explore the implications of social 
cognitive circles for the whole discipline. If circle networks spread 
ideas within paradigms, then these networks also raise communication 
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barriers between paradigms. This implies that separate camps within the 
discipline systematically eliminate a set of key ideas from their theory-
building repetoire. Other-paradigm perspectives become heresies to argue 
against (Ritzer, 1975:201-08). On the other hand, if circles form around 
substantive interests (Crane, 1972) or single-theoretical ideas (Mullins, 
1973) that do not happen to belong in single paradigms, then we can assume 
each circle contains the entire repetoire of theory-building tools. 
Policy implications--for example, the staffing of graduate schools--would 
also change depending on the relationships between circles and paradigms 
and how we assess the functional value of this relationship. 
CHAPTER III 
NUMERICAL TAXONOMY APPLIED TO THEORY CLASSIFICATION 
Typology construction in sociology ranges from the clustering of 
innumerable variables on the basis of some common factor or latent 
structure to the listing of important theoretical considerations that 
should mark a type if it conforms to a particular possibility. These 
typologies define concepts as groups of items. Ideally, we try to 
build types so that groups of clearly related items cluster within each 
type and the types themselves relate to some outside feature. This pro-
cess streamlines theory building by enabling us to conceptualize items 
in groups rather than one by one by one (Stinchcombe, 1968:38-47). In 
empirical practice, typologies must handle two kinds of items: charac-
teristics or traits and individuals who exhibit these characteristics. 
We have already reviewed how variable traits become part of a typology. 
Either they are chosen from a large pool of empirical variables or they 
are selected for relevance in some theoretical framework. Beginning 
with the list of empirical variables, for example, we can profile cities 
according to their relationship to various factors or we can identify 
"egoistic" suicide occurring in a social situation. Using the directly 
·theoretical approach, we can contrast a real bureaucracy with an ideal 
one or examine the effect of certain pattern-variable combinations on 
middle-class child rearing. 
These examples all exhibit a common strategy. They build from 
variables collected in a concept system to a discussion of how indi-
viduals possessing a particular constellation of traits would behave 
(McKinney, 1966:35-67). Theory classifications reverse this approach 
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by beginning with a collection of similar theorists and proceeding to a 
discussion of what traits create this similarity. Thus variants of Q-
methodology have inherent attractiveness for theory classifiers (Sneath 
and Sokal, 1973:114-16, 256-59; Kerlinger, 1973:582-600). We normally 
assume that individual theoretical works possess an internal coherence, 
that they form an articulated system not just a random collection of 
conceptual parts. In analyzing such coherent systems, we cannot 
simply note, among other things, whether theorists who stress values 
often neglect ecological variables. We want to identify a theorist like 
Marx, whose work could be enriched in certain aspects by the incorpora-
tion of ecological variables. Thus, for analyzing types of theory we 
must begin by identifying clusters of theoretical works instead of 
clusters of theoretical traits. 
Other social scientists have begun experimenting with various 
modern biological techniques to identify human groups. Wilkins and 
Smith (1964) borrowed a simple method for grouping delinquent boys 
through a series of dichotomous splits, first in the original group and 
then in some of the successive groups. Driver (1967) reviewed various 
more sophisticated classification approaches in bioanthropology, lin-
guistics, archeology and ethnology. In each of these fields, anthro-
~ologists face the classical biological clustering problem: grouping very 
similar individuals on the basis of numerous related traits. In political 
science, Alker (1969) complained that many promising approaches, includ-
ing the ones I will try here, have not been adapted to the study of 
similar political behavior exhibited by people who share similar back-
ground characteristics. Finally, in his recent review of sociological 
clustering methods, Bailey (1975) referred to the possible, but largely 
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untested, utility of biological clustering techniques in sociology. 
For this reason, in my attempt to develop a numerical classifi-
cation for theory, I have chosen to use an approach developed in biology 
tnstead of the clustering techniques traditional in sociology. Biolo-
gists have long been concerned with the problems of grouping similar 
individuals both for identification and comparison of organic groups and 
for study of their evolutionary development (Sokal, 1966). Ignoring the 
problems of evolution in theory, I will simply use phenetic (or "resem-
blance") classification to group "camps" of theorists much as biologists 
group mutated forms of bacteria. But even with these simple resemblance 
groups, I can also look for the evolutionary effects of outside influ-
ences (like ideological preferences) much as a biologist observes whether 
sunlight or fertilizer change the traits within plant groups. 
Both social science and biology have long used skilled, intuitive 
scholars to define groups like species or civilizations and assign 
individual animals or societies to the various types. Numerical taxono-
my provides a· routinized mechanical method for achieving the same 
results with greater speed and more accuracy. It groups units (like 
bacteria) into taxa (or species) on the basis of numerous variable-
character states. In other words, numerical taxonomy provides a system 
. for listing a large number of variables, coding individuals according 
to each character trait, identifying groups of similar individuals, and, 
an important addition, providing the mechanical routine for identifying 
additional individuals as members of some established group (Sneath and 
Sokal, 1973:3-4). This procedure has important advantages over the old 
"creative" way: it integrates information about many characteristics, 
more than we could handle in conventional classification; it provides a 
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coding procedure for unskilled, routine workers; and it forces us to 
really define variable traits in explicit coding terms (Sneath and 
Sokal, 1973:11). So if the classification system does no more, it can 
at least inspire more rigorous thinking about theoretical character-
istics and a more comprehensive appreciation of the patterns these 
characteristics tend to exhibit in various research works. 
To adapt the numerical taxonomy approach for this classification, 
I propose a five-point strategy: 
1) definition of key variables; 
2) definition of taxonomic groups; 
3) evaluation of the resulting classifications; 
4) investigation of how theory groups relate to outside influences ; 
5) evaluation of all classification results in terms of theory 
reformulation. 
The first four points actually could apply to any numerical taxonomy 
although they need some modification for application in sociology. The 
last step, however, requires an addition to usual procedure. Normally 
biologists want to identify flora and fauna, not restructure them--
although it is possible, at least theoretically, to combine these traits 
in new ways and create new animals (Sokal, 1966)--or new modes of theory. 
_For us, such rearrangements have great practical importance because 
theory transmutations can be effected in "real" life. So I will explore 
such possibilities; only instead of using the computer to rearrange 
traits in all possible combinations, I have chosen to examine the data 
matrix personally and discuss some of the rearrangements and combina-
tions that appear fruitful for sociology. 
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Taxonomy Construction 
In numerical taxonomy, workers assign individuals to types accord-
ing to their position in a resemblance matrix comparing each individual 
with every other on the basis of similarity (or dissimilarity) in 
character traits. Thus, the resulting types describe groups of indi-
viduals who share a certain range of similarity. High similarity does 
not mean, however, that all group members share any one particular 
trait much less a single defining characteristic (Sneath and Sokal, 
1973:21). Instead of grouping "ethnomethodologists" or "Kantian for-
malists" and then discussing other traits within each group, numerical 
taxonomists consider a collection of characteristics simultaneously as 
if all had equal weight or influence in defining the type. If we dis-
cover a few important traits that actually do identify works as members 
of a particular class, then we can use those traits alone in later classi-
fications. Alternatively, we may discover that numerical taxonomy 
defines groups we already recognize, groups defined on the basis of Kant-
ian epistemology, organic analogies, or other variables not used here. 
In this event, the numerical types may prove useful for describing the 
additional theoretical components associated with major approaches. Do 
"formal" sociologists work inductively or deductively? Do they concen-
trate on interpersonal relations or social structure? 
Numerical taxonomy contains no magic formulas for answering such 
questions. Good classification rests on the selection of appropriate 
variables, the construction of an appropriate similarity matrix, and 
the development of a classification from the matrix. This section will 
outline the techniques essential for all three and the following 
sections will review strategies for the evaluation of taxonomic results, 
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particularly as this evaluation also helps us to assess the various 
hypotheses suggested earlier. 
Variables 
Numerical taxonomy uses two kinds of variables--in technical 
terms, operational taxonomic units (OTU's) and character traits; in our 
terms, theoretical works and variables describing theory. Both sets of 
variables should be selected to "represent" the population we are trying 
to describe. However, numerical taxonomy does not assume random sampling 
or selection of either. 
In selecting individuals to classify, taxonomists try to find a 
range of possibilities, not a selection weighted according to their 
actual frequency in the population (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:68-71). A 
random sample of birds in Illinois would contain hundreds of starlings 
but might miss red-winged blackbirds altogether. A good classification 
should ~valuate one example of each. Obviously, then, selection of 
OTU's begins with some foreknowledge of the results. Although taxono-
mists have not agreed on theoretical rules for maintaining prescience 
without prejudgment, the rules worked out in practice seem to include: 
selecting individuals varied enough to provide a range of possibilities 
while at the same time using a group large enough for any planned sta-
tistical evaluation but small enough for ease in computation. Once a 
classification is established more individuals can be added one by one. 
Indeed, a classification's ability to incorporate new individuals is 
one sign of its value or validity. 
For the initial classification I have chosen twenty-five theo-
retical works ranging from one by Comte (a "positive organicist") to 
one by Blalock (a "new causal theorist"). These works (listed in 
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Appendix A) represent many strands of theoretical thinking often 
identified by other theory classifiers. Some strands ("new causal 
modeling," for example) obviously are very much alive today; others 
appear dead or dormant with mere remnants extant in current thinking. 
or perhaps the work of men like Comte is more alive than we think. 
Certainly an evaluation of the similarity between his approach and 
recent theoretical fashion would be one way of assessing whether Comte 
and similar early theorists pioneered the paths we still travel or 
explored unfruitful fields. So, I have included works representing a 
wide range of theoretical perspectives without deciding in advance which 
historical ideas are most important today. 
The traits or characters form the other set of variables for the 
original data matrix (Sneath and Sakal, 1973:71-75). Each trait must be 
a sensible, tangible object, something we can measure directly from 
observation of the OTU's (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:17-18). Beyond that we 
must consider the criteria for choosing traits, the proper number for an 
adequate measure of types, and the coding best suited for both the traits 
and their placement in a similarity matrix (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:103-
13). First traits, like OTU's, represent a spread of possibilities, a 
selection from areas we have already defined as important. Traits should 
also vary from individual to individual--for classification purposes it 
is senseless to measure either mammals or fish by whether or not they 
breathe with lungs. But we might use lungs as a trait for evaluating 
all animals. Traits may be related--given the nature of classification 
systems, they often are--but one trait should not be the necessary or 
logical consequent of another. If two traits must occur together, why 
measure both? Deciding how many traits to use is another important con-
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sideration. Early taxonomists, looking for a number large enough for use 
in possible statistical testing, preferred sixty or more. More recent 
workers set a much lower limit based on practical criteria: we should 
use enough traits that the addition of one more would not affect the 
resulting classifications. Thirty seems large enough (Sneath and Sokal, 
1973:162-65). Numerical taxonomy also solves the coding selection 
problem in a practical manner. Without parametric estimates of the 
character variables, there is no inherent advantage in ordinal and 
interval measures. In fact, even when such measures represent the data 
accurately (which is not true in this instance), nominal-level codings 
are generally very close to the results of more sophisticated, more 
costly, more time-consuming approaches (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:147). 
I have already discussed the trait,or character variables--subject-
matter perspectives, observational categories, and the like--at length. 
(See list in Appendix B.) They form a nominal set of independent and 
partially related traits, naturally coded as present (I) or absent (0). 
With the abstract variables, I have coded each end of the polarity as 
two separate items. For example, a theorist might or might not define 
social subject matter in subjective terms; he might or might not define 
it in objective terms. A theorist could be both interpretive and posi-
tivistic but no theorist can be neither. (For coding details see 
Appendix D.) Thus, although the traits are not necessary or logical con-
sequents of each other, many are related and the coding procedure must 
measure this relationship. This coding also creates sixteen variables 
out of eight polarities. Added to the other traits, they bring the 
traits to forty-two, an acceptable number. 
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After coding the traits, we can assemble a data matrix of the 
theoretical works by character traits (t x n). The next step is 
measuring the similarity (or dissimilarity) between OTU's and translat-
ing these results into a similarity matrix (t x t) which, in turn, can 
be analyzed to define the types. The basic rule that applies to coding 
also operates here: keep it simple. Complex procedures generally yield 
results quite similar to those of simple techniques unless there is 
some problem in the data requiring special handling (Sneath and Sokal, 
1973:147). So, with this rule in mind, I have chosen the simple match-
ing coefficient, modified elementary cluster analysis, and factor 
analysis for constructing the classification system. 
If positive and negative matches are equally important--if it is 
just as important that two theorists both have or both do not have a 
particular trait--then the simple matching coefficient (S ) measures 
sm 
dichotomy similarity very well (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:132-33) 
m 
s ------am m + u 
when m represents a positive or negative agreement between two indi-
viduals (both coded 1 or both 0) and u represents a difference between 
them on any given trait. After computing the similarity for each work 
~ompared to itself (S • 1.00) and compared to every other work 
sm 
~ (S - 1.00), we can present the results in a similarity matrix (t x t) 
am 
showing the relationship of each work compared to every other work. 
In addition to being a straight-forward measure, S also approxi-
sm 
mates a binomial distribution if more than twenty traits have been used. 
Actually the binomial distribution overestimates the variance of S by 
sm 
ten to twenty per cent, thus forming a conservative estimate of confi-
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dence limits for any given coefficient and providing a conservative 
way to estimate the significance of difference between any two coeffi-
cients. This relationship between S and the binomial distribution 
sm 
allows limited statistical testing of classifications based on S 
sm 
(Sneath and Sokal, 1973:132-33). 
Before testing, however, we must first define the class groups by 
clustering the coefficients into high similarity groups. For this 
classification, I have modified elementary cluster analysis because it 
too is a simple, straight-forward approach for this particular data. 
ECA consists of two basic steps: choosing a series of similarity levels 
and identifying successive clusters of OTU's that share various levels 
of similarity (Sokal and Sneath, 1963:179-80). Beginning with the 
highest similarity coefficients, we could isolate several small clusters 
of' closely related theory works from assorted, less related works. By 
lowering the required similarity level, we incorporate the unattached 
units into some group but, with this particular procedure, we may very 
well incorporate some of them into two or more groups at the same time. 
This duel-membership phenomenon violates the basic rule of typology 
construction requiring exclusive categories. However, in many situa-
tions, real data also violate this rule (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:207-08). 
·Some classification techniques would definitively incorporate the low-
similarity items into some group, perhaps by defining a large, loosely 
related class that includes both of the smaller groups along with the 
units lying between them (Bailey, 1975). But, for our purposes, it 
would be better to think of two types and a possible paradigm bridger 
belonging to both. Thus, elementary cluster analysis provides one way to 
evaluate an hypothesis about the theory-classification system: 
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Hyp 11--Paradigm bridgers can be identified by the classification 
system. 
The only real disadvantage of using this technique here, if we 
can call it a disadvantage, is the necessity of defining cut-off points 
and rules for dealing with low-similarity OTU's before actual analysis 
in order to reduce bias and routinize the procedure for reliability. 
Taxonomy Evaluation 
How do we recognize a "good" classification system? This 
question troubles all numerical taxonomists because there are no clear 
answers (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:63-67). Numerical procedures will 
always define some types. The question asks whether the types describe 
data and whether the classifications system (and its procedures) are 
simple enough to be practical. The simplicity problem is one reason, 
among several, I chose the simple matching coefficient and elementary 
cluster analysis for this classification. Sociologists need a system 
for examining new works (and possibly new character traits) quickly and 
easily, not a complex procedure that defines classes of fossils "for all 
time." The other problem--whether the types exist in data as well as in 
the system--cannot be handled so readily. Nonetheless, we can estimate 
the validity of a taxonomy in two ways: by examining the classification 
·statistically and by assessing the classification's usefulness in further 
analysis (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:275-77). In the statistical examination, 
we can define confidence intervals for similarity coefficients, and de-
scribe the "fit" between the classification and the data. For the other 
assessment, we must replace mathematical procedure with insight to 
judge whether theorists seem to belong in their types and whether the 
types themselves, along with the original data matrix, suggest new ways 
to evaluate or reformulate theory. 
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Significance Testing 
-
Strictly speaking we cannot test the significance of all relation-
ships in a classification. Nor would we want to do this. The focal 
point of evaluation must be the classification as a whole rather than 
any particular relationship within it. Indeed, in this taxonomy the 
outer members of one group may be quite similar to the outer members of 
a neighboring group or actually belong to both. Furthermore, the whole 
system marks small divisions between the works of thinkers who are, we 
assume, basically orientated toward explaining similar problems with 
similar techniques. Sampling procedures also vitiate many forms of 
statistical analysis. In R techniques, we draw a random sample of inde-
pendent individuals from a common population and measure their possession 
of certain traits. In Q techniques, we do not have a corresponding pop-
ulation of character traits from which to draw this sample. In other 
words, sampling is not random and character variables are, by definition, 
a diverse lot, even worse, correlated with each other in ways that 
violate any assumption of independence (Sokal and Sneath, 1963:153-54). 
Nevertheless, we can perform some limited statistical tests to use 
as a rough estimate of the overall importance of relationships in the 
matrix (Sokal and Sneath, 1963:313-15; Sneath and Sokal, 1973:163-68) • 
. Since the distribution of the simple matching coefficient (S ) approxi-
sm 
mates a binomial distribution, we can compute the standard error of S 
sm 
and estimate confidence limits for any particular coefficient. 
SEs ·J's<;-s) when S • Ssm and n • the number of character vari-
ables. Given this property of S we can look for differences between 
sm 
strategic coefficients. Most differences will not be significant. But, 
since a matrix with no significant differences would not be worth examin-
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iog, we should at least consider whether the most characteristic work 
iP one group differs significantly from the most characteristic work 
iP another (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:284-87). One strategy for such a 
test would be establishing confidence intervals for high similarity 
within the first group and then demonstrating that the similarity 
between two key works falls outside of these limits. Another would be 
computing the mean coefficient of similarity within groups and comparing 
these means to the mean similarity of the group as a whole. Either pro-
cedure gives us some purchase on the first hypothesis: 
Hyp !a--Theoretical-research works fall into natural categories 
defined according to their subject matter and methodology--by demon-
strating whether or not the system yields some significant relationships 
between classes. 
For assessing the hypothesis predicting specific type categories: 
Hyp le--The classification will conform to the three-fold typology 
suggested by Ritzer, Boskoff and Able, we could begin by looking for a 
three-class division and then comparing the members of these classes 
with the distribution that Ritzer et al. would predict. However, in 
order to use Chi-square with such a small number of variables, we must 
also collapse the Chi-square table into two cells, "works that fall 
.into the predicted category" and "works that do not fall into the pre-
dicted category." 
In other words, by examining significant relationships, we can 
test two basic hypotheses about any classification systems (Sneath and 
Sokal, 1973:284-87): 
Hyp--The procedure will yield a classification of natural groups; 
Hyp--A given subset of individual OTU's will fall into a given type 
or class. 
77 
However, significance testing must be used with caution. Sampling, 
as we already know, is a chancy, somewhat arbitrary procedure in 
numerical taxonomy. Improper sampling of either character variables or 
oTU's increases the variance of the similarity coefficients by some 
unknown amount, thus increasing our chance of making a Type I error and 
finding statistically significant relationships that do not exist 
(Sneath and Sokal, 1973:162-68). At best, significance tests serve as 
one way to evaluate a classification. Furthermore, even the most "sig-
nificant" set of classes is only valuable because it provides a useful 
guide to real data. 
Best Fit 
The other mathematical strategy for evaluating numerical taxonomy--
looking for ''best fit"--investigates another basic hypothesis: 
~-This classification adequately describes the original data. 
Of course, we must also ask: What "original" data--the data summarized 
in the similarity matrix (containing all the sampling errors intro-
duced by non-random procedures) or the "real" data someplace "out there?" 
If we trust the similarity matrix to reflect reality and if we use 
variance minimizing techniques to find exclusive clusters, we might com-
pute a cophenetic correlation coefficient (r ) between the unsorted 
cs 
·Coefficients in the similarity matrix and the similarity coefficient 
levels indicated by the classification system (Sneath and Sokal, 1973: 
278-79; Sokal and Sneath, 1963:312-23). Taxonomists do not know 
exactly how high r should be although the usual range for workable 
cs 
classification systems seems to be from .60 to .95. This coefficient 
can also be used to decide which of several exclusive cluster techniques 
provides the best description of a given similarity matrix. We can also 
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evaluate the hypothesis about relationships among trait variables: 
Hyp lb--The classification results (or "natural categories") 
will remain constant when separate dimensions of the typology are con-
sidered separately. 
For example, we could classify the works using only abstract 
traits and then compare these results with those of the original typology. 
Another possible measure of best fit is the ability of a classifi-
cation to incorporate new OTU's (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:289-90). Faced 
with a small handful of new units, a skillful taxonomist could simply 
assign them to a class where they fit or decide that the system is not 
complete enough to include the strangers. But, to introduce any large 
number of new theoretical works, we should either recompute the system 
or develop a standard key for coding and assigning--that is, identify-
ing--newcomers (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:394-400}. 
In addition, the identification process provides a second way to 
explore the ''bridger" hypothesis. If certain trait variables prove 
"most characteristic" of a class, bridgers may be defined as theoretical 
works that belong to the class but score in uncharacteristic ways, at 
least on the key variables. Furthermore, if Ritzer's thesis is correct, 
the abstract character variables are the ones most apt to define the 
bridgers. Although most class members may score positive on some of 
these traits and negative on others, the bridgers would be more likely 
to score positive on both, to use contrasting abstract perspectives 
simultaneously in their works. 
Evaluating Additional Hypotheses 
Once they have constructed a classification system, taxonomists 
can easily use it to assess the relationship between classes and "out-
79 
side" (environmental) variables (Sneath and Sokal, 1973:373-76). The 
basic three-step procedure includes: 
1)· choosing a group of OTU's that have some "outside" quality; 
2) if these units have not already been classified, recomputing 
the system or identifying these units as members of some 
existing type; 
3) using a statistical test (like Chi-square) to confirm or deny 
a significant relationship between membership in a class and 
possession of the "outside" variable. 
For our purposes, the most problematic step would be the first, 
choosing the proper theoretical works to test each of the remaining 
hypotheses: 
Hyp Ilia--The members of particular substantive circles in sociology 
will produce works that are similar to the works of fellow circle members. 
Hyp IIIb--The members of a social circle formed around core ideas 
will produce works that are similar to the works of fellow circle members. 
Hyp IIIc--People trained both in the same tradition and at the same 
school will be more likely to produce similar works than theorists who 
ctmply share the same substantive interests. 
Hyp !lid--Opponents in famous controversies will tend to belong to 
different classification categories. 
Hyp IVa--In the early stages of a specialty, theoretical-research 
works will tend to be more similar to each other than they are in later 
stages. 
Hyp IVb--When a new tool is introduced to a disciplines, its initial 
users will tend to be very similar to each other. 
Hyp V--"Priestly" and "prophetic" sociologists will form two cogni-
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tive groups producing two different types of sociological work. 
In some instances, for example, when comparing "priests" with 
"prophets," we could work from an available list. For other hypotheses, 
we must develop a rationale for deciding what constitutes a 11famous con-
troversy11 or "substantive circle." In other words, there is no common 
pool of possibilities from which to draw a random sample, so researchers 
must follow the usual numerical-taxonomy procedure of judicious selection. 
Once past this difficulty we could identify the theoretical works as 
members of some class, setting up a two-cell table with predicted fre-
quencies of similarities based on our hypothetical ideas. Then, with Chi-
square, we could simply compare observed frequencies of similarity with 
predicted ones. In some instances the differences will exist, but not at 
a "significant 11 level. However, since the binomial distribution for large 
numbers of cases approximates the normal distribution, we could supple-
ment the other evaluations, perhaps with t tests to contrast within-class 
mean similarities with mean similarities to "outside" works or with the 
mean similarity of the entire sample. 
This research--with twenty-five works--cannot use all of the mathe-
matical techniques described above. However, the analysis can describe 
how these works exhibit (or fail to exhibit) hypothesized relationships. 
·Do Sumner, Durkheim, and Weber develop similar ideas when discussing 
"religious asceticism?" Does Parsons the Priest differ radically from 
Marx the Prophet? In the final analysi~, whether we use twenty-five works 
or a thousand, these are the kinds of questions we want to answer. 
Classification Utility: The Ultimate Evaluation 
Thus, we may argue, a classification system can only be termed 11good" 
because it is useful. If the taxonomy makes theory easier to understand, 
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easier to explain, easier to reconstruct, then it is useful. If the 
taxonomy tells us something about the relationship between a theorist's 
ideas and the social-ideological parameters of his life, then it is use-
ful. So, as I proceed through the various sections of the classification 
construction and evaluation, I will suggest how we can use this particular 
system for more than just describing the shape and significance of simi-
larity between Parsons and Park and Pareto. 
CHAPTER IV 
THEORY CLUSTERS DEFINED: LOOKING FOR PARADIGMS 
Theorists differ, in perspective, techniques, and major conclu-
sions. Given such differences, any well-constructed clustering pro-
cedure will produce "types" of theoretical works. In other words, we can 
simply apply numerical taxonomy and "interpret" the results whatever they 
might be. For a more informed interpretation, however, we need some 
standards of evaluation or some rationale for anticipating possible 
cluster forms. 
The literature on Kuhn paradigms can provide this theoretical 
justification if we conceptualize clusters as groups of works sharing a 
paradigm and define theoretical paradigms as common cores of similar 
thought. We can also understand the similarity core within a cluster as 
a network of binary similarity relationships, that is, a network of 
numerous relations connecting members of a cluster while few relations 
spread between the cluster members and outside works. Thus all works in 
a field are connected to each other with some degree of similarity. 
"Clusters" indicate the strongly connectedworks (Sokal, 1974:1121). 
Before examining the actual theory-clusters, I will explicate this 
line of reasoning in brief detail: first the conception of a paradigm 
and its implication for the kind of data used here; then the conception 
of types as clusters of binary relationships between objects. 
Kuhn Paradigms Redefined 
Kuhn, himself, defined paradigm several different ways ranging 
from a total scientific vision to an exemplar for research (Kuhn, 1970: 
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175; Masterman, 1970}. He also noted that the existence of some para-
digm within a discipline is signaled by close communication, often in 
journal articles, between specialists whose technical conceptions are 
incomprehensible to the average layman. Like beginning students, lay 
people must depend on textbooks written especially for their understand-
ing if they want to comprehend basics in a paradigm field (Kuhn, 1970: 
10-22). According to some critics, sociology reached this level of 
incomprehensibility some time ago, first through jargon and then through 
technical methodological sophistication. I am not certain, however, that 
this is the style of "incomprehensibility" Kuhn had in mind. Although the 
average reader may not understand the mathematical underpinnings of path 
analysis, he can grasp substantive arguments about stratification, atti-
tude change, or some other phenomenon based on the statistical manipula-
tions. Perhaps, judging by this standard, we may argue that sociology has 
not yet developed enough sophistication for distinctive world views or 
even exemplar research. Sociology obviously has not produced simple 
frameworks outlining social interaction in a few elegant laws. However 
we define paradigms, they will not contain the distinctive hypotheses and 
arguments characteristic of Newton's physical paradigm and Einstein's 
replacement. 
If paradigms are more limited visions and if these exist in sociology, 
how can we distinguish one from another? Can we truly identify Homans as 
a "social behavioralist" distinct from "social factists" or should we place 
both groups together in a paradigm of "positivism?" In other words, how 
can we decide if sociology has paradigms and what they might be? First 
we must abandon the Newton-Einstein model of an ideal paradigm and think 
instead of minimum requirements. Masterman (1970:79-89) argues that 
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limited paradigms could be defined as thought typology systems with 
"inexact matching;" in mathematical terms, clusters or "clumps" of 
thought sharing a core of similarity. Such paradigms contain the 
incipient elements of "crisis" because clusters with inexact matching 
must contain unmatched--perhaps contradictory--ideas outside their 
common similarity core. Revolutions can occur with a shift of the core 
as certain fringe ideas become "absurd11 and others begin to explain the 
absurdity. 
Viewed in these terms the paradigm becomes a limited construct and 
the typical revolution far less unsettling than the conversion from New-
ton's physics to Einstein's. Indeed, normal scientists may travel the 
distance between paradigms during a career or even during a research 
project. These limited paradigms need not define "incommensurable" 
world views (Phillips, 1975). 
Individual scientists may be blind to certain positions, even posi-
tions held by people with whom they share many points of similarity. 
Thus, incommensurability or paradigm-blindness may involve only certain 
tenets within a framework, not the entire scientific view. (As a side 
issue, we may note that if paradigms were completely incommensurable, 
then Kuhn, standing in his particular paradigm of the history of science 
would not be able to describe previous kinds of historical insights.) 
Applied to sociology, these ideas suggest lines of interpretation. 
Sociology is a few hundred years younger than physics and focused on a 
far less predictable subject matter. This science has not had the time 
to experience discipline-shattering revolutions and, given the natural 
unpredictability of social life, it would be difficult to document the 
clear superiority of a new paradigm even if a revolutionary contender did 
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appear. Kuhn (1970:144-59) has argued that political support insures the 
success of a new paradigm. Mullins (1973) among others, has suggested 
how this political support may build through networks of disciples and 
colleagues. However, neither questioned the inherent scientific attrac-
tiveness of competing paradigms (Urry, 1973). If creative working scien-
tists believed intellectual change to be no more than a trip between 
political groups, then many would probably abandon the pursuit for some 
less demanding form of futility. But, if science does depend--to some 
extent--on our ability to perceive truth about data, then scientists 
themselves probably react to the data-paradigm relationship in their dis-
cipline. Those working in fields where.data seems more closely tied to 
paradigms, will probably form more distinct separate paradigm groups--
each pointing to the data that verified its versions of truth. Scientists 
working in a field like sociology usually cannot demonstrate their 
"truths" so clearly. So, we may suspect, sociological paradigms cover 
limited areas, in Masterman's terms, clusters of theoretical works con-
taining small cores of total similarity and much wider areas of partial 
agreement. Elements from these partial agreements may, in turn, form 
the total-similarity core of an adjacent group. 
Clusters: The Paradigm Des-
_cribed Mathematically 
To translate the paradigm idea into mathematical clusters, we must 
look for "natural" groups within sociology. These natural groups, if 
they exist, reflect modal densities of underlying variables (cattell, 
1968:99-100). This conception contrasts with the principles of dichotomy, 
continuum, or "school" identity that form the basis of most typologies in 
sociological theory. Not only does the cluster summarize the impact of a 
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far greater number of variables, but it also defines areas of density; 
that is, it places the theoretical works in a geometric space, looks 
for densely occupied areas, and defines types in terms of that density. 
These dense areas are natural groups. Ideally, we would find two or more 
dense clusters separated by great empty spaces (Needham, 1965)--perhaps 
Ritzer's three paradigm groups with each social behavioralist being 
totally different from each factist and each definitionist, as if 
Homans completely opposed Talcott Parsons, as if Parsons were unable to 
even comprehend Goffman or Cooley. In the real world, and particularly 
in the real world of sociological theory, natural groups interbreed pro-
ducing semi-similar hybrids. So, instead of neat monothetic clusters in 
which all works share the same traits in common, we may expect poly-
thetic clusters in which works share many traits but few, if any, traits 
are shared by all (Bailey, 1973b). Furthermore, two works from different 
groups might, nonetheless, share many common characteristics. In factor 
analysis, these polythetic groups would form around impure factors; 
although one underlying factor would appear most prominent in one group, 
it could be important for all (Fruchter, 1954:1-17). 
The natural groups--pure or impure--form through binary relation-
ships between works. Each group is a network of similarity relationships 
.uniting two works at a time (Bisher and Drews, 1970:48-75). In a fully 
connected-network, each work would be related to every other just as, in 
a close circle of friends, each friend has a friendship relationship with 
every other group member (Beauchamp, 1970:17-55; Marshall, 1971). The 
total similarity matrix describes such a fully connected network; each 
theorist related to every other although the degree of relationship 
varies widely. If the various groups within this matrix represent strong 
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paradigms, almost incommensurable with each other, then the natural 
groups should be fully connected on a high degree of similarity. Lower-
level similarity relationships should connect theorists from different 
groups. On the other hand, if sociological theories are hybrid state-
ments, theoretical works will form loosely connected groups with many 
high similarity levels running between groups. Some theoretical works 
may be central (connected to many other works) in several groups; some 
may be peripheral to all groups. 
Normal clustering procedures can obscure these complex relation-
ships. Average linkage and total linkage alogarithms force each object 
into a single group even if the object properly belongs to more. If 
clusters are loosely related with many high-similarity connections 
between groups, single linkage methods will quickly group all works 
into one large, string-shaped cluster. In other words, the usual vari-
ance minimizing procedures force each work into a single group. If 
pure, sharply delineated groups actually exist, this poses no problem; 
any standard technique will serve to identify dense clusters with large 
spaces between. For theory groups, however, we must anticipate over-
lapping clusters and use approaches that reveal this spread. Factor 
analysis, comparing the relative association between works and some com-
.mon properties, provides clues for interpreting theory groups in terms of 
these properties, whatever they might be. Smallest space analysis seems 
a potentially good combination technique for measuring distance between 
theorists: it clusters similar items into a small geometric area repre-
senting their common property (McFarland and Brown, 1973). However, 
since we cannot anticipate either the dimensions of the clustering or the 
nature of the underlying common elements, the techniques that assess 
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these phenomenon directly are more appropri~te for now. 
Thus, the problem of delineating theory groups requires a com-
bined strategy: one clustering technique to identify the groups indicating 
possible overla? between them; a second technique totrace the path of con-
nections between works while also measuring the density within groups, and 
factor analysis to provide a parsimonious summary of commonality within 
groups as well as a rough measure of the common dimensions of the total 
sample. 
But what criteria can we use to judge the validity of this strategy? 
Since any data can be clustered and since we do not have a well-articulated 
underlying mathematical model for clustering, we must rely on other 
standards. Factor analysis presents additional difficulties by assuming a 
linear relationship between factor variables, a problematic assumption 
when the variables are idiosyncratic theorists rather than continuous 
attitudinal scores (Fleiss and Zubin, 1969). Therefore, without external 
standards describing a proper tree, we must judge its fruits; at the 
least, we expect the theory typology to display parsimony and a "good 
fit" to data (Baggaley, 1964:91-96), two standards we will consider later. 
The Theory-Work Clusters 
Identified 
To begin, both clustering and factor analysis depend on the basic 
similarity between theory works as defined in Chapter III. Looking at 
the original data matrix (Table 1), we can see that virtually all trait 
variables affect the classification: no traits appear always present (I) 
or always absent (0). Table 3, summarizing the similarity distribution 
among theoretical works, indicates that the trait variables do, indeed, 
distinguish between them. However, this table obviously does not describe 
a closely related band of beetles. Similarities between pairs range from 
.""'111111 
TABLE 1 
TilE ORIGINAL-DATA MATRIX COMPARING WORKS BY TRAIT VAR.'IARLES 
Worka* Trait Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Blak 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Comt 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1· 
Cool 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Dkl2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Dk97 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Goff 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Ho74 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ho50 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Lund 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 CD \0 
Marx 1 1 1 0 .. 1 1•0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Mr48 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Mr36 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Pare 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Pk36 0 1 1 0 0 1 1. 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Pk28 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Pr71 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 .1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Pr53 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Pr37 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Schu 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SimC 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
SimP 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Sumn 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Tard 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
We22 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
We/6 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
Coser's "two-method" ideal types--regression-stratification and ethnomethodology 
re-st 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
ethno 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
TABLE 1-(cont) 
worksv Trait Variables 
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 
Blak 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Comt 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Cool 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Dkl2 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Dk97 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Goff 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Ho74 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Ho50 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Lund 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Marx 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Mr48 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Hr36 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 \0 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 Pare 
Pk36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Pk28 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Pr71 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Pr53 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Pr37 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Schu 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
SimC 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
SimP 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Sumn 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Tard 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
We22 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
We4-5 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Coser's "two-method" ideal-types--regression-stratification and ethnomethodo1ogy 
re-st 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
ethno 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
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.40 (t .15 at the .05 level) to .88 (± .10 at the .05 level) with a mean 
of .637. Table 2, describing the similarity of each work with every 
other work, hints at further complication of this data. The mean simi-
larity for specific works ranges from .502 to .686. Some works, like 
simmel's "Poor" and Durkheim's Elementary Forms, appear closely related 
to most others; at the opposite extreme, Romans's work seems marginal to 
the rest. 
TABLE 3 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF WORKS BY SIMILARITY LEVELS 
Level Frequency Total Similarity Score 
.88 1 .88 
.86 1 .86 
.83 4 3 .32 
.81 5 4.05 
.79 9 7.11 
.76 15 11.40 
.74 20 14.80 
.71 19 13.49 
.69 29 20.01 
.67 28 18.76 
.64 33 21.12 
.62 24 14.88 
.60 22 13.20 
.57 28 15.96 
.55 17 9.35 
.52 14 7.28 
.so 10 5.00 
.48 9 4.32 
.45 7 3.15 
.43 1 .43 
.40 4 1.60 
Total 300 190.97 Mean • .637 
Figure 1 identifies the pairs with the highest similarity relation-
ships (.71 to .88, a range which includes 63 pairs on 21 per cent of all 
possible pairs). As we would expect from the mean similarities, the 
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Figure 1.--Higb Similarities Among the Works Based on the Total 
Set of Trait Variables 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
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the number of high stmilarities varies sharply between works. Like a 
sociometric star, Simmel's "Poor" links highly with thirteen other 
works, but Romans in The Human Group (a social isolate?) links highly 
onlY with Romans in Social Behavior. 
But do these linkages define theory groups? Elementary matrix 
analysis (Sokal and Sneath, 1963:178-80) provides a preliminary answer to 
this question by identifying some clusters. It is the existence of these 
clusters, not their size, that we must consider. Since the theoretical 
works were chosen to represent a spread of possibilities rather than a 
"random sample" of likely events, an isolated work or two may represent 
an unknown quantity of similar items existing in the literature. With 
this in mind, consider Figure 2. I arranged this matrix by placing the 
most related pairs (.81 and above) close to the diagonal and surrounding 
them with the next related pairs. Assuming the classification contains 
several groups of works highly related to each other and loosely related 
to other groups, assuming this ideal situation, the final matrix should 
have highly related pairs lined in several clusters along the diagonal 
and minimally related pairs in the left-angle corner. Although the data 
does not conform to this ideal, Figure 2 does reveal some patterns: 
1) Marx, Comte, Cooley, Parsons 1971, and Weber 1922; 2) Pareto, Stmmel 
.''Poor," and Durkheim 1912 (all strongly related to Cluster 1) along 
with Sumner, Parsons 1937, Merton 1936, Merton 1948, and Simmel "Conflict:" 
3) Durkheim 1897, Blalock, and Lundberg (who link strongly with Pareto, 
Sumner, and Merton 1936 of Cluster 2); 4) Tarde, Park 1928, and Park 1936 
(each of whom has idiosyncratic links with Clusters 2 and 3); 5) Schutz 
(related to Parsons 1937 and Durkheim 1912 from Cluster 2) and Goffman 
(tiEd to Simmel "Poor" from Cluster 3 and Park 1928 from Cluster 4); 
Works* 
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Comt 
Cool·~+-~ 
Pr71 
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Dkl2·~~~~~~+-~~~~~ 
SimP 
Mr36 
Kr48 
S:lmC 
Tard 
Pk28 • 
-I* I 
£II 
1.00 
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Figure 2.--High Similarities Among the Works Based on the Total Set of Trait 
Variables and Arranged with High-Similarity Pairs Close Together 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
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6) Homans, who related highly only to himself; and, finally, 7) two out-
liers, Weber 1904-05 (related only to Merton 1936 from Cluster 2) and 
parsons 1953 (related to Comte from Cluster 1 and Merton 1948 from 
Cluster 2). 
Using Ritzer's (1975) terms we could identify social definitionists, 
social behavioralists, and several varieties of social factists. But 
such labels would be premature since we still must account for within-
group differences and other anomolies. Why, for example, do Weber 1904-
05 and Parsons 1953 appear so marginal? Neither is highly related or 
highly unrelated to any cluster even though most critics would consider 
both part of the sociological establishment rather than the artifacts of 
some esoteric cult. Conversely, why are Durkheim 1912, Simmel "Poor," 
and Pareto tied to so many other theorists? None of these works is 
normally cited as one of the exemplars of sociological analysis. Clearly 
a complete analysis of the material requires two approaches: a more 
rigorous exploration of clusters in the similarity matrix supplemented 
by an investigation of the original-data matrix for clues about how or 
why some works do not fit a pattern. 
This more rigorous exploration may include comparisons between 
the original similarity matrix and matrices for selected trait vari-
ables. Figures 3 and 4 (showing the top 22 per cent of relationships 
for the abstract dimensions) place Durkheim 1912, Parsons 1953, and 
Weber 1904-05 in approximately the same atypical positions they occupied 
before. Pareto, on contrast, relates minimally to some of the same 
theorists he resembled closely in the total trait matrix. And both 
Homans works relate highly to several others. However, the dimension 
matrix can only provide clues about specific relationships. With six-
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Figure 3--lligh Similarities Among the 1-l'orks Based on· the First Sixteen 
Trait Variables 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
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Figure 4.--High Similarities Among the Works Based on the First Sixteen 
Trait Variables (Arranged to Correspond with the Final Total-
Trait Arrangement in Figure 2) 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
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teen trait~ computed for Table 4, each similarity coefficient has a 
verY wide confidence interval (between ! .13 and ! .24) indicating we 
.. , can only interpret extremes with any confidence of a real difference. 
But we can draw some conclusions about relationships between abstract 
traits as a whole and the total set of similarities. The cophenetic 
correlationship coefficient (a Pearson's r comparing the relative simi-
larity level of work-pairs in Table 2 with those in Table 4) is only .388, 
hardly a sign that abstract orientations preclude or require some total 
package of sociological thought. If paradigms must be total perspectives, 
we will not find them with the traits used here. 
For a second clustering technique, I have modified the single link-
age approach. Normally with this approach, a single link can unit two 
otherwise different clusters: once a single linkage occurs, all members 
of each group are "related." But we already know three theorists, 
Durkhetm 1912 and Pareto and Sinmel "Poor," who between them are related 
to everyone else except Romans. Therefore, to reveal paths of relation-
ships rather than just links between clusters, I defined permissible 
linkages in terms of a group nucleus of works and linkages with less 
highly related works joining the group. In other words, I began by 
identifying seven .exclusive groups of highly related works. For each, I 
added works related to it on the next highest level of similarity. With 
this new nucleus I then proceeded down another similarity level until 
reaching .71 (the cut-off used in the elementary analysis procedure). 
Tables 5 through 11 name these highly related works and show the degree 
of relationship for each cluster. The first Cluster (Table 5) start-
ing with Durkheim 1912 and Simmel "Poor" contains twenty-three works. 
Romans, in contrast, does not begin to relate to other works until 
level .69 (Table 11). For each work, I recorded its total and mean 
TABLE 4 
SIMILARITY MATRIX. COMPARING WORKS* FOR THE FIRST SIXTEEN TRAIT VARIABLES 
~ ... J ,.. ~ ... .. 0 ] a Ill \0 :! \0 i ... ... ~ ~ X ! J 1! H .• • • • i ~ ... ~ :i i i 2 i E E ... ., 8 a :. .. • .. .. : :l . • llak 1.00 
Co:.t .H 1.00 
Cc:o1 .~0 .81 1.00 
D<-12 .so .56 .63 1.00 
D~97 .~4 .38 .56 .~6 1.00 
Co"'' .. .56. .38 .56 .81 .63 1.00 
lb74 .81 .3a .44 .44 .7S .so 1.00 
... 8.:;50 • 56 .so • .56 .69 .so .63 .75 1.00 0 Lead .94 .38 .44 .44 .88 .so .75 .so 1.00 0 ~~;~-x .44 .63 .81 .S1 .so .75 .Ja .~:! .38 1.00 
Xr~IS .75 .44 .63 .75 .Sl .81 .69 .t.9 .69 .69 1.00 X:36 .69 .lS ,44 .81 .75 .1S .63 .so .63 .63 .S1 1.00 l'.ue .81. .38 .44 .56 .7S .so .75 .75 .1S .so .69 .63 1.00 P<.36 .81 .EJ .69 .69 .75 .7S .7S .7S .7S .63 .81 .63 .63 1.00 i'>:2S .63 .44 .63 .88 .69 .94 .56 .69 .56 .S1 .S8 .81 .56 .81 1.00 l'r71 .44 .75 .81. .(.g .38 .63 .38 .63 .38 .88 .56 .so .so .63 .69 1.00 l'rH .56 .63 .56 ,56 .63 .38 .38 .38 .63 .38 .56 .so .so .so .~4 .38 1.00 P:-37 .56 ,63 
.69 .81 .so .75 .so .7S .so .75 .69 .63 .63 .is .81 .sa .so 1.00 Sc~u .38 ,56 ~63 .88 .44 .81 .31 .56 .31 .69 .63 .69 .44 .56 .7S ,69 .56 .81 1.00 Si:::C .u .38 .44 ,69 .63 .7.5 .so .63 .75 .63 .69 .63 ,63 .75 .81 ,63 .so .75 .56 1.00 Si.::l' .69 .so .44 .81 .63 .7.5 .so .63 .63 .63 .69 .75 .63 .75 .81 .63 .so .75 .611 .a a 1.00 S= .69 .so .56 ,.56 .63 .63 .sa .sa .63 .so .69 .so .63 .88 .69 .so .38 .63 .44 .63 
.63 1.00 'f&r4 .so .56 .63 .75 .56 .69 .56 .69 .44 .69 .15 .69 .56 .69 .15 .s& .44 .56 .63 .56 
·" ·'' 
1.00 \:ell .so .69 .&3 .a a .44 .69 .44 .69 .44 .81 .63 .69 .56 .69 .75 .81 .44 .81 .15 .6t .u .s& .7S 1.00 ~ .44 .63 .56 
·" 
.so .so .25 .38 .38 .75 .• .s& .63 .so .l8 .56 .63 .63 .so .56 .50 .Q • 25 .s • 
·" 
1.00 ... 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
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TABLE 5 
CLUSTER ONE BASED ON HIGH-SIMILARITY CONNECTIONS 
BETWEEN WORKS 
Entrance Total Total Average 
Similarity Works* Connections Similarity Similarity 
.88 SimP 13 9.92 .76 
Dkl2 13 9.85 .76 
.81 Mr36 12 9.05 .75 
• 79 Pare 9 6.64 .74 
We22 5 3.74 .75 
Pk28 4 3.00 .75 
SimC 4 2.95 .74 
Mr48 8 5.82 .73 
Sumn 7 5.16 .74 
Pr71 5 3.66 .73 
Pr37 4 3.00 • 75 
Dk97 4 2.92 .73 
Marx 3 2.21 .74 
.74 Comt 4 2.90 .73 
Tard 3 2.19 .73 
Blak 2 1.48 .74 
Goff 2 1.45 .73 
Lund 2 1.45 .73 
Schu 2 1.45 • 73 
Pk36 1 .74 .74 
We4t5 1 .74 .74 
.71 Cool 1 .71 .71 
Pk53 1 .71 • 71 
Total 23 110 81.74 .743 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
**See page 107 for explanation. 
Connections 
Kat;io** 
.217 
r 
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TABLE 6 
CLUSTER TWO BASED ON HIGH-SIMILARITY CONNECTIONS 
BETWEEN WORKS 
Entrance Total Total Average 
Similarity Works* Connections Similarity Similarity 
.83 Pr71 10 7.64 .76 
Marx 8 6.18 • 72 
Comt 7 5.27 .75 
We22 6 6.18 .72 
Cool 4 3.11 .78 
.79 Dk12 9 6.66 .74 
Mr48 8 5.85 .73 
Pr37 3 2.27 .76 
.76 SimP 6 4.34 .73 
Tard 5 3.66 .73 
Pk28 3 2.21 .74 
.74 Pare 4 2.90 .72 
SimC 3 2.16 .72 
Goff 2 1.45 .72 
Mr36 2 1.45 • 72 
Schu 2 1.45 .72 
Sumn 2 1.45 .72 
.71 Pr53 2 1.42 .71 
Pk36 1 .71 .71 
Dk97 • 1 .71 .71 
Total 20 88 65.56 .743 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
**See page 107 for explanation. 
-
Connections 
Ratio** 
, .232 
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TABLE 7 
CLUSTER THREE BASED ON HIGH-SIMILARITY CONNECTIONS 
BETWEEN WORKS 
Entrance Total Total Average 
Similarity Works* Connections Similarity Similarity 
.81 Sumn 8 5.97 .75 
Pr37 6 4.60 .76 
.79 Pr71 5 3.69 .74 
.76 Mr36 8 5.93 .74 
SimP 7 5.10 .73 
.74 B1ak 2 1.48 .74 
Tard 2 1.48 .74 
Pare 2 1.45 .73 
Dkl2 1 .74 .74 
Lund 1 .74 .74 
Pk36 1 .74. .74 
Schu 1 .74 .74 
We22 1 .74 • 74 
We46 1 .74 • 74 
.71 Mr48 3 2.13 .71 
Dk97 2 1.42 .71 
Comt 1 .71 .71 
Goff 1 .71 .71 Connections 
SimC 1 .71 .71 Ratio** 
.158 
Total 19 54 39.82 .737 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
**See page 107 for explanation. 
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TABLE 8 
CLUSTER FOUR BASED ON HIGH-SIMILARITY CONNECTIONS 
BETWEEN WORKS 
Entrance Total Total Average 
Similarity Works* Connections Similarity Similarity 
.83 Pk28 6 4.59 .76 
Pk36 3 2.28 .76 
.79 SimP 6 4.37 .73 
.76 Dk12 7 5.11 .73 
Marx 3 2.21 .74 
.74 Comt 3 2.19 .73 
Goff 2 1.45 .73 
Mr48 2 1.45 .73 
Pr71 1 .74 .74 
Pr37 1 .74 .74 
Sumn 1 .74 .74 
Tard 2 1.42 .71 
Cool 1 .71 .71 
Dk97 1 .71 .71 
Pare 1 .71 .71 
Schu 1 .71 .71 Connections 
Ratio** 
SimC .. 1 .71 .71 .154 
Total 17 42 30.84 .734 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
**See page 107 for explanations. 
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TABLE 9 
CLUSTER FIVE BASED ON HIGH-SIMILARITY CONNECTIONS 
Entrance 
Similarity 
,;86 
.83 
.76 
.74 
.71 
Total 
* Works 
Blak 
Lund 
Dk97 
Pare 
Mr36 
Mr48 
Sumn 
Tard 
We22 
We45 
Marx 
Pr71 
SimP 
13 
BETWEEN WORKS 
Total 
Connections 
5 
4 
6 
8 
7 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
40 
Total 
Similarity 
3.93 
3.10 
4.54 
5.85 
5.17 
1.45 
1.45 
.74 
.74 
.74 
.71 
.71 
.71 
29.84 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
**See page 107 for explanation. 
Average 
Similarity 
.17 
.78 
.76 
.73 
.74 
.73 
.73 
.74 
.74 
.74 
.71 
.71 
.71 
.746 
Connections 
Ratio** 
.256 
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TABLE 10 
CLUSTER SIX BASED ON HIGH-SIMILARITY CONNECTIONS 
Entrance 
Similarity Works* 
.79 Goff 
Schu 
.74 Pk28 
Pr37 
.71 Dkl2 
SimP 
6 
BETWEEN WORKS 
Total Total 
Connections Similarity 
3 2.24 
3 2.24 
1 .74 
1 .74 
1 .71 
1 .71 
10 7.38 
•see Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
••see ·page 107 for explanation. 
TABLE 11 
Average 
Similarity 
.75 
.75 
.74 
.74 
.71 
.71 
.738 
Connections 
Ratios** 
.333 
CLUSTER SEVEN BASED ON HIGH-SIMILARITY CONNECTIONS 
BETWEEN WORKS 
Entrance Total Total 
Similarity Works* Connections Similarity 
.76 Ho74 3 2.12 
Ho50 1 .76 
.69*** Lund 1 .69 
.67 Dk97 1 .67 
Total** 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
Average 
Similarity 
.70 
.76 
.69 
.67 
Connections 
Ratio** 
**Not computed for this cluster because the two Homans works have 
high similarity only with each other. 
***Highest similarity level for any new connection with either 
Romans work. 
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similarity within the cluster along with the number of connections or 
links it holds with other members of the group. Finally, I computed a 
"connections ratio" between the actual number of pair connections and 
the possible total. This possible total is 
n(n-1) where n • number of works in the cluster. 
2 
Table 12 reveals that this procedure both identifies clusters and 
measures their underlying density. The mean similarity for each group 
(except the Romans cluster which was not big enough to be tested) differs 
significantly (t test, .01 level) from the total similarity mean. How-
ever, the number of connections within each group (except the Romans 
cluster) is significantly lower (Chi-square, .01 level) than we would 
expect in a dense, highly interrelated group. Sociology, we may argue 
tentatively, contains perspectives instead of paradigms. Most works 
link highly with many others although the paths of linkage shift depend-
. 
ing on which works we use for a starting nucleus. Only Romans--the 
so~al behavioralist in the matrix--stands alone. But Goffman and 
' ' 
Schutz, two social definitists, also relate atypically. Their cluster 
- -
' (Table 10) contains only four other members: Durkhetm 1912 and Stmmel 
' 
"Poor~" who relate highly to almost everybody, and the more definitional 
work of Park in "Marginal man" and Parsons in The Structure of Social 
·Action. 
Factor analysis shifts our perspective from the location of groups 
in space to the identification of underlying common properties. Tables 
13 and 14 list the theoretical works in order according to factors they 
relate to most strongly and their rank of relationship within that 
factor. Both equtmax and oblique rotations expose three common prop-
erties and tend to assign works to similar positions within each factor 
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TABLE 12 
MEANS AND CONNECTIONS IN SEVEN CLUSTERS OF WORKS WITH HIGH-
SIMILARITY AND FOR THE TOTAL SET OF SIMILARITIES 
Cluster Mean* Connections Connections** 
Ratio Possible Present 
1 .743 .217 253 55 
2 .743 .232 190 44 
3 .737 .158 171 27 
4 .734 .154 136 21 
5 .746 .256 78 20 
6 .738 .333 15 5 
7*** • • • • • • • • 
Total .637 1.000 
*All cluster means are significantly different from the total 
population mean beyond the .01 level with the t test. 
**All present connections are significantly different from the 
possible total beyond the .01 level with the Chi-Square test. 
***Mean and ratio are not included for Cluster Seven because the 
Homans works cluster only with each other at a high level of similarity. 
grouping. However, both rotations also delimit a very "impure" struc-
ture with many theory works highly correlated to each factor. The geo-
metric representation of the equimax rotation (Figures 5 through 7) 
illustrates this visually; instead of lining along the factor axes, the 
works cluster mid-way between. Since the factors are highly inter-
related, an oblique rotation yields a better description. Even with 
oblique rotation, however, we cannot sharply discriminate between 
groups. For example, Homans--the marginal Romans--loads .52461 on 
Factor 1, .73000 on Factor 2, and .68271 on Factor 3. But this rota-
tion offers one further advantage by separating the structure matrix of 
correlation coefficients associating works with factors from the pattern 
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TABLE 13 
FACTOR MATRIX COMPARING WORKS TO FACTORS 
(EQUIMAX ROTATION) 
Works* Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Marx 0.83472 0.25534 0.30864 
Pr71 0.76027 0.30518 0.35733 
We22 0.69611 0.26710 0.44366 
Comt 0.69315 0.42334 0.26853 
Cool 0.66314 0.37627 0.30345 
Dkl2 0.63797 0.33292 0.54621 
Tard 0.62241 0.36099 0.36766 
Pk28 0.61022 0.27875 0.51114 
We/15 0.59758 0.38551 0.28052 
Mr48 0.55671 0.46960 0.42388 
SimP 0.55605 0.46765 0.53549 
Pk36 0.51588 0.40041 0.43691 
Blak 0.37137 0.81987 0.20596 
Lund 0.15999 0.80599 0.41151 
Dk97 0.34184 0.76314 0.29791 
Sumn 0.41477 0.60922 0.42775 
Ho74 0.08721 0.60022 0.55022 
Pare 0.53530 0.59997 0.33311 
Mr36 0.47504 0.57379 0.41240 
Pr53 0.45766 0.53776 0.30675 
v'co££ 0.29135 0.23448 0.80822 
Schu 0.34949 0.22235 0.73681 
Ho50 0.14249 0.37162 0.64771 
Pr37 0.47169 0.44881 0.53858 
SimC 0.38860 0.48021 0.52461 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
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TABLE 14 
OBLIQUE ROTATION STRUCTURE MATRIX(CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENTS) RELATING WORKS TO FACTORS 
Works* Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Marx 0.91578 0.47886 0.48083 
Pr71 0.89267 0.52506 0.52824 
Dk12 0.87739 0.57864 0.69797 
We22 0.85923 0.49999 0.59264 
SimP 0.85708 0.68799 0.70719 
Comt 0.84701 0.60080 0.46078 
Pk28 0.81937 0.51292 0.64740 
Cool 0.81787 0.55994 0.47877 
Mr48 0.81370 0.66036 0.60055 
Pare 0.80994 0.75562 0.54087 
Tard 0.80383 0.55493 0.53078 
Mr36 o. 78149 0.74067 0.60189 
Pr37 0.78094 0.65527 0.69315 
Pk36 0.75826 0.59076 0.59070 
We/6 0.75778 0.55039 0.44916 
SimC 0.71843 0.66580 0.67475 
Pr53 0.71084 0.67533 0.48936 
Lund 0.60904 0.90143 0.60877 
Blak o. 70776 0.89940 0.44611 
Dk97 0.69812 0.86462 0.51666 
·sumn 0.75124 0.76703 0.61600 
Ho74 0.52461 0.73000 0.68271 
Goff 0.65623 0.49044 0.87480 
Schu 0.67126 0.47085 0.81202 
Ho50 0.52126 0.54988 0.73076 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
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matrix of regression weights predicting work position from factors (Kim, 
1975). Table 15, based on oblique regression weights, presents the 
most discriminating picture of difference between factors. In rank 
order: Factor 1 contains Marx, Parsons 1971, Weber 1922, Comte, Cooley, 
Tarde, Durkheim, 1912, Park 1928, Weber 1904-05, Merton 1948, Simmel 
"poor," Park 1936, Pareto, Parsons 1937, Parsons 1953, Merton 1936, and 
Simmel "Conflict;" Factor 2, Lundberg, Blalock, Durkheim 1897, Homans 
1974, and Sumner; Factor 3, Goffman, Schutz, and Homans 1950. Only one 
work, Simmel "Conflict," continues to share all three common properties 
almost equally. 
This factor analysis adds a dimension to the Ritzer typology. He 
named key independent variables: social-group reality, social perspec-
tives, and stimulus reaction. Factor 1 points to a structural property 
that presupposes some degree of group "reality"--at least Ritzer would 
identify most of the works as "factist" writings. Factor 3--with the 
phenomenologist Schutz and the symbolic actionist Goffman--must identify 
a perspective or definitional property. However, Factor 2 contains Lund-
berg and Homans 1974 (who also associate with the definitional property) 
as well as three works with factist leanings. With the possible exception 
of Sumner (the most ambiguously placed of the five works here) all of 
·these works grew from a conscious effort to explicate some methodology. 
The methodologies themselves differ, but the stress on working out a 
sociological approach inspired the research for each work. Even Sumner 
wanted to develop a special methodology although he lacked the sophisti-
cation of the other four authors. No behavioralist factor appears in 
this analysis. But we must remember that Homans's cluster marks him as 
an atypical theorist; perhaps with different traits or more bahavioralist 
r 
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TABLE 15 
OBLIQUE ROTATION PATTE&~ }~TRIX (REGRESSION WEIGHTS) 
FOR PREDICTING WORKS FROM FACTORS 
works* Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Marx 1.04965 -0.13942 -0.07767 
Pr71 0.92735 -0.05639 0.00107 
We22 0.83340 -0.09289 0.14021 
Comt 0.82146 0.13708 -0.10067 
Cool 0.78595 0.08585 -0.03499 
Tard o. 72189 0.07130 0.06221 
Dk12 0.72147 -0.01009 0.27077 
Pk28 0.70097 -0.05511 0.25523 
We46 0.69572 0.13194 -0.03436 
Mr48 0.59707 0.21978 0.13177 
SimP 0.57887 0.19247 0.26311 
Pk36 0.55421 0.15164 0.18202 
Pare 0.55207 0.40772 0.00411 
Pr37 0.46574 0.20723 0.30940 
Pr53 0.46284 0.37364 0.02328 
Mr36 0.46190 0.38545 0.13041 
SimC 0.34561 0.28606 0.32316 
Lund -0.02769 0.80942 0.21647 
B1ak 0.29483 o. 77684 -0.12299 
D~7 0.25223 0.70081 0.01150 
Ho74 -0.10364 0.56211 0.46084 
Sumn 0.36783 0.45217 0.16718 
Goff 0.22183 -0.03128 0.75768 
Sc:hu 0.31654 -0.05616 0.65073 
Ho50 0.00969 0.23844 0.60450 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
, 
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works, we would have identified one more factor. 
Coser's (1975) ASA presidential address provides a partial test 
of the methodology-factor interpretation. He outlined two methodo-
logical extremes, technical positivism as it occurs in some regression 
analysis and subjective interpretation as it appears in some ethnometho-
dology. (See bottom of Table 1 for trait coding of typical works in each 
extreme.) Coser's ideal-type regression analyst relates highly to most 
works in the method factor: Lundberg .90, Blalock .95, Durkheim 1897 .83, 
Bomans 1974 .60 and Sumner .74. However, Coser's ideal-type ethnometho-
dologist relates about equally to the subjective subject-matter theorists 
and the methodologists: Goffman .67, Schutz .69, Homans 1950 .57, Lundberg 
.69, Blalock .69, Durkheim 1897 .68, Homans 1974 .71, and Sumner .76. 
Perhaps, for theorists working out a new methodology, method becomes at 
least as important as subject matter in determining their work traits. 
In sum, the factors represent two dimensions: a stress on methodology 
per se and a stress on subject matter. Among those who stress subject 
matter, most emphasize structure and a few prefer exploring cultural-
social perceptions. These factors seem sensible. They represent tradi-
tiona known in the field and add some nuance to the Able-Boscoff-Ritzer 
perspective discussed earlier. Furthermore, cluster analysis identifies 
the same key works that stand most prominently in each factor. The 
structuralists Marx, Parsons 1971, Weber 1922, Comte, and Cooley formed 
the nucleus group in Cluster 2 (Table 6); the methodologists Lundberg, 
Blalock, and Durkheim 1897 group in Cluster 5 (Table 9); and the defini-
tionist Goffman links with Schutz in Cluster 6 (Table 10). 
Other clusters, however, identified similar groups of works related 
to more than one factor. For example, Durkheim 1912 and Simmel "Poor" of 
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cluster 1 (Table 5) both belong in the structural factor but share defini-
tional leanings. Sumner and Parsons 1937 of Cluster 5 (Table 9) display 
mixed factor properties; Sumner is a methodologist with factist leanings 
and Parsons 1937 is a structuralist with definitional persuasions. The 
disparity between factor analysis and clustering results occurs for two 
reasons. First, factor analysis measures the complete set of relationships 
between all paired works, but the clustering procedure used here only 
examines the top fifth of the relationships. Second, as we suspected from 
the beginning, the relationships are multidimensional based on shifting 
similarity cores, possibly with a unique core for each set of pairs. 
Although the clustering techniques used here confirm this suspicion, they 
cannot describe such multidimensional relationships in a two-dimensional 
framework. 
In terms of Baggaley's criteria, the disparity between clustering 
results and factor analysis raises a dilemma. If we build a typology 
with clusters, we can describe the results of complex trait distribu-
tions in confusing detail. If we begin with factor analysis, we achieve 
comprehensible parsimony without some important nuances. For the 
moment, I will choose parsimony at the expense of "good fit." Figure 8 
portrays my view of theory types locating the ten unambiguously identi-
.fied works (and suggesting a location for six others) in a two-dimen-
sional space. Later I can use these typical works to define the standards 
for measuring others (Bailey, 1973a). 
This later measure will have to assess the relationship between 
common properties and the trait variables upon which they have been 
built. Tables 16 to 18 list the work by trait codings for each factor; 
Table 19 gives the number and percentage for each trait occurring in the 
Structural Patterns of 
Group Reality as The 
Key Independent Variable 
Marx 
SUBJECT-MATTER DIMENSION 
Parsons 1971 
Weber 1922 
Comte 
Durkheim 1912 
Simmel Conflict 
Cooley Weber 1904-05 
S\lllner 
Blalock Durkheim 1897 Lundberg 
METHODOLOGY DIMENSION 
Cultural Meanings or Social-
Personal Perceptions as The 
Key Independent Variable 
Schutz 
Goffman 
Homana 1950 
Bomana 1974 
Fig.8--Initial Typology of Ten Unambiguously Classified Works* (underlined) 
and Suggested Placements for Six Others. 
*The Underlined works fell into the same groups regardless of the method used 
for grouping. The other works fell into ambiguous positions and are placed here 
primarily according to their factor loadings. However, the true placement of 
ambiguously located works would depend on many dimensions and could not be visually 
portrayed on a two-dimensional space. 
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TABLE 16 
THE ORIGINAL-DATA MATRIX COMPARING WORKS BY TRAIT VARIABLES FOR FACTOR ONE 
Works* Trait Variables 
1 2 3 4 s 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Marx 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Pr71 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
We22 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Comt 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Cool 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Tard 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Dk12 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 ~ ~ 
Pk28 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 \0 
WellS 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
Mr48 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
SimP 0 1 1 0 () 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Pk36 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Pare 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Pr37 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Pr53 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Mr36 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
SimC 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
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TABLE 16-(Cont) 
Works* Trait Variables 
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 . 37 38 39 40 41 42 
Marx 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Pr71 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
We22 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Comt 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Cool 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Tard 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Dk12 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 ~ 
Pk28 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 N 1 1 0 0 
We45 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Mr48 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
SimP 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Pk36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Pare 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Pr37 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Pr53 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Mr36 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
SimC 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
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TABLE 17 
THE ORIGINAL-DATA MATRIX COMPARING WORKS BY TRAIT VARIABLES FOR FACTOR TWO 
Works* Trait Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Lund 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Blak 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Dk97 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Ho74 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 ... 
Sumn 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 N ... 
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 
Lund 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Blak 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Dk97 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Ho74 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Sumn 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
TABLE 18 
THE ORIGINAL-DATA MATRIX COMPARING WORKS BY TRAIT VARIABLES FOR FACTOR THREE 
Works* Trait Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Goff 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Schu 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ho50 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
.... 
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 N N 
Goff 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Schu 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Ho50 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
------
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TABLE 19 
FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE OF EACH TRAIT VARIABLE AS IT OCCURS AMONG THE "rO'rAL SET 
OF WORKS AND AMONG WORKS IN EACH FACTOR 
Trait Variables 
Work Groups l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 
Total 
Frequency 12 23 22 5 12 19 20 7 19 9 13 16 9 22 8 22 
Percentage (48)( 92)( 88) (20) (48) (76)( 80) (28) ( 76) (36) ( 52) ( 64) (36) ( 88) (32) ( 88) 
Factor 1 
Frequency 9 17 17 2 10 12 12 7 15 5 7 13 8 14 5 15 
Percentage (53)(100)(100) (12) (59) (71)( 71) (41) ( 88) (29) ( 41) ( 76) (47) ( 82) (29) ( 88) 
.... 
N 
Factor 2 '! w 
Frequency 1 5 3 2 0 1 l 0 l 4 5 0 0 5 3 4 
Percentage (20) (100) ( 60) (40) (00) (20) ( 20) (00) ( 20) (80) (100) ( 00) (00) (100) (60) ( 80) 
Factor 3 
Frequency 2 l 2 l 2 2 3 0 3 0 l 3 l 3 0 3 
Percentage (67) ( 33)( 67) (33) (67) (67) (100) (00) (100). (00) ( 33) (100) (33) (100) (00) (100) 
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Total 
Frequency 5 8 2 5 4 5 20 17 
Percentage (20)( 32) (76) (20) (16) (20)( 92) (68) 
Factor 1 
Frequency l 3 0 4 3 4 15 14 
Percentage (06)( 18) (00) (24) (18) ·(24)( 88) (82) 
Factor 2 
Frequency 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 3 
Percentage (40) ( 40) (00) (00) (00) (00) ( 80) (60) 
Factor 3 
Frequency 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 0 
Percentage (67) (100) (67) (33) (33) (33)( 33) (00) 
........ 
TABLE 19 (cout) 
Trait Variables 
Work Groups 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
Total 
Frequency s 13 1 3 12 s 7 12 10 10 4 1 
Percentage (20)( 52)( 04) (12) (48) ( 20) ( 28) (48) ( 40)( 40)( 16)( 04) 
Factor l 
Frequency 2 8 1 1 10 4 6 11 16 4 0 0 
Percentage (12) ( 47) ( 06) (06) (59)( 24)( 35) (65) ( 64)( 24)( 00)( 00) 
Factor 2 
Frequency 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 3 s 1 1 
Percentage (20) ( 40) ( 00) (20) (20)( 20)( 20) (20) ( 60)(100)(-20)( 20) ... 
..., 
Factor 3 ~ 
Frequency 2 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 
Percentage (67) (100) ( 00) (33) (33)( 00)( 00) (00) ( 00)( 33)(100)( 00) 
37 38 39 40 41 42 
Total 
Frequency s 7 2 17 9 17 
Fercentage ( 20)( 28) (08) (68)( 36)( 68) 
Factor 1 
Frequency s s 2 13 6 14 
Percentage ( 29) ( 29) (12) (76) ( 35)( 82) 
Factor 2 
Frequency 0 0 0 2 3 1 
Percentage ( 00)( 00) (00) (40)( 60)( 20) 
Factor 3 
Frequency 0 2 0 2 0 2 
Fercentage ( 00) ( 67) (00) (67) ( 00) ( 67) 
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total set and within each factor. Statistical comparisons of the trait 
distribution between factors will not help us here because the factor 
membership is too small for rigorous comparisons and, as we anticipated, 
the common core of similar traits shifts within each factor group. 
Nonetheless, we will return to the trait variables later for clues about 
reformulating theory. In this indirect way we can assess the importance 
of a few traits for theorists working in the structural, definitional, or 
methodological .traditions. 
Paradigm Hypotheses Evaluated 
Whatever its usefulness for classifying works, numerical taxonomy 
procedure can answer some of our questions about paradigms. In my 
initial discussion of sociological theory I hypothesized the following: 
paradigms exist, hold constant across trait dimensions, and conform to 
Ritzer's typology. I also hypothesized that "bridgers" span the para-
digms. Later, I defined paradigms as tightly connected clusters. By 
this definition sociology may have three paradigm frameworks with a few 
sociologists exploring one paradigm thoroughly and numerous eclectics 
borrowing random pieces from each. Or perhaps sociology has different 
perspectives--not firmly drawn paradigms but tendencies toward key modes 
of analysis. By searching the literature for appropriate examples, we 
could find sociological works to cluster in tightly connected groups 
within the structural, definitional, and methodological "paradigms." 
However, most works used here are well-known, highly regarded research 
monographs. Most belong to the "living body" of sociological thought. 
If these works do not cluster into tight-knit paradigm groups, then, we 
may conclude, sociology itself contains paradigm tendencies rather than 
incommensurable frameworks. Or as an alternative hypothesis, we might 
I 
I 
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speculate that sociology contains one master paradigm and that we are 
all imprisoned within, unable to envision any real competing framework. 
If this is true, we have lived in our prison since Comte began building 
it in the 1820's. Comte's work of 1820 remains a central plank of the 
factist framework along with some works by Marx, Weber, Parsons, and 
Cooley• Thus even if we are locked in a master paradigm, it appears to 
have tendencies that could develop separately. 
The clustering of the paradigm tendencies or types suggests a 
shifting similarity core of trait variables. The similarity matrix based 
on all traits does not conform to the similarity matrix based on abstract 
traits alone. Many works load highly on two or three factors. Sfmmel's 
"Poor" shares high similarity with thirteen works; Weber's Protestant 
Ethic with only one--even though the Protestant Ethic is far better 
known, far more frequently cited. The types themselves begin with three 
non-exclusive dimensions of structure--definition--method and expand into 
an uncharted area of overlapping cluster memberships. To conclude, the 
typology modified Ritzer's types into a more complex framework represent-
ing partially related underlying dimensions. 
When travelling such marshy, unmapped terrain we may erect bridges 
where we choose. Bridgers could be the fifteen ambiguously placed works. 
Or the works with the largest number of high-similarity scores. But 
neither definition encompasses Ritzer's useful concept of works spanning 
the distances between so-called "incommensurable" positions. This 
typology simply does not define irreconcilable extremes. Perhaps bridgers 
could be identified in terms of individual traits used in their analysis. 
Those theorists who consciously reconcile opposing theoretical components 
(measured by the trait variables) are "bridgers." In other words, although 
127 
the typology itself does not name bridger theorists, we may discover 
8 ome later while analyzing specific works. 
A Cautionary Note: Limits of Numerical 
Taxonomy in Theory Classification 
Regardless of whatever refinements we may make on this classifica-
tion, two features limit its usefulness. First, as in any clustering of 
empirical variables, each group is a time-bound sample, not a set of 
universal, abstract categories applicable to all other items in a defined 
universe (Dunnell, 1971). Second, since the groups reflect over-all 
similarity rather than similarity on particular items, we cannot define 
the properties of an individual work simply by identifying it as a member 
of some cluster (Bailey, 1972). 
Both of these problems present a greater challenge to sociologists 
than to the biologists who pioneered numerical taxonomy in systematics. 
Biological clustering usually starts with higher over-all similarity 
values--after all, biologists generally cluster highly related organisms 
not the whole range of life. Many important biological groups can also 
be defined by reproduction: either members are capable of reproducing 
identical organisms or are evolving toward that capacity. Theorists, in 
contrast, combine intellectual species much more freely producing all 
.manner of hybrids. According to recent discussions about scientific 
paradigms, these hybrid ideas could form the basis for unified explana-
tions of physical motion or evolutionary development or human interaction 
(Kuhn, 1970; Ritzer, 1975). In other words, biologists identify minor, 
highly related, relatively stable groups within the whole range of life. 
For them, a semi-permanent catalogue of fossils can prove very useful. 
With this catalogue, they can explore both the nature of a species and 
I 
I 
I 
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the evolutionary sequences of species change (Mayr, 1942). Theory classi-
fiers, who must map shifting, ill-defined divisions within a smaller · 
range of rapidly changing phenomena, cannot hope for a useful semi-per-
manent catalogue. 
What, then, can we ask of numerical taxonomy? As I have suggested 
earlier, classification may highlight clues for theory reformulation and 
identify the cognitive similarities in various groups who are related by 
political ideology, friendship, or some other non-scientific criteria. 
Eventually it may also yield some ahistorical types that can catalogue 
the theorists of the future. If each similarity group shares a small 
core of common traits, these shared variables might be used to redefine 
types of theory, ultimately, we may hope, exclusive-exhaustive ideal 
types. If • • • Then we will have travelled full circle--back to 
theory classification based on a small handful of variables. But with an 
important difference: the new classification will have its origins tested 
against a more varied empirical reality. 
r 
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CHAPTER V 
THEORETICAL REFORMULATION: USING THE TYPOLOGY 
Locating natural groups of sociological theorists can be an intrigu-
ing exercise in computer ingenuity, but to cross-breed these groups, we 
must examine some animals at closer hand. I will do this by dissecting a 
few work pairs to inspect their similarity core of trait variables. 
1 am assuming that sociological theory should address some empirical 
research problems of social life. In other words, the most important com-
ponent of a theory is not its form, but its substance: form is the tool, 
exploration of substance the finished product. If this is so, we should 
search for ways to explain a topic rather than arguments for defending a 
paradigm-framework (Singleman, 1972a; 1972b). In "Notes on problem-
finding in sociology11 Merton recommended theory questions 11so formulated 
that the answers to them will confirm, amplify, or variously revise some 
part of what is currently taken as knowledge in the field" (1959a:x). 
Such questions inform all the works in this theory typology. In this 
chapter, 1 will examine works that explore a similar substantive topic 
from a different type or paradigm perspective. Do they ask similar 
questions? Do they argue for similar explanations? 
For this examination, I havechosentwo substantive issues: the 
group process of stratification and a cultural product, namely religious 
asceticism. Both issues form the subject matter of three or more works 
in this typology. Further--although this outcome exceeded my expecta-
tions--the works fall in strategic type positions. Marx, Blalock, and 
Goffman, each the top theorist in a different factor group, probe for 
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the causes and consequences of that pervasive, ubiquitous human condi-
tion called inequality. Durkheim 1912, Weber 1904-05, and Sumner 
detail the nature of religious asceticism. The first two works belong 
to the same structural factor; however, Durkheim relates highly (.71 or 
more) to 13 other works, Weber to only 1. None relate highly to each 
other, yet all address the same limited subject topic. We may wonder if 
they share a critical core of common trait variables or if they used 
very different traits to produce strikingly different explanations. 
There are also less substantive kinds of subject matter in soci-
ology. Schutz, Simmel 11Poor, 11 and Park 11Marginal man11 use the ana-
lytic construct of social role. Stratification is a group process in 
the typology (trait 30); religious asceticism is a cultural product 
(trait 42). The role, in contrast, exists only in the mind of the 
sociologist. This abstract term describes a concept of social behavior. 
that is, a category to be used by theorists and researchers viewing 
social activ~ty. Tarde, Romans, and Pareto raise a different subject 
matter issue when they reduce group problems and products to the effects 
of individual psychological desires (trait 4); doing this, they define 
sociological subjects as the results of personal motivations. After 
examining the stratification and religion works in some detail, I will 
briefly suggest how subject material like the role or psychological moti-
vations or even the choice of subject groups can also be reworked using 
ideas from the theory typology. 
The Traits: Components of Reformulation 
Reformulation depends on the trait variables (listed in Appendix 
B). Fortunately, we can hold some faith in this list of forty-two. In 
Chapter II, I developed a rationale for my choices, defending them in 
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exhaustive,or at least exhausting, detail. In Chapter IV, I built a 
theory typology based on these traits. Each had some impact; none 
were always present (I) or always absent (0) among the total set of 
works. 
On the other hand, codingerrorscould bias any description based on 
these variables. As Sokal (1974) documents, the beauty of a trait--
indeed its existence within a taxonomy--varies with the eye of the be-
holder. Although we can easily decide if Goffman did or did not use 
participant observation in research, we have no standards telling us if 
a theorist has used a positive approach or a cultural-science one or both. 
Clearly Lundberg falls in the first category and Schutz in the second. 
But how do we categorize Marx or Park in "Marginal man" or Simmel' s dis-
cussion of "The poor"? I have tried to answer this question in Appendix 
D by listing all traits along with a basic coding rationale, a few 
examples of coding decisions, and some citations to literature that dis-
cusses the operational definition of particular traits more thoroughly. 
Someone else would judge a few works differently. Nonetheless, with 42 
trait variables, the typology can remain stable against the minor 
assaults of human-coding error. 
In this chapter I will use the traits--errors and all--to explore 
reformulation possibilities suggested by the core of similar traits and 
the dispersal of dissimilar ones in works on a single topic. 
The search for commonality between different theorists has an old 
tradition. Talcott Parsons launched a career with this search; many 
people still consider The Structure of Social Action (1937) his most 
durable contribution. Parsons examined the works of Weber, Durkheim, 
and others to trace the growth of a unified "social action framework" 
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based on shared agreements about social norms and individual choice. 
However, this hypothesis about commonality in Weber and Durkheim is 
still being disputed; for example, Pope et al. (1975) challenged Par-
sons's doctrines by citing different passages from the same scriptures. 
One suspects, if we performed detailed exegesis on the work of any 
sophisticated theorist, we would find wide ranging ideas. The minor 
points casually mentioned by D~rkheim could very well include ideas 
central to Weber's thought. Of course, both Parsons (1976) and Pope 
claim to interpret the most crucial message of Weber and Durkheim. We 
need not arbitrate that dispute here; I have avoided the problem by con-
centrating on one single work at a time, one particular subject at a 
time. 
Besides areas of agreement, we should discover weak portions of a 
theory, missing components-of thought (Siebler, 1973). The trait vari-
ables give one check list of components. Using this standard, I will 
outline how a theory could change if a writer incorporated new traits. 
However, the 42 trait variables do not form an exhaustive catalogue of 
possibilities. Exercises in theory reformulation may eventually yield 
an additional set of important traits. 
Theory Reformulation: Two Examples 
To reframe theoretical views about some topic, one must consider 
the feature of a particular theory along with the additions or deletions 
that would make the construct more attractive. Although, I will use the 
42 trait variables as sources of ideas for such rearrangements, these 
traits are not a checklist of "things to see." They form a group of 
interrelated variables, some critical to a particular theory, some quite 
unimportant. Therefore, I willchoose among them selectively as they seem 
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r tmportant for a type of theoretical perspective, for a general topic, 
and for a specific work. 
Stratification (trait 30) is a major societal process effecting a 
distribution of goods and services through a population (Eisenstadt, 
1971:233-35). The stratification process determines who gets what by 
doing what to whom. Power, inequality, or their correlates seem to be 
key concerns of any stratification theory. In other words, to study 
this topic we can look at the relationships that effect an unequal dis-
tribution of social goods or we can examine the pattern of this unequal 
distribution (Coser, 1975). We may wonder if different types of theorists 
tend to favor one or the other of these conceptions in stratification. 
Marx, Blalock, and Goffman each consider stratification from a different 
type perspective; Marx as a structuralist (Factor 1), Blalock as a 
methodologist (Factor 2), and Goffman as a definitionist (Factor 3). As 
we shall see, the typology category does inspire different views of 
stratification. 
Marx, like many factists, defined society in terms of "reciprocal 
action" (1846b:670). He believed that physical-environmental resources 
(trait 37) combined with a society's technological level (42) and popula-
tion density (39) to produce certain levels of interaction and, most 
important, divisions of labor. New divisions of labor lead, in turn, 
to new economic practices and new ideas (42) (1846a:6-16). In this 
developmental process (8), Marx included coordination (29) and social 
change (32) among the background features for the stratification structure. 
His research reflects this thinking: he examined institutional arrange-
menta (33) exploring how change of production spurred new political forms, 
how religious thought reflected economic ideology, how the coordination 
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.achinery of the state tended to serve some economic groups better than 
others. 
In "The eighteenth Brumarie of Louis Bonaparte," Marx detailed 
revolutionary changes in the French government between 1848 and the 
triumph of Napoleon II by 1851. Doing this he asked why people support a 
government against their own class interests. To answer his question he 
examined the role of various groups supporting Bonaparte's new populist 
dictatorship. That bulwark of reactionary rule, the peasantry, is a 
social category, not an interacting group. With the French Revolution 
peasants had become landowners, a status later confirmed by Napoleon I 
in his effort to secure peasant support. The peasants had not really 
become country plutocrats, however, their small plots could not support 
a family, let alone an elegant lifestyle. They had simply exchanged 
their old feudal obligation to a noble landlord for new capitalistic 
debts to mortgage holders and tax collectors. Living in the isolation 
of their famrs, separated by bad roads, poor communication, and illiteracy, 
they could not form associations to learn of their common plight or to 
work for their common interests. Therefore a populist dictatorship like 
Bonaparte's--pandering to their love of land and false sense of owner-
ship--could win their support. 
Blalock shifts focus from a concern for explaining the inequality 
between social groups to the need for designing research that tests 
specific hypotheses (10) about social inequality. He commends causal 
models: carefully explicated statements about the causal links between 
variables, measures for each variable (2) and predictions (15) of how 
the presence of one measured variable will affect the presence of 
another (1969:1-10). Blalock usually defines these variables as indi-
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vidual characteristics (41) to be measured through a questionnaire or 
interview (34}. Basically he hypothesizes that certain kinds of people 
tend to act out certain kinds of behavior: people with incomes over 
$100,000 tend to vote Republican; people who are downwardly mobile tend 
to support the political right. In theory Blalock could also measure 
groups; he could weigh the percentage of individuals with "middle" 
incomes against the degree of democracy in different countries (40). In 
practice, however, such measures of group properties like "democracy" 
often elude the researcher bent on interval-level precision (1974}. 
Since Blalock prefers explicating a methodology to probing a subject 
matter, he concentrates on the problems of measurement error rather than 
the inequality perpetrated by an "unmeasurable" social system. 
For example, in his article on "Status inconsistency, social 
mobility, status integration and structural effects," Blalock presented 
current theories describing the effects of social status and mobility on 
prejudice. Here he explicitly considered the difficulties of work with 
certain types of complex theories, ones in which the dependent vari-
ables are casued by interaction between two or more variables. Avail-
able research suggests that prejudice varies with occupational status, 
often with blue-collar workers and their children exhibiting more pre-
judice than higher-status workers and their families. Further, the 
occupationally mobile children may appear more prejudiced as they join· 
blue-collar ranks or less prejudiced as they enter white-collar work. 
Finally, the difference between old and new status multiplied by some 
magnitude of change effect may produce a level of prejudice in addition 
to the level produced by present status plus childhood status. In 
research terms Blalock wonders how we can empirically separate the 
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effects of ch~ldhood socialization in a previous status, life style in 
the present one, and changes between them, particularly if the change 
sometimes produces more prejudice and sometimes less depending on its 
direction. We can measure old status, present status, and the pre-
judice level associated with each. We can also verify whether down-
wardly mobile workers display more prejudice than stable ones and up-
wardly mobile workers display less. However, isolating the degree of 
"change effect" is another matter, especially if we suspect there is 
also a change in attitude associated with maturation. Often in research 
situations there is no way to measure such a factor independently of 
other variables. In these instances we are left with the choice of 
reconceptualizing the theory into one we can test or, at least, recog-
nizing the untestable provisions in very complex theories. 
Goffman, the third stratification theorist, also concentrates on 
a methodology, but one designed to tap a specific subject matter. His 
"dramaturgical framework" reviews individual performances on the stage 
of life (1959:1-10). The performances occur on a small, confined set 
(38) where individuals perform defined roles (40) and act to create the 
image they deem appropriate for their part (42). During a long-run per-
formance, individuals may create groups (18,25), develop new roles (26), 
.deviate from assigned parts (28). We can understand this action by 
watching the individuals (35) go through a routine of impression manage-
ment that signals their part to other players including the sociologists 
in the audience. In "The nature of deference and demeanor," Goffman 
observed the ritual exchanges between superiors and subordinates in a 
mental hospital. He watched how patients and staff members signal to 
each other in the effort to create the proper impressions, to maintain 
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appropriate social distance. The doctor might suddenly stop a patient 
in the hall for conversation; patients should not presume to be so 
familiar and could be repulsed with a frown, a hasty answer, or some 
other sign that they had violated proper distance by failing to recog-
nize the doctor's superior front. Patients, on the other hand, had 
license to "act crazy," to violate convention. A patient could avoid 
intrusions on his privacy by spitting at someone who spoke to him; an 
orderly would be fired for such behavior. Thus the cultural norms (42) 
--the accepted dramaturgical fronts--of the people in a situation support 
its superior-subordinate structure (40). 
The three type frameworks presented here encompass very different 
views of stratification--one portrays the sweep of history, another 
confines action to a single building; one asks why stratification con-
ditions arise, a second details some effects of stratification in a 
given population, a third illustrates how people act in different 
status positions. It is not surprising, then, to find these works 
share only 15 traits (three-way similarity level .36) in common. If we 
add Parsons' 1953 article on "A revised analytic approach to the theory 
of social stratification," the overall similarity level drops to .19 
(based on 8 common traits). Adding Homans' articles about status levels 
and conformity to norms would reduce the common core still further. 
Marx, Blalock, and Goffman each share more common traits with the key 
members of their factor type than they do with outside stratification 
theorists (Tables 16 to 18). 
Reviewing these works, we may argue there is no one way to study 
stratification, no master framework. However, although we may choose 
from among several vantage points, the choice of framework and its 
r 138 related traits does affect the study. 
First, the basic difference between a structural orientation 
(Factor 1) and a definitional one (Factor 3) encompasses a far deeper 
division than the simple trait distinction between theorists with a 
positive (trait 2) or cultural~eaning (trait 1) approach to sociological 
subject matter. Marx used both approaches yet heads the list of struc-
tural theorists. Blalock, who used a strictly positivistic approach 
relates weakly to the structural factor and heads the methodological 
one (Factor 2). Among the endemic quarrels in sociology is the dispute 
about whether we can build theories for stratification and other power-
linked societal processes without incorporating both positive and cul-
tural meaning variables. Those who argue for both usually attach struc-
tural approaches like functionalism for their failure to analyse how 
cultural meanings, especially the ideologies of powerful interest groups, 
shape social life (for example, see Rex, 1961:60-77; 115-55). However, 
Parsons 1953 (among others) presents a functional theory explicating 
commonly held cultural ideas and tracing their impact on stratification: 
our common societal values define valuable activity, and we reward those 
who perform such valuable service with money, prestige, and the good 
life. Thus, using a combined positive-cultural meaning approach, as 
Marx did, Parsons draws opposite conclusions about the causes and func-
tions of class structures. Goffman, in contrast, uses a strictly cul-
tural approach and heads the definitional factor. Yet somehow one senses 
that his patients have created their own world, placed themselves in a 
subordinate status, and secured this lowly position. by presenting a sub-
ordinate front to the other performers on the stage. Blalock, the 
positivistic methodologist, sees people reacting to a status position: 
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upwardly mobiles feel more kindly toward unfortunates than do downwardly 
mobiles, at least they say so on questionnaires. Both Coffman and Bla-
lock share a common perspective that describes individual people reacting 
within their social position. How or why people reached these positions 
is the issue unraised by either theorist. Both Coffman and Blalock 
study the distribution of stratification traits rather than the rela-
tionships that effect this distribution: the impression management of 
people who "act crazy" but not the forces used to define mental illness; 
the attitudes of nouveau riche but not the differences in routes of 
social mobility for people who rode an expanding-class escalator with 
numerous companions and those who climbed a stalled economic system one 
position at a time. 
The problem, then, is whether a structural issue can be explained 
with data about individuals. Blalock recommends random sampling (11) 
and questionnaire data (34) to measure both the extent and direction of 
class based attitudes. Using a deductive (10) framework, built on 
probability as well as the substantive ideas of the moment, he predicted 
(15) correlations between class membership and attitudes. In effect, 
be measured the consequences of class consciousness (or lack of class 
consciousness) among Americans striving toward the Great American Deam. 
Coleman (1975) suggests we can build information about these kinds of 
individual judgments into theories of how "corporate actors" behave. In 
this instance, the corporate-actor downslider would repeal the first 
amendment and revive the New Deal. Coleman argues from three basic 
assumptions: "corporate actors" possess the sum total of individual 
thought; individuals and groups do act on their beliefs; and--the critical 
assumption here--beliefs reflect self-interest. He even hopes for "nor-
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.ative evaluations of society by the degree to which they satisfy the 
preferences of their members" (1975:93). But what happens to a cor-
porate actor with a split personality? Does his weaker self get sent to 
the ovens? Does society itself condemn the weaker corporate actors? Do 
corporate actors ever acquiesce in their own condemnation? 
These questions return us to the problem of reconciling Blalock's 
methodological individualism with Marx's theory about the role of indi-
viduals in the stratification process. Unlike Coleman, Marx did not 
assume that our perceptions of self-interest reflect our real situation. 
Instead he predicted a series of events: increasing interaction among 
exploited miners, seamstresses, and chimney sweeps followed by the rise 
of a true class consciousness and the consequent revolt of these victims. 
Meanwhile, manufacturers, government bureaucrats, and other well-placed 
fortunates controlled the various propaganda sources, convincing the poor 
to "be humble, obey the law, wait for heaven later." Thus Marx outlined 
an historical sequence affecting attitudinal change. Further, he traced 
the origin of this sequence to a set of economic conditions--the break-
down of French peasant economy--which should have an increasing impact 
on each generational cohort. After the revolution, grandfather owned 
enough farmland to sustain a family. Two grandsons cannot support their 
families on the same land; three grandsons have migrated to the city and 
become revolution-minded proletarians. In other words, Marx described a 
functional sequence on the brink of developmental change (8). The old 
revolution had won peasant support which was later reinforced by govern-
ment propaganda; however, increasing economic pressure combined with 
increasing opportunities for the dispossessed farmers to congregate in 
urban slums, would generate true--revolutionary--class consciousness 
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among the lower-class corporate actors and this consciousness would 
create the pressure for a new revolution. With Marx's expla~tion, a 
set of predictions really, about institutional structure (33) and 
related cultural products (42), we could design a class-consciousness 
questionnaire (34). Then, with random sampling (11) and a miracle of 
retroactive time, we could perform a longitudinal study of rising pro-
revolution attitudes. Or, we could sample strategic groups (12,40), 
test their attitudes (42), and combine this information with census 
projections (39) to predict future attitude change. (See Stinchcombe, 
1968:101-30 for other examples of this approach.) 
Goffman's individualistic approach would lead us to other kinds 
of reformulation. He too probes the nature of class consciousness, 
specifically the conscious perceptions of subordinate and superior. 
Like Marx, he directly examines the structural limits (40) of his par-
ticular stage and links these structures to universal conditions (12): 
all "inferiors" will become conscious of their condition if interaction 
structures are present; all subordinates will develop "humble" fronts if 
superiors seem to demand these. However, where Marx and Blalock had 
studied societal (23,14) change, Goffman observes (35) the limited stage 
of primary groups (18) within one complex organization (19). Can we 
combine Coffman's ideas about interaction fronts with Marx's theory of 
class consciousness? We cannot simply use Goffman the way we used 
Blalock, as a test of Marx. Blalock designed a methodology to test 
theory; Goffman, in contrast, developed a framework for generating it. 
He moves his framework into the field and observes the action (35). 
Goffman happens to be a master observer who has detected interaction 
similarities between the convent novice and the prisoner of war, between 
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the socially stigmatized prostitute and the physically handicapped para-
plegic. However, a framework like his finds its meaning only in the 
talent of the observer. Less skillful researchers, eyeballing the 
scenery without the guidance of a plot outline, tend to acquire the 
ideology of individual actors without appreciating the entire set (Huber). 
How ironic! If we study impression management and interaction fronts, 
we must assume that our subjects are also presenting a front to us. Thus 
we may be led by our own methodology into a world of perception unbounded 
by structural limits. 
But, thinking about this problem for a moment, we can imagine how 
very useful a front must be. Information is power; knowledge of their 
fears and desires enables others to control us, through manipulation if 
nothing else (Stinchcombe, 1968:163-73). Both exploited and exploiter 
would have good reason to present a false interaction front. Perhaps 
we could develop several ideal types (13): the god-like noble, the humble 
peasant, the crafty entrepreneur. How would these people interact in a 
typical encounter? We could assume each type of person acts rationally 
to hide critical information from the others. Then the pre-industrial 
peasant, the older black man, the traditional housewife, should all pre-
sent a front that displays servility and masks hostility. To test our 
idea we can observe the action, measuring real players against typical 
ones. Using types for comparison we can also observe action in different 
structural situations. Do rural, southern blacks present "humble" fronts 
more consistently than their urban, northern cousins? Even more critical: 
do fronts promote or retard class consciousness? In Rainwater's (1970) 
study of a housing project, residents would not unite for common causes 
because each refused to associate with "disreputable" fellow residents. 
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Suttles' (1968) participant observation of a lower-class Chicago com-
munity caught many residents in the act of presenting their fronts to 
"disreputable" members of other groups--with dress, street demeanor, 
and other signals, they told each other "I'm a safe associate" or "Don't 
tread on me." Alinsky's (1971) work in community organization typically 
began when residents acted as if they were powerful (perhaps in an exer-
cise set up for this purpose by Alinsky himself). A powerful act would 
become power itself when lower-class people came to see themselves as 
powerful actors with powerful fronts. In sum, Goffmanesque players 
occupy far larger stages than the ward of a mental hospital. Investi-
gating their fronts could detail some of t~e mechanisms behind the growth 
of class consciousness and suggest techniques for raising (or suppressing) 
this consciousness in modern groups. 
In conclusion, Marx remains the most general stratification theorist 
of the three considered here. Marx outlines a societal process and the 
distribution of its effects. Blalock, the methodologist, suggests ways 
to test some predictions from Marx's theory. Goffman, the inductive 
definitionist, raises new questions about how class-based ideas come 
into being. 
Religious asceticism is a cultural product (42), a particular set 
of beliefs about spiritual good and related processes shared by some 
groups. Weber 1904-05, Durkheim 1912, and Sumner, three authors who 
were not writing in response to each other, still share remarkable 
agreement on the nature of religious self-sacrifice for spiritual ends. 
Nonetheless, these authors are not highly similar to each other in 
overall trait distributions. Even though Durkheim and Weber both belong 
in the structural factor (Factor 1) and Sumner is a methodologist 
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(Factor 2) with structural-factist tendencies, their overall similarity 
is only .43 (based on 18 common traits). I will examine their diverse 
theoretical approaches to this common problem beginning with the group 
processes they observed (trait dimension 5) and the observational vari-
ables they used (dimension 6). Then I will review their separate 
methodological traditions (dimensions 1 and 2) to discern how a combined 
methodology could generate new hypotheses about religious asceticism. 
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism Weber detailed 
the beliefs of radical protestant sectarians (trait 41), the Protestant 
people most anxious to lead "new" lives, to oppose all popish ideas and 
life styles. These intensely practical pe~ple condemned waste-of-time 
as the ultimate sin. Excessive sleep, non-useful sex, profligate spend-
ing, all distracted men from the pursuit of God's calling to useful work 
in the world. Furthermore, man is only God's trustee; the fruits of a 
successful calling belong to God, not to the vineyard worker. Thus, 
Protestant asceticism both denied sectarians the right to enjoy success 
by wasting time or money on "useless" activity and, at the same time, 
urged them to work harder than ever at their calling, which happened to 
be trade. The result: a new kind of businessman (26) on the cutting 
edge of the culture (31). Their dynamic inner-worldly asceticism per-
meated and transformed modern life (32): the severe English Poor Relief 
Legislation, for example, reflected the moral order of people who called 
beggardy a sin; and now adults in industrial societies live in the Iron 
Cage of work even though their religion no longer defines work as God's 
calling. 
In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim delineated a 
more restricted subject matter, the positive and negative rituals of 
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primitive peoples. Ascetic rituals or negative rites separate sacred 
areas from profane ones, teaching (27) profane humans how to perform 
sacred acts. In other words, negative ascetic practices distinguish 
among people (26), helping to coordinate (29) sacred-profane areas of 
social life by assigning the roles and rites appropriate to each (40). 
The world does not contain inherently sacred or profane objects. We 
ourselves define who is our God or what is our totem. Since these dis-
tinctions are socially defined rather than inherent, we naturally blur 
them in our own minds and need some social mechanisms to remind ourselves 
that different kinds of objects exist in the world. These social 
mechanisms, various practices like fasting or flagellation are, there-
fore, not the fruits of more positive spiritual impulses, but the sources 
of such spirituality. Without suffering induced by ascetic rites, there 
would be no proper sense of a distinct sacred duty to a god or to society. 
In Folkways Sumner surveyed numerous, diverse groups looking for 
ways that people endure pain in the name of religion. He called asceticism 
"an abberation," an innovative (31) response to man's ancient fear of 
spiritual forces. Even in modern life, such "abberant" responses as 
voluntary poverty and perpetual virginity exist in testimony to the per-
sistant belief that powerful gods are pleased by man's suffering. Natu-
rally, Sumner concluded, the ascetic impulse lures men from harmonious 
personal balance toward extremes. We must not be surprised to find those 
who refrain from sex judging the sexual activities of others; those who 
seek pain for themselves permitting torture for others. • • • 
Turning to the methodology behind these three views, we find 
increasing levels of sophistication. Sumner worked with the simplest 
framework, far too simple in fact. For Folkways he viewed "anthropo-
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logical data" by simply imposing an inductive (9) "evolutionary per-
spective" (1910:2244-47) in order to "trace the evolution of society 
from its germ up to its present highest forms" (ca 1900:425). One 
suspects his "evolutionary perspective" encouraged a chronic case of 
temperocentrism. Durkheim, of course, looked for social facts or 
"phenomena which would not exist if this society did not exist and which 
are what they are only because this society is constituted the way it is" 
(1900:363). Phrased differently, he studied "all the beliefs and the 
modes of conduct instituted by the collectivity" (190l:lvi). Sumner 
explained that a psychologically based (4) fear of the spiritual world 
leads men to propitiate the gods through culturally defined rites; Durk-
heim that men acting in their society (3) name a god and then build 
ascetic practices to encourage more positive forms of worship. Both 
theorists defined asceticism as an evolving cultural meaning, but only 
Durkheim attempted to probe that meaning (1) in his research. Weber 
introduced a different methodological perspective; instead of searching 
for the ultimate origin of religious impulse, he designed a methodology 
explicitly for examination of such cultural forms once they exist. His 
sociology studies causal chains of social action by exploring bow and why 
people voluntarily act in response to other people. He assumed, of course, 
.that cultural values define the reasons behind voluntary social action. 
Weber investigated these cultural reasons with a technique of analytic 
understanding, or Verstehen (2) (1922:4-26); he defined an ideal type (13) 
describing the extreme or characteristic values of some social-action 
orientation and then interpreted a specific situation in terms of its 
correspondence to the ideal type (1904:62-112). After defining a type 
of social-cultural meaning, he could hypothesize the causal sequences 
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of special situations (12) where his types, or some empirical forms 
approximating his types, would occur in the empirical world. In this 
instance, he described a causal sequence of negative-ascetic practices 
strengthening the spiritual power of certain Protestant sects thereby 
igniting a powerful economic motive which he called the "spirit of 
capitalism." 
When combining the ideas of these three theorists, we can begin 
with solid agreement on basic definitions. All three described negative 
or ascetic practices--personal denial ranging from self-torture that 
prevents the very pleasure of feeling good to sexual abstinance that 
precludes the pleasure of feeling very good. All believed ascetic 
practices would inspire more positive forms--worship ranging from a 
mystical escape in other-worldly ecstasy to a grimly degermined conquest 
of this world. All observed how people who practice asceticism expect 
others to practice it as well. However, Weber and Sumner differed from 
Durkhetm on one important point. Durkheim stressed the usefulness of 
rites to define a line of practice separating the sacred world from the 
profane one. Sumner and Weber suggested that ascetic practices could, 
depending on one's view of religion, lead one to unite the sacred and pro-
fane worlds instead of separating them. In other words, they described 
.different types of religious impulse. Although all religious meanings 
begin in man's effort to deal with some other-worldly force, some direct 
that spiritual force into a redirection of mundane life. 
I Direction of Spiritual Impulse 
Other-worldly 
Mixed 
Inner-worldly 
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Chart 1 
TYPES OF SPIRITUAL PRACTICE 
Negative 
(Ascetic) 
Positive 
(Non-ascetic) 
Social Con-
sequences 
Private Fast Initiation into Separation of 
Rituals (Durkheim)~Priestly Rites ~ Sacred and profane 
(Durkheim) (Durkheim) 
Sexual Abstinance Medieval Monas- Christian Attitude 
(Sumner; Weber)~ ticism (Sumner)~ toward Sexual"Sin" 
(Sumner) 
Abstinance From 
"Idle" Time 
(Weber) 
\II Calvinistic 
11Calling" 
(Weber) 
English Poor Relief 
Legislation (Weber) 
Viewed in this typology, the line between the sacred and profane blurs 
further. Durkheim described "elementary forms" of religious ritual in a 
mystery-laden primitive world; Sumner and Weber detailed ascetic practice 
in a much more secularized society. If Durkheim is correct in claiming 
we-define god and the sacred in the image of our own group, then a small, 
ethnocentric primitive tribe could define itself as a sacred people and its 
own natural environment as a powerful sacred force: "we are the people and 
this land is made for us by our gods." Modern man, well innoculated by 
anthropology and natural science, is more apt to deny all sacredness, to 
. call the world world a profane machine. Modern man also lives in a 
world of heterogeneous belief, sometimes even heterogeneous belief under 
the cover of a common religion. Whatever his view of the sacred, he 
experiences it as a minority view. I would hypothesize that the long 
term trend toward modern secularization has changed the universal social 
conditions (12) underlying the sacred impulse. If primitive asceticism 
marked a distinction between sacred and profane in a predominantly 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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sacred milieu, modern asceticism illuminates small corners of sacredness 
in an overwhelmingly profane world. So naturally, modern asceticism 
must inspire men to act in the world rather than withdraw from it. (For 
an interpretation of the development of Roman Catholic religious orders 
that assumes this hypothesis, see Gannon and Traub, 1969. 
To research these sweeping ideas, I would begin by defining univer-
sal societal conditions (12) in terms of the first three observational 
traits. The societies with high technical and material resources (37), 
high urbanization (38), and low mortality rates (39) would probably differ 
religiously from those with little science and technology, low urbaniza-
tion, and high mortality. Then, borrowing from Weber's type-building 
strategy (13), I would look for societies that approach extremes of pri-
mitive and modern development, or perhaps two extremes and a midpoint: 
for example, selected primitive tribes, medieval Europe, and the modern 
United States. In these societies, I would expect religious asceticism 
to find different expression, especially in its social consequences: 
more mysticism in the sacred societies, more overt social-control action 
in the secular ones. The position of a group within the society may 
also be critical. We might assume the trend toward secularization is 
also a trend toward increasing human control over physical and social 
matters. If this is true, we might further expect different kinds of 
people (41) with different positions and feelings of power to have differ-
ent religious impulses. Among those who actually practice a religion, 
lower-class slum dwellers might score higher on an "other-worldly 
religion" questionnaire than middle-class suburbanites (Roof, 1976:197-97). 
Or a society with a colonial power structure (40) might inspire more 
sectarian religious movements than a more egalitarian society (Smelser, 
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1962:338-52). Finally, going beyond religion per se, we might look for 
religious ideas in other institutions, like law: Is law more likely to 
enforce the negative proscriptions of asceticism or the positive pres-
criptions of worship? Given the ascetic's zeal to impose his self-denial 
on others, I would expect religious-inspired law to say "do not" more 
often than "do." Gusfield's explanatory history of the temperance crusade 
provides one illustration of this zealous desire to eradicate sin com-
mitted by others {Gusfield, 1963). 
These research hypotheses will not astound anyone familiar with 
current thought in the sociology of religion. However, the theoretical 
framework, building from the theory typology, constructs a common 
structure around the hypotheses by indicating societal conditions that 
accompany certain forms of religious asceticism and stating these condi-
tions in a way that frees them from specific groups and specific time 
periods. (For more details on this approach, see Freese, 1972a, 1972b; 
Willer and Willer, 1972.) If the theory typology helps us articulate 
more such common theoretical frameworks, it will have served us well. 
Theory Reformulation: Approaches From the Theory Taxonomy 
So far I have used two substantive problems, the group process of 
strattfication and the cultural product called religious asceticism, to 
serve as examples for reformulating the ideas of several theorists into a 
more unified common framework. In each example, I tried to expand the 
original theories either by generating new propositions about a subject or 
by suggesting new testing strategies or both. Doing this, I developed 
some general ad hoc rules. First, I briefly defined where the subject 
matter at hand fit among the trait variables and what it meant as a 
sociological issue. Second, I reviewed the methodological and subject 
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matter assumptions posited by each author, relating these assumptions 
(along with their associated trait variables) to the work itself. For 
less familiar theories, I would reason backwards from the works to the 
assumptions: Does the author seem to be developing a deductive mathematical 
model (10) or interpreting social action (1)? Does he stress social 
causes (3) or psychological ones (4)? Actually this procedure serves well 
even with familiar authors. For example, Durkheim's positivistic rules 
formulated in the 1980's do not detail the more interpretive methodology 
of Elementary Forms. Third, I examined the trait distributions for the 
chosen works. Did the common traits seem vital to analysis or peripheral? 
The stress on social-level causes (3) common to all stratification 
theorists seems inherent to any analysis of how social structures rank 
people within societal groups. On the other hand, we could easily study 
stratification effects in the community (22) even though none of the 
theorists in our sample chose to do so. Finally, with these ideas about 
subject matter, author's orientation, and some particular works firmly in 
mind, I began "plflying" with the theories. In these examples, I supple-
mented my own game rules with theory-building ideas from Stinchcombe 
(1968), Freese (1972) and the Willers (1972). In this final section, I 
will present other reformulation problems for those who would like to 
play on their own; first some comments on social roles, and then two 
subject matters I introduced in Chapter II, namely reductionism and the 
use of social groups as sites of analysis. 
Role is a crucial component of group differentiation (26). However, 
roles are not real objects but analytic constructs far more abstract than 
a group process like stratification or a group product like religious 
asceticism. The term "role" denotes a network of rights and duties 
r 
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associated with some position or functional performance in society. 
Always a social level variable (3), the role explains individual behavior 
by tying it to some position in the surrounding structure (40). Whatever 
their psychological motives may add to the situation, priests and prosti-
tutes act a part as they perceive it is prescribed by society. When we 
begin to analyze these roles, we find separate components: prescribed 
roles (what society expects); subjective roles (what we think society 
expects); and enacted roles (what we do in conformance with expectations) 
(Deutsch and Krauss, 1965:175-77). In effect each role is really three. 
So we may wonder about the course of role play in those situations, most 
likely changing ones, when societal expectations and personal actions do 
not coincide. Unfortunately, we cannot investigate this question easily 
because the problem of measuring role components independently or linking 
changing social definitions to changing role behavior still troubles role 
theorists (Komarovsky, 1973). 
The three role works in our typology--Park's "Marginal man," Simmel' s 
"Poor," and Schut~'s "Homecomer"--may provide clues for solving some parts 
of this methodological puzzle. All three describe changing situations 
which disturbed some set of role expectations. Park argued that during 
times when cultural groups first intermingle, societal expectations must 
create a "marginal" world for the mulatto, the inunigrant, and the various 
other people who live between the two cultures. Park names these marginal 
role players as the bellwethers of our cultural future, the people whose 
marginal status forces them to enact new roles. Stmmel described indi-
viduals who could not initiate role innovations but must simply react to 
expectations imposed by others. By definition, the "poor" are those who 
ask for help but cannot contribute to society in return. For this reason 
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they cannot bargain over role definitions but must accept their defined 
positions--as unfortunates who can justly claim a fair share of social 
goods, as objects of charity performed for the benefit of the donor, as 
the source of potential menace who must be given welfare so they will not 
steal, as whatever society chooses to call them. In role analysis, both 
Park and Simmel discussed how society can create a role (2); Park also 
indicated that an individual may subjectively redefine his role, particu-
larly if he hears conflicting definitions from society (1). Schutz 
directly examined the subjective roles we build for ourselves and for 
others by constructing "personal types, 11 in this example ideal-type con-
structs of people creating false expectations for other members of their 
primary group. He described a homecomer newly returned from World War II. 
The family expected a John Wayne hero who would nonetheless be content to 
settle into his old life. Instead the homecomer was a young man anxious 
to make a different life or too anxious for any life except a long slide 
into alcoholism. 
In our efforts to reformulate role theory, we could begin as these 
theorists did by defining some peculiar, changing societal condition (12) 
and constructing a typical-hypothetical role expectation (13) that could 
grow from these conditions. Like Simmel and Park we could stress cultural 
expectations as they can be inferred from social structure (2,40) or like 
Schutz we could construct subjective expectations held by individuals 
judging others (1,41). Either way we will have outlined a role component 
independently of the way some individual plays the game yet tied to changes 
in the social structure. To complete the analysis, we should continue 
beyond such definitions to examine the role-in-action. The real question 
is when and why the expected-prescribed roles differ from the subjective 
I 
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and enacted ones. When does the immigrant decide to become a "real" 
citizen with a rightful claim on participation in the society? When 
does the homecomer simply tell his family "it must be & way?" When do 
the poor welfare recipients begin to demand their "just" rights? When, 
in other words, do role players achieve class consciousness and begin to 
redefine and reenact their roles (Komarovsky, 1973:659)? 
Reductionism (4), the use of psychological level variables to 
explain sociological data, has raised perennial controversey since sociolo-
gists first tried to claim a real, independent, scientific field. Few 
would seriously deny the importance of psychological variables; the problem 
is whether we can, or should, use them to explain group-linked behavior. 
Looking at the five reductionist works in the typology (Romans 1974, 
Romans 1950, Pareto, Sumner and Tarde) we can find rather different uses 
of this technique. Pareto and Tarde studied institutional structures of 
society (33); later, to explain these structures, they simply named the 
psychological motives behind the institutionalized behavior. Tautology--
the people who rule like "lions" have lionine psychological motives; the 
people who imitate an exciting new fad have a desire for novel activity. 
Sumner used similar reasoning when he attributed religious activities 
like asceticism to a motive like "fear of ghosts" which leads men to 
religion. Romans moved closer to the people with the psychological 
motives through his use of secondary sources based on interview/question-
naire data (34), participant observation (35), and experiment (36). He 
could even have looked directly for information about psychological pre-
dispositions if he had inquired about these in his subjects' background 
characteristics (41) or cultural values (42). However, unlike the other 
reductionists, he ignored these observational variables and concentrated 
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on the structural character of groups (40). Therefore, his reductionism 
rests on very abstract ground. All people desire goods; all pay limited 
costs to get these goods; a person's position in a group restricts his 
access to goods. But Homans never defines these goods. He does not ask 
why men in different groups value skill at diplomacy over prowess on the 
battlefield (42) or whether the peasant loves war as much as the noble 
(41). 
In sum, examining reductionism in terms of trait variables reveals 
different kinds of reductionism with different substantive consequences 
and different problems for theory reformulation. If reductionism ends in 
tautology, we must construct independent measures of lionine impulses, 
novel desires, or what have you. If reductionism has erased all group 
qualities and if we wish to make generalizations about social life, we 
must start by "bringing the group back in" to analysis. 
Groups have long been a focus of sociological interest. Studies 
of community (21,22), small or primary groups (17,18) and complex organi-
zations (19,20) fill the literature even though they are not well repre-
sented in this typology. But I have a suspicion, mentioned in Chapter II, 
that studies using one kind of group as a source of independent variables 
(a unit of analysis) and another as a source of dependent variables (an 
obje~t of analysis) differ in important ways from studies focusing on only 
one kind of group. 
Looking at other trait variables we can see how this effect must 
vary with the kinds of groups. Studies focusing exclusively on small 
groups or complex organizations often describe the internal mechanisms of 
an artificial setting. For example, when Homans linked status level with 
deviance, he defined "status" in terms of the experimental (36) subject 
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group; some members were told that others had rated them "high" or "low" 
(40). Romans later examined status and deviance in real groups with 
people who brought their status with them from society itself. Since 
most of us respond to our own personal status background (41) as well as 
the structural character of a small group (40), a telling study of per-
sonal status effects must eventually consider both. Furthermore, even 
the naturally formed groups respond to pressures from other groups. We 
can see this, among other places, recorded in the history of community-
power literature. It began with traditional, in-depth studies of a single 
community, almost self-contained if we believe the sociological descrip-
tions. More recently this field has progressed to regression analyses of 
environmental variables affecting a list of communities examined only for 
the specific regression variables (Clark, 1975). Actually the variables 
examined may remain the same--population distribution, ethnic composition, 
material resources--but in one form of analysis, the variables may rest in 
the unique holistic fabric of a single community (5,21); in the other form, 
variables become separate, weighted qualities of society (6,23) that happen 
to converge in a particular place, bringing particular effects. In studies 
with society as the object of analysis (24), we usually reverse the direction 
of the variables and look for effects generated by internal groups. In other 
words, we can conceptualize society as a single, holistic group (5) or the 
site of various analytically distinct institutional structures (6) which 
can act through various communities, complex organizations, or primary 
groups. Cooley's study of class ideology illustrates the holistic approach. 
He explained how capitalistic ideology permeated the minds of all members 
of society; although the rich controlled the media (and, we presume, pro-
moted their own ideas), all citizens shared the dream of social mobility 
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through hard work and even the lower-classes worked to transform their 
dream into reality. Marx, with his more analytic conception, did not 
assume such happy agreement among people placed in different institu-
tional structures of society or such a fortunate correspondence between 
dreams and more substantial reality. 
Perhaps, the most important distinction to make in this discussion 
of groups is whether a sociologist studies the group itself as a subject 
matter or whether he examines a particular problem like power or coordina-
tion or stratification. If we simply want to study a group per se, we 
may be justified in viewing it as a holistic entity, source of both inde-
pendent and dependent variables. But for studies of group process, we 
need a more analytic approach, connecting separate parts of a group or 
tying the group to outside influence. 
In conclusion, trait variables do provide clues for theory reformula-
tion. These variables also reveal an intimate relationship between sub-
stance and method. The choice of observational variables or data-gather-
ing techniques first appears to be a methodological decision. But a pre-
ference for questionnaire data (34) may lead one to use social background 
characteristics (41) like a respondent's social class. This choice, in 
turn, may lead one to study the distribution of stratified goods rather 
than the relationships creating that distribution. Finally, the vari-
ables prove there is no one pre-packaged way to approach a substantive 
topic. With at least three works for each topic, we find rather small 
cores of similar traits. The highest overall similarity for any of the 
topic group considered was .55 (based on 23 shared traits) for the three 
social role works, well below the pair-by-pair mean similarity of .637. 
Clearly, we must conclude, theory building can follow many forms; it is 
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unlikely that any one paradigm tendency delimits the analytic possibili-
ties for any one sociological topic. 
, 
CHAPTER VI 
INFLUENCES ON SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY: CREATING THE CLUSTERS 
In Chapter VI I will examine the proposition that "truth" is a 
dependent variable: even "rational" scientific truth may be affected by 
such non-rational, non-scientific considerations as the group membership 
(or social circle) of the scientist. We have solid evidence arguing for 
the existence of potentially effective groups; for example, Crane's (1970) 
identification of "invisible colleges" and Mullins' (1973) mapping of 
"theory groups." Both Crane and Mullins exposed ties of interests uniting 
clusters of social researchers and theorists. Allegiances formed through 
sponsorship or colleagueship reappeared as authors advocated similar per-
spectives, worked on similar problems, cited a common pool of sources. 
But--this is the question I raised earlier--do these social-circle groups 
share the common gestalt of a single paradigm? 
With the evidence from the theory typology, we must answer "no" 
because the paradigm types are so loosely clustered few theorists 
belong unambiguously to any one type (see Figure 8). I even labeled 
these types "paradigm tendencies" rather than paradigms. I also located 
clusters of theorists centered around a similarity core of trait vari-
ables, but found within each cluster that two works could be highly 
related to a third yet share very little similarity to each other: as if 
one sociologist loved sports, one classical music, a third both field 
hockey and opera. Thus, even membership in the same cluster does not 
insure high similarity between a specific pair of theorists. With this 
peculiar structure of similarity between theoretical works, we cannot 
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expect a simple correspondence between social circles of theorists and 
paradigm types of theoretical thought. Nonetheless our taxonomy pro-
cedure can answer some questions about whether social allegiances influ-
ence thought, whether scientific politics affects science, whether belong-
ing to a group means thinking in orthodox ways. In this chapter, I will 
consider the sociology-of-sociology hypotheses presented in Chapter II. 
We need not sort the thinkers into paradigm groups to test these hypotheses. 
Instead, assuming that works on a tether circle together, we can look for 
the ties of high similarity between works written by members of the same 
scientific circles. 
The final hypothesis links theoretical ideas to groups of theorists 
who share basic outlooks about the proper function of sociology in society. 
For this problem, I will use a different strategy. Since I did not delib-
erately choose policy researchers, radicals, or other practice-orientated 
theorists, I do not have a good selection of them in the typology. How-
ever, the typology does contain one outstanding radical, Marx, who advo-
cated science-for-action but shares highest degrees of similarity with the 
much more conservative Parsons 1971, with Cooley the ever-optimistic 
democrat, with the consensus theorist Comte, and with Weber 1922 the 
cautious academic. Something besides their sense of sociological mission 
must have united these theorists. To delimit their common views, I will 
perform another exercise in theoretical reformulation via the trait vari-
ables. Although relatively few traits separate these thinkers, the odd 
traits may well be the crucial ones. 
Social Circles in Sociology Revisited 
The various hypotheses linking paradigm views with group membership 
rest on two basic assumptions, one drawn from the philosophy of science, 
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one from the sociology of sociology. I originally assumed that exclusive-
exhaustive paradigms exist. But the evidence of Chapters IV and V firmly 
contradicts this. In Chapter IV only ten out of 25 works could be unam-
biguously placed 'in a type category and even these had non-zero factor 
loadings for other types (see Tables 13-15). In Chapter V, I demonstrated 
how a few key traits, rather than an entire paradigm complex, account for 
the necessary ties among theorists working on some common sociological 
topic. The second assumption has proved less problematic. I claimed that 
scientific sociological circles exist and in Chapter II supported my asser-
tion with research evidence from the literature on "invisible colleges," 
"theory groups," and other colleague circles. 
If the typology had defined unambiguous type categories, we could 
test hypotheses relating circle groups to paradigms with a simple procedure, 
straightforward even if time-consuming. We could select theorists from 
various social circles, code a selection of their works, classify these 
works with the variable weights from multi-discriminant analysis (see 
Table 20) and, finally, test the statistical probability that circle 
membership would coincide with type memberships the way they do. (For an 
explanation of how to identify new works with discriminant analysis, see 
Sneath and Sokal, 1973:400-08; for a mathematical exposition of multi-
discriminant analysis, see Cooley and Cohnes, 1971 and Van de Geer, 1971; 
for computer procedures, Klecka, 1975.) Of course, we cannot pursue this 
strategy here, partly because unambiguous paradigms do not exist--at 
least not in this research--and partly because our initial group of 25 
works does not justify this kind of statistical testing. Fortunately we 
have other options. The typology rests on similarities defined by the 
simple matching coefficient. In Chapter III, I detailed the virtues of 
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TABLE 20 
DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS POR PREDICTING GROUP-TYPE MEMBERSHIP PROM SELECTED TRAIT VARIABLES 
Function 1 Function 2 
Standardized8 Unstandardizedb Standardized a Unstandardized 
Var 1c 0.04632 0.09085 5.08970 9. 98171 
Var 2 0.54873 1. 98178 0.67718 2.44568 
Var 3 0.20652 0.62267 -4.44383 -13.39863 
Var 4 0.50160 1.22866 0.03700 0.09063 
Var 5 0.13125 0.25741 0.89525 1. 75573 
Var 6 -0.53405 -1.22519 -6.21680 -14.26231 
Var 7 -0.41257 -1.01058 -1.68483 - 4.12697 
Var 8 -0.51989 -1.13449 -1.96213 - 4.28172 
Var 9 -0.41171 -0.94453 -10.36690 -23.78328 
Var 10 -0.33651 -0.68690 -10.79249 -22.03008 ~ 0\ 
Var 11 -0.95230 -1.86762 - 1.91163 - 3.74901 N 
Var 12 -0.35916 -0.73313 0.26018 0.53109 
Var 13 -0.06076 -0.12402 - 0.07378 - 0.15059 
Var 14 -o .04118 -0.12418 - 0.05062 - 0.15263 
Var 15 0.16579 0.34822 5.58668 11.73438 
Var 16 0.02670 . 0.08050 2.82919 8.53030 
Var 17 -0.03704 -0.09073 - 4.07428 - 9.97990 
Var 18 0.63738 1.33877 6.17277 12.96540 
Var 19 -o.84220 -3.04168 - 3.82290 -13.80666 
Var 20 -0.46313 -1.13444 - 1. 74623 - 4.27737 
Var 21 0.04991 0.13340 0.59982 1.60308. 
Var 22 1.01394 2.48364 7.63197 18.69444 
Var 23 0.93022 2.27855 4.08282 10.00082 
Var 24 0.59903 1.25822 2.11054 4.43301 
Var 25 0.82912 2.03093 3.95757 9.69403 
Constant -3.90851 40.16757 
TABLE 20--(Cont) 
Function 1 
Standard!Zed4 Unstandardizedb 
Centriods 
Type 1 
Type 2 
Type 3 
Relative 
Percentage of 
Discriminatory 
Power 
Significance of 
Explanatory 
Function 
98.42 
d.£. so 
Chi-square 219.183 
level Beyond.Ol 
0.51603 
-0.23687 
-2.52940 
Function 2 
Standardized8 Unstandardizedb 
1.58 
24 
88.946 
Beyond.Ol 
0.43073 
- 1.94538 
0.80122 
astandardized coefficients can be interpreted like beta weights in regression analysis. 
bunstandardized weights multiplied by the variable scores (1 and 2 instead of the initial coding of 
0 and 1) and added to the function constant provide a total score for any particular work. This score, 
compared to the Type centroid, is the basis for classifying new works being added to the typology. 
cSee Appendix B for list of traits. Other trait variables were dropped by the computer during 
analysis because they caused singularity in the within-groups covariance matrix and, therefore, could not 
be used for computations. However, with a different set of works, they may prove important. 
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this tool: it falls into a conservative binomial distribution, giving us 
a basis for statistical comparisons of similarity pairs; it is also a Q 
technique to cluster theorists from a sample of traits, giving us an N 
of 42 traits instead of 25 theorists. Thus, for an initial exploration 
of our hypotheses, we need only define an intersting group and compare 
its mean similarity with overall population means (see Appendix E for 
formulas). 
Our original hypotheses about social effects on theoretical works 
fell into three categories: four hypotheses about the composition of 
scientific social circles, two about patterns of change in the circles, 
one about societal influences on the circles: 
Hypothesis IIIa.--The members of particular substantive circles in 
sociology will produce works that are similar to the works of fellow 
circle members. 
Hypothesis IIIb.--The members of a social circle formed around core 
ideas will produce works that are similar to the works of fellow circle 
members. 
Hypothesis !!!c.--People trained both in the same tradition and at 
the same school will be more likely to produce similar works than 
theorists who simply share the same substantive interests. 
Hypothesis IIId.--Opponents in famous controversies will tend to 
belong to different classification categories. 
Hypothesis IVa.--In the early stages of a specialty, theoretical-
research works will tend to be more similar to each other than they are in 
later stages. 
Hypothesis IVb.--When a new tool is introduced to a discipline, its 
initial users will tend to be very similar to each other. 
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Hypothesis V.--"Priestly" and "prophetic" sociologists will form 
two cognitive groups producing two different types of sociological work. 
Later we will return to the last hypothesis, but first consider the 
evidence on Hypotheses Ilia through Vlb along with some implications 
carried by that evidence. 
Hypotheses Ilia and IIIb.--In Chapter V, I analyzed the networks of 
similarity among students of stratification and religious asceticism, 
advocates of role analysis and reductionism. Now we can examine the same 
theorists as those who share a "substantive circle" or a circle formed 
around "core ideas." In each instance, we would expect the mean similarity 
for the group to be significantly higher than the overall mean of .637. 
Instead we find very different patterns (see Tables 21 through 24). The 
stratification mean falls near the average when we consider all stratifi-
cation theorists in the typology (.621) and significantly below the 
average for the three analyzed earlier, Blalock-Goffman-Marx (.533). 
Although we should expect a low mean for Blalock-Goffman-Marx (since we 
already analyzed them as theorists who approach the same problem from 
different types perspectives), we could expect the total stratification 
mean to reflect the substantive similarity much more than it does. 
Asceticism analysts and reductionists also share near-normal similarity 
cores (means .636 and .614). Only the role theorists fall into the pre-
dicted pattern of a significantly high mean (.70). 
Even with this high-similarity group, however, the total core of 
trait variables shared by all three theorists is quite low (22 or .55 
three-way similarity). In other words, the findings on these hypotheses 
linking substance to similarity reinforce our earlier discovery about the 
relationship between paradigms and substantive issues. Regardless of 
Blak-Cool 
Blak-Goff 
Blak-Ho74 
Blak-HoSO 
Blak-Marx 
Blak-Pare 
Blak-Pr53 
Blak-\~e22 
Blak-He46 
Cool-Goff 
Cool-Ho74 
Cool-HoSO 
Cool-Marx 
Cool-Pare 
Cool-Pr53 
TABLE 21 
SIMILARITIES FOR PAIRS OF STRATIFICATION THEORISTS* 
.62 Cool-We22 
.so Cool-lVe4o5 
.60 Goff-Ho75 
.45 Goff-HoSO 
.so Goff-Harx 
.76 Goff-Pare 
.64 Goff-Pr53 
.60 Goff-We22 
.51 Goff-He4-5 
.so Ho74-Ho50 
.55 Ho74-Harx 
.so Ho74-Pare 
.81 Ho74-Pr53 
.67 Ho7l1-He22 
.64 Ho74-He45 
Overall Similarity Mean = .637 
Stratification Mean • .621 
d.f. - 41 
t • 1.6, n.s. 
Mean for Blalock-Goffman-~~rx • .533 
t = 10.4 
.69 
.57 
.57 
.62 
.60 
.55 
.48 
.62 
.45 
• 76 
.40 
• 64 
.52 
.48 
.40 
HoSO-Marx 
HoSO-Pare 
Ho50-Pr53 
Ho50-We22 
Ho50-He4'5 
Marx-Pare 
Marx-Pr53 
Marx-We22 
Marx-He46 
Pare-Pr53 
Pare-He22 
Pare-Het,O 
Pr53-He22 
Pr 5 3-\~e4'5 
He22-\.Je4-5 
Sig. at .01 level, one-tail test--apposite the predicted direction 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
.40 
.55 
.48 
.52 
.45 
.71 
.60 
.83 
.67 
.64 
.74 
.67 ... 0\ 
.57 0\ 
.60 
.69 
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TABLE 22 
SIMILARITIES FOR PAIRS OF RELIGIOUS-ASCETICISM THEORISTS* 
DK12-Sumn .69 OVerall Similarity Mean • .637 
DK12-We45 .67 
Sumn-We45 .55 Asceticism Mean • .636 
d.£. - 41 
t • .1, n.s. 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
TABLE 23 
SIMILARITIES FOR PAIRS OF ROLE THEORISTS* 
Pk28-Schu .62 OVerall Similarity Mean • .637 
Pk28-SimP • 79 
Schu-SimP .69 Role Theorist Mean • .70 
d.£. - 41 
t - 6.30 
Significant at .01 level, 
one tail test 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
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TABLE 24 
SIMILARITIES FOR PAIRS OF REDUCTIONIST THEORISTS* 
Ho74-Ho50 .76 Overall Similarity Mean • .637 
Ho74-Pare .64 
Ho75-Sumn .67 Reductionist Mean 
- .614 
Ho74-Tard .45 
HoSO-Pare • 55 d.g • 
- 41 Ho50-Sumn .57 t 
-
2.30, n.s. 
Ho50-Tard .40 
Pare-Sumn .69 
Pare-Tard .67 
Sumn-Tard .74 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
what may hold true for physics, in sociology substantive problems are not 
tied to the high-similarity core of paradigm views. But, we have not 
really addressed the initial problem of circle groups and similarity. The 
various writers considered here did not always belong to the same circle, 
at least not as circles have been defined by Crane and Mullins. Many of 
these theorists worked on the same substantive issues without acknowledging 
each other, sometimes without even knowing of each other. Therefore we 
must look further to investigate questions about circle membership and 
similarities in cognitive structure among members. 
Hypothesis IIIc.--To properly test the "training" hypothesis, we also 
need more evidence than we have here; a cadre of theorists taught in the 
same tradition, graduated from the same school. Failing that, I have 
settled for Robert E. Park, a student of Georg Simmel, an imitator of 
Charles Horton Cooley (Braude, 1970; Coser, 1971:357-84). The comparison 
of Park with both of his forebearers and then Park with his teacher 
Stmmel shows that training may have some impact; the means (.66 and .667) 
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both fall slightly above the average although only the second is signifi-
cant (see Table 25). 
TABLE 25 
SIMILARITIES FOR PARK AND HIS INTELLECTUAL FOREBEARERS* 
Pk36-Cool 
Pk36-SimC 
Pk36-SimP 
Pk28-Cool 
Pk28-SimC 
Pk28-SimP 
.62 
.57 
.69 
.67 
.62 
• 79 
Overall Similarity Mean = .637 
Park-Simmel-Cooley Mean • .66 
d.f. - 41 
t • 2.30, n.s • 
Mean for Park-Simmel alone = .667 
t - 3.0 
Significant at .05 level, one tail test 
*See Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
However, we cannot fashion a conclusion from one example particularly 
when the exemplar theorist consciously imitated his high-similarity coworkers. 
For establishing the ties between training and theory, we should examine 
cohorts of graduates from selected schools. Mullins (1973:294-315) has 
mapped the lines of influence between sponsor and protege. But he further 
observed that the same intellectual parent may father very different off-
spring--as Parsons begat both Robert Bellah and Harold Garfinkel. Lodahl 
and Gordon (1973) observed teachers in more codified (paradigm-orientated) 
disciplines spending more time and thought, exerting more influence, on 
the direction of graduate students. These authors compared firm para-
digm disciplines like chemistry and physics with the less structured dis-
cipline of sociology. We may wonder if this tendency exerts its influence 
within sociology: no schools organized around more unified points of view 
produce more high-similarity graduates? Or do sociology departments simply 
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produce graduates who really learn on their own, and, no doubt, develop 
their own heresies in the process? 
These are not trivial questions. In practical decisions we assume 
great unity within graduate schools and diversity between them. Harvard 
and Chicago do not, we assume produce interchangeable scholars. A mid-
western school may deliberately seek a transfusion of "new blood" from 
the East Coast or from Berkeley. Stinchcombe (1975) compared such 
academic hiring procedures to primitive exchange rituals. Although all 
women have the same virtues (more or less), an Elk man must marry the 
"special" Beaver woman, else the whole exchange system would collapse and 
no Beaver men would consent to marry his Elk sisters and daughters. The 
evidence so far--on Park's moderate, deliberate similarity to his teacher 
Sfmmel; on the whole network of similarities--suggests that important 
·differences between groups may be small and deliberately contrived. Per-
haps Stinchcombe is right; in six months an Elk could learn to be a 
Beaver--in sociology the source of training is more important for political 
reasons than substantive ones. 
Hypothesis IIId.--Famous quarrels abound in sociology, as they do 
everywhere else I suppose. Ritzer (1975:201-08) argues that disputes often 
arise between paradigm perspectives and illustrates his claim with suitable 
example of theorists debating over methodological approaches. His 
examples include the Parsons (1963-Homans (1971) controversey over reduc-
tionism vs. functionalism (Ritzer, 1975:165-67). Although Parsons and 
Romans do not spend much time in mutual criticism, each consistently works 
in his own tradition, each consistently avoids the other's perspective. 
Excluding the unusual Structure of Social Action, I compared Parsons' 
work with Homans' and found a mean similarity of .487, well below the 
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average (see Table 26). The typology also contains Tarde and Durkheim, 
TABLE 26 
SIMILARITIES FOR PAIRS OF WORKS* IN FAMOUS CONTROVERSIES (TWO 
DK12-Tard 
DK97-Tard 
Ho74-Pr71 
Ho74-Pr53 
Ho50-Pr71 
Ho50-Pr53 
.67 
.60 
.45 
.52 
.50 
.48 
REDUCTIONISM CONTROVERSIES) 
Overall Similarity Mean • .637 
Controversey :t-1ean • .537 
d.£. - 41 
t - 10.0 
Significant at the .01 level, 
one tail test 
Durkheim-Tarde Mean = .635 
t • .2, n.s. 
two other theorists who consistently opposed each other on the issue of 
reductionism and sociological analysis, once carrying this opposition to 
public debate (Tarde, 1904). The mean similarity between their works, 
however, is almost exactly average at .635. 
Once again, although we cannot draw firm conclusions from the 
limited examples here, they do suggest problems for further thought. The 
mere existence of a quarrel does not signal paradigm divisions in sociology. 
To assess a quarrel we must examine the trait variables involved. Even a 
series of disputes centered around the same narrow topic, in this instance 
reductionism, may actually carry several sets of meanings. In Chapter V, 
I used trait variables to distinguish the tautological labeling by Tarde 
from the behavioralist analysis of Romans. This seems a good approach for 
examining controversies. Ritzer correctly documented how arguments may 
arise from paradigm divisions. Nonetheless, our task, if we are interested 
in theoretical reformulation, is to determine the exact points of differ-
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ence and the possible paths of reconciliation for theorists who oppose 
each other ever some specific method or technique. 
Hypotheses IVa and IVb.--The next two hypotheses link cognitive 
similarity to patterns of change in the discipline. Neither issue can be 
properly solved with the material from our typology although the clusters 
do leave some clues. For example, if we consider specialists very broadly 
defined, we find contradictory tendencies. When nineteenth-century Marx 
analyzed stratification, he resembled the old-fashioned Cooley (.81 + .12) 
and Pareto (.71 + .14) far more than the modern Blalock (.50+ .15) whereas 
Blalock does not share high similarity with fellow contemporaries Romans 
1974 (.60 + .15), Romans 1950 (.45 + .15), or Goffman (.50+ .15). It 
appears that the core of similarity does, indeed, decline as a speciality 
ages. On the other hand, when three near contemporaries--Weber 1904-05, 
Durkheim 1912, and Sumner--investigated religious asceticism, their mean 
similarity was only .635--compared to the overall mean of .637. The evidence 
on methodological tools is no more conclusive. Schutz based his ideal-
type methodology directly on Weber's (Wagner, 1970); ethnomethodology, in 
turn, claims direct kinship with Schutz (Turner, 1974:321-31). But the 
group means for Verstehen sociology is only .55, well belo~T the average 
(Table 27). In contrast, Blalock's path analysis of stratification relates 
very highly (.95 + .07) to the "typical" work of its kind described by 
Coser (1975). Here the combination of tool plus substance may be the 
critical variable. When Clark (1975) described recent path analyses of the 
variables affecting urban policy outputs, he described a group of researchers 
whose work used the Blalock mathematical techniques on a different set of 
topics (coding for Coser and Clark works available on request). Clark's 
typical work relates Only .74 (+ .13) to Coser's ideal type and .69 (+ .14) 
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TABLE 27 
SIMILARITIES FOR PAIRS OF WORKS* USING THE SAME 
SPECIAL METHODOLOGICAL TOOL 
Verstehen Methodology 
(as introduced by 
Weber) 
Coser' s "Typical" Ethnomethodologist-Schutz • 69 
Coser's "Typical" Ethnomethodologist-Weber 
04-05 .45 
Path Analysis (as 
developed by 
Blalock) 
Schutz-Weber 04-Q5 .52 
Blalock-Cla rk' s "Typical" Community-Power Work • 95 
Blalock-Coser's "Typical" Stratification Work .69 
Clark-Coser .74 
Overall Similarity Mean • .637 
Methodology Mean • .67 
d.f. - 41 
t - 3.30 
Significant at the .05 level, one tail test 
Mean for Verstehen Group • .55 
t: - 8.7 
Significant at the .01 level, one tail test-- opposite the 
Mean for Path Analysis Group • .79 
t - 15.6 
Significant at the .01 level, one tail test 
predicted 
direction 
~See pages 116, 172-73 for explanation of Clark-Coser works. See 
Appendix C for list of abbreviations. 
to Blalock's article, scores above average but also well below the almost 
total similarity between Blalock and other regression analysis-stratifies-
tion pieces. 
Coser himself (1975:693-95) suggests it is the combination of metho-
. dology with substance that freezes a work style. In other words, when we 
begin to automatically combine substance and method, we may impose pre-
mature closure on our technique. Since--if the evidence of this study 
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comes near the truth--we have not found the approach ideally suited to any 
one topic, we need open options, multiple techniques. However, promiscu-
ous leaping from fad to fad does not advance science either. In paradigm 
fields, a few creative pioneers lead into new territory, followed by 
dozens of imitators using the same kind of axe to clear the same kind of 
brush. Blalock (1970):114-15) would refer to the brush-clearing activity 
as "replication." Therefore, even if the use of similar tools does 
create a temporary high-similarity fad among social scientists, we need 
not disceurage this flurry of imitation. Perhaps, after tool and topic 
have both been tested in numerous replications, it may then be time to 
travel new scientific directions, axe in hand, looking for a new kind of 
brush. 
In conclusion, these hypotheses simply assert an overlap between 
members of a scientific social circle and theorists who belong to the same 
theoretical type sharing a high similarity core of trait variables. The 
results so far, ambiguous at best, indicate a possible relationship between 
thought similarities and such circle criteria as common training. We can-
not be surprised by the low support for these hypotheses. As we have seen 
in Chapter IV, even the types themselves show relatively low cores of 
similarity shared by all members. In Chapter V, I demonstrated how a few 
critical variables distinguish one analytical approach from another; and 
these critical variables vary with the subject. Finally, the small number 
of works examined here, selected to present diverse trends in the field, 
may not provide the sample to demonstrate these points. Indeed, I am 
certain we could define "substantive circle" and other circle groups in 
such narrow terms that all members would share quite similar thoughts (see 
Crane, 1969:316-17 for sampling suggestions). 
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causal direction: Do like~inded groups,circle together? Or does the dis-
cipline train like-minded groups? These questions need not concern theory-
builders who reconcile Goffman's study of self-fronts with Marx's ideas 
about class consciousness. But the issues involved do concern those 
interested in "normal science" research problems. If Kuhn (1970:23-51) 
is correct, if normal science activity requires scores of scientists 
researching the minor problems within a defined framework, then the dis-
cipline should consider how to acquire these normal scientists. On the 
other hand, if Crane (1972:22-40) is correct, if the need for concentra-
tions of specialists and generalists varies with the growth stage of the 
specific sub-field, we must also assess the maturity of a speciality. At 
present, sociologists often assume concentrated training will produce 
needed workers for speciality areas (Quarentelli and Weller, 1974:66). 
But, given the loosely defined "immature" state of many specialities, the 
discipline may be better served by generalized training for people who 
will work several subfields. In any event, more thorough investigation of 
possible causal paths implied by these hypotheses might help us to assess 
the merits of such issues as specialized versus generalized training. 
The Political Mission of the Scientific Circle 
The final hypothesis links scientific thought to outside influences; 
in this instance, "priestly" or "prophetic" orientations, an ideological 
stance about the purpose of science and, we presume, other areas of life 
as well. I will not attempt to test this hypothesis in the usual way but 
instead, will approach the problem with trait-variable analysis. I have 
chosen this approach chiefly because the reformulation problems here prove 
far more interesting than the identification ones. First, however, we 
, 
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JDU&t identify the basic difference between "prophets" and "priests." 
When Friedricks (1970) named these two types of sociologists, he was 
examining the discipline at its "prirnordal paradigmatic level" to uncover 
basic assumptions about the sociological role. He described prophets as 
iconoclasts who broke facets of the old order (1970:75) and priests as 
caretakers who preached a faith in truth from the past •. A priest would 
project past order on the future; a prophet would use knowledge of the past 
to change the future (1970:106-09). Good distinctions--but who are the 
theorists? Marx must be a prophet; he broke with the industrial-capital-
istic order by advocating a classless future. Nonetheless, after devoting 
many pages to Marx and the ''Marxist analogue," Friedrichs found very few 
"fully prophetic" sections in Marx's. work (1970:286). In truth this should 
not surprise us because few great thinkers can be comfortable fully married 
to an existing order or fully divorced from it. 
After reading Friedrichs, I concluded that the prophet-priest distinc-
tion is a variant of the old conflict-consensus dichotomy. It distinguishes 
those who wonder about the source of disorder and explain it in terms of dis-
agreement between interest groups from those who marvel at the existence of 
order and explain this in terms of a societal-wide consensus on basic values 
(Lenski, 1966:24-42). The conflict theorists, seeing one interest group 
suppress another, advocate insurrection; the consensus theorists, seeing a 
balance of agreement in society as a whole, praise the status quo (Warshay, 
1975:26-29, 60-66). Friedrichs himself (1970:289-328) recognized the 
parallel: if prophecy and priestliness do not equal conflict and consensus 
orientations, surely they are similar. 
However, I do not plan to code all 25 works from the typology on some 
conflict/consensus scale. As an alternative, I will examine the one truly 
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beads a theory cluster (Cluster 2, Table 6) immediately joined by Comte, 
Cooley, Parsons 1971, and Weber 1922--all clearly less prophetic, less 
iconoclastic than Marx. Yet all of these theorists share high similarity 
with each other and together head the structural factor (Factor 1, Table 15). 
If other prophetic ideas of conflict orientations required a separate para-
digm, surely Marx would not be quite so highly related to Parsons 1971, to 
Comte • • • Even with five people in the group, they share 24 common 
traits (.57 five-way similarity). 
These common traits argue against facile contrasts between conflict 
and consensus approaches. For example, is conflict an inherently radical-
developmental approach? Radical-critical sociologists, we have been told, 
study root relationships or the historically conditioned origin of change-
able structures (Birnbaum, 1971; Horowitz, 1971:12). But consensus 
researchers also explore "root relationships." All five of the writers in 
this group examined coordination (trait 29) with its implications of power; 
all stressed changing (32) modes of coordination, not short term change, but 
historical developmental sequences (8). In The System of Modern Societies, 
to take one example, Parsons outlined the shifting relationships between 
institutions when a society adapts to modern-commercial environments. 
Parsons argued that only a society with increasingly independent institu-
tions could effect the adaptive shift from medieval to modern capacity. 
Ironically, as Lenski (1966) concluded in Power and Privilege, the radical 
expose of exploitation structures often depict elite abuse of power dur-
ing a long-term status quo, while functional-consensus works like Parsons 
1971 better expose the root relationship leading a functionally useful group 
to assume elite positions in the first place. 
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Similar paradoxes pervade many other comparisons between these two 
approaches. Consider how functionalism and other varieties of large-systems 
analysis are often interpreted in conservative terms: "a function must be 
served." All five theorists examined here began by viewing a total society 
with functions (23); all but Weber 1922 continued on that level (24). All 
examined institutional structures (33) within a holistic-systems framework 
(15). Given these traits, we could fashion each work into a functional-
systems analysis. Even the piece by Marx. The "Eighteenth Brumaire" 
could be a description of how limited land reform promotes short-term 
political stability in a peasant economy. 
Rex (1961:60-71, 136-55) identified another conflict-consensus para-
dox. Conflict approaches, he argued, must separate personal motive from 
systems function, something functional analysis does not always do. Indeed, 
all of the works here stress a positivistic approach to viewing the action 
from the "outside" (2) and all explain people's behavior in terms of 
societal structure (3) rather than individual motives (4). On the other 
hand, Marx the conflict theorist and Cooley the conservative both used 
interpretive analysis (1) to link people with ideas--Cooley for detailing 
how society-wide open class ideology functions to obviate the need for 
rebellion; Marx in predicting how group-based class consciousness forms to 
ferment revolution. These "personal motives" could also be assessed through 
a positivistic questionnaireTinterview technique (34) if we asked about 
attitudes and labeled the answers "personal assessment of group interests." 
The crucial problem for conflict analysis, however, is determining where 
ngroup interest" really lies both in relation to function and compared to 
personal opinion. 
In other words, although our five exemplar theorists do not form a 
r 179 
representative sample of conflict-consensus theorists, they do illustrate 
that theory traits cannot be exclusively assigned to one perspective. 
Given our interest in theory reformulation, a more fruitful approach would 
be looking for common requirements rather than distinguishing features of 
conflict-consensus analysis. 
To begin, let us consider only problems of coordination (29) in a 
total society (23). Conflict in a permanent stalemate seems contradictory 
in such settings so we should use developmental analysis (8). Further, 
conflict occurs between two or more parties--at least it requires relational 
analysis (6) of different sectors in society; these relations could be 
observed with data about the structural characteristics of society (40) and 
the social background characteristics of individual people (41). This last 
trait seems vital. Conflict must occur between different kinds of people. 
If some groups exercise power (40), they may be performing a vital function 
for society; but if certain kinds of people (41) monopolize positions of 
power, then they have probably created a "conflict" situation. Marx in 
"Eighteenth Brumaire" and Weber in The City both examined what the power of 
"citizenship" might mean for distinct social groups. Both observed how 
urban masses formed a reservoir of revolutionary potential. Weber assessed 
the "bread and circus" policy of ancient Rome, economic and entertainment 
pallatives for the masses; Marx critiqued governmental reforms which 
appeared to relieve lower-class conditions while actually worsening them. 
Both men also highlighted an important facet of consensus. Agreement 
about societal values may occur for many reasons and have different impli-
cations among various groups. If we are to investigate the content of 
this consensus, any details besides the simple agreement signaled by 
absence of overt conflict we must examine it either as an interpreted 
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~eaning in the context of specific group situations (1) or as a cultural 
product tied to some particular group (42). For theoretical reformulation, 
we should use these ideas to unite both conflict and consensus in one 
analysis--! suggest by defining consensus in terms of group power, consensus 
as a source or product of conflict, perhaps consensus "a trophy for the 
winners." 
Collins (1975) has detailed a resolution between conflict and con-
sensus in precisely these terms. He called consensus a "power resource," 
the creation of consensus a "power act" (1975:59). In his chapter on 
"State, economy, and ideology" he argued that even the most arbitrary 
dictatorship rests on a set of beliefs organized by the dictator (1975: 
348-413). At a minimum, citizens share consensus that their personal self-
interest will be best served by obedience to the established order. I 
suppose this could include the self-interest in not being shot. Certainly 
when we examine a societal group looking for the specifics of consensus, 
we find little practical agreement: everyone supports "justice" but differs 
over the particulars of a just decision (Mennell, 1974:116-40). Thus, the 
consensus actually supporting a social order may be no more than a wide-
spread agreement that, for whatever reason, we personally will not subvert 
the present regime. 
If we accept this perspective of conflict/consensus we need not wonder 
why prophets and priests gather in the same theory cluster. Instead, we 
should examine the mechanisms promoting consensus. Treat consensus like 
money or material or manpower or any other power resource. Look for the 
routes through which one group acquires control over the ideas of others 
and detail how this group then uses consensus to further its advantage. 
This perspective eluded Comte during his search for the universal 
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sequence of connnon world views (1858:258-63). In "Brief estimate of modern 
history," he related the shift in European culture from the spiritual force 
of papal rule to the scientific capacity of industrial states presenting 
European history as the most advanced example of this relationship between 
kinds of societies and kinds of thought. In the end, however, Comte's 
explanation tells far more about the spreading effect of technology than 
about the outlines of consensus within an industrial society. 
Marx the conflict theorist actually analyzed the problems of consensus 
in better detail. With his stress on groups defined by common economic 
situations (1846a:6-16) and on reciprocal action between members of these 
specific groups (1846b:670), he suggested that the scientific capacity may 
not have the same effect on each segment of society. Nonetheless, as Marx 
demonstrated in "Eighteenth Brumaire," subgroups do not necessarily formu-
late ideas to reflect their own self-interest in the given situation. 
Cooley identified a consensus mechanism that may explain this anomaly: 
social life, he said, is a social-mental process (1926:305-07), society a 
network of connnunication (1918:26-29). In his work "On the ascendency of 
a capitalistic class," he reported connnunication networks spreading hope 
for the lowly through open-class ideology. As a vehicle for consensus, 
his communication network of mass media reinforced by primary group values 
has proved more important than reciprocal action. The history of Marxist 
movements demonstrates how effective leadership can communicate a message 
even to those far distant persons who have no opportunity for consciousness-
raising interaction as Marx envisioned it. 
But what is the necessary content of this leadership message? How 
much consensus is necessary before a group can act? Parsons outlined an 
11action framework"--ends, means and conditions, norms--culminating in a 
182 
"common value integration" of group created values directing us to choose 
the appropriate norms to suit the ends, means, and conditions (1937:727-
35), Parsons had elaborated his action framework from Weber's theory of 
social action. Weber, however, simply defined social act.ion as human 
activity orientated toward the responses of others (1922:22-26). Clearly 
we need some agreement among ourselves to rescue social action from a 
vacuum of meaningless; social action depends on others who react in 
expected, "appropriate" ways. But Weber required only a small core of 
consensus, just enough to make social life tolerably predictable, not so 
much that we can assume common agreement on a basic world view (Cohen, 
1975). There is, in other words, a critical difference in the two social 
action approaches. Parsons searched for the emergent property of common 
value integration, even defining sociology as the study of this consensus 
property (1937:768). In his System of Modern Societies he described 
industrial society guided by universalistic standards, specific role 
obligations, and other adaptive values. Weber only expected enough mutual 
agreement to insure that we can depend on others to hold up their end as 
long as we hold up ours. Why these others are dependable is not the key 
issue. With this interpretation of consensus, Weber could expect a small 
elite to define societal values for the rest of us. For example, growing 
rationality in Western civilization meant growing rationality in institu-
tional arrangements: religious practices that "please" god; bureaucratic 
hierarchies to execute army plans; careful reinvestment for promotion of 
capital growth (Bendix, 1960:64-69). But individual people could simply 
follow their leaders without themselves working toward the rational, 
deliberate manipulation of means for some end. In The City economic prac-
tices limited the possibility of consensus; ancient Roman nobles might buy 
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lower-class allegiance with social welfare, but the nobles did not expect 
the urban proletariate to formulate wise political decisions based on 
proper Roman values. 
Thus, by seeing consensus and conflict as a single issue, we can 
find combination possibilities even with the small number of works con-
sidered here. The nature and content of consensus varies for different 
groups in society. Those with control over the communication network may 
influence consensus among others._.., Those with control over important insti-
tutional structures may encourage others to "go along" regardless of what 
they think 
This combined view of conflict-consensus returns us to the problem 
raised by Friedrichs in his comparison of prophets and priests--sociology 
for revolutionary praxis and sociology .for understanding faith. But once 
we have turned consensus into a possible object or weapon of conflict, we 
destroy the basis for faith. Faith in what? if we cannot believe the 
established order. Cooley revealed how a society can spread some common 
belief, we presume belief in anything. Parsons, with radical insight, 
explained how certain beliefs may mobilize society, but not, we must con-
clude, for the necessary benefit of all consenting individuals. Although 
this bad news about consensus may encourage us to promote changes in the 
group, praxis offers no standards for the end point of that change. Marx 
once envisioned a society without unnecessary concentration of power, with 
minimal bureaucratic power in the hands of a few coordinators (Mouzelis, 
1967:8-15). However, both history and sociology challenge Harx's narrow 
definition of "necessary" power. When power is mobilized and concentrated 
in certain ways, society produces more-~ore economic materials, more 
judicial decisions, more of all those goods that can increase day-to-day 
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privileges have shown a persistent tendancy to concentrate in a few hands. 
John Rawls (1971) would justify such inequality so long as it serves 
the interests of the "worst off" groups of society: thus, a centralized 
industrial society producing more surplus goods for everyone can be more 
just than an egalitarian society with few goods equally distributed to all. 
Reasonable enough, until we realize that social goods are often defined by 
private choices, the aggregate of which are impossible to control (Boudon, 
1976). For example, the private decision of many couples to have "one more 
_baby" can create a baby boom, precipitating a demand for more schools, more 
jobs, numerous other goods. Further the consensus about what is "good" 
changes--often in the direction of increasing demand for a higher level of 
good given to an ever larger percentage of the people. I mentioned Rawls 
and his Theory of Justice as a current, sophisticated attempt to bring 
prophetic ideals into the service of some end besides iconoclasm. Deal-
ing with the problems raised by Rawls will be, I predict, a major new 
direction for sociology. If theorists like Collins forge the links between 
conflict and consensus principles, we must look for other social ends 
besides those defined by consensus--not to the perpetual image breaking of 
the prophets, nor the past-oriented order of the priests but to some other 
standard; perhaps defined by a theory of justice, we hope tested for its 
effects by sociological analysis. 
This chapter on the sociology of sociology has traveled from simple 
tests for simple-minded comparisons between groups to an expedition into 
the nature and implications of the sociological mission. Although I can-
not credit numerical taxonomy with all of the analysis here, it does pro-
vide a tool for comparisons between groups and--more important as we have 
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seen with the prophet-priest comparison--a tool for sorting through theo-
retical ideas. Using thi.s simple tool, I found a common edge with Collins 
and his sophisticated analysis of the same conflict-consensus problem. In 
conclusion, numerical taxonomy can be a useful devise for further explora-
tion into the sociology of sociology: first because the typoiogy based on 
numerical taxonomy enables us to identify cognitive similarity between 
theorists who may also be related on other criteria: second because the 
trait variables which form the basis for classification also form a check-
list of properties we may consider in critical analysis. 
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CHAPTER VII 
RETROSPECT ON THEORY PARADIGMS 
To be truly useful in modern theoretical work, classifications of 
sociological thought should do more than simply divide theorists into 
schools. At present two additional goals seem important; 1) examining the 
formal elements within a theoretical system as a step toward reformulating 
theory; and 2) identifying the social-environmental influences that may 
affect theoretical development. Toward these ends, I have proposed a 
numerical classification system based on many variables instead of the 
traditional few usually employed for cataloguing theoretical works. I 
have detailed a rationale for choosing a particular approach, the mathe-
matical techniques involved, a preliminary analysis of theory-classifica-
tion data, and some suggestions for using this data in theoretical reformu-
lation and explorations into the sociology of sociology. 
How can we judge the results of such effort? An adequate taxonomy 
identifies "natural" groups of phenomena. A truly successful taxonomy 
also retrieves information easily and tests hypotheses (Sokal, 1974:185-
86). In this project I tried to identify natural paradigms of sociological 
thought, to use the taxonomic traits for reformulating theory, and to test 
a few hypotheses about the kinds of theorists who would be most likely to 
cluster together in natural-paradigm groups. First I translated the Kuhn 
paradigm into mathematical terms. A paradigm of works sharing a common 
perspective for sociological reasoning is a dense monothetic cluster of 
works sharing a large core of similarly coded trait variables. Ideal we 
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could expect to find two or more of these dense "natural" clusters separated 
by great empty spaces of low similarity. To identify the groups and trace 
connections between them, I used three techniques: rearrangement of the 
similarity matrix to group like works together; construction of clusters 
based on similarity levels; and factor analysis of underlying similarity 
properties. All three tools located three major groups and consistently 
' placed ten (of the twenty-five) works in a specific group. These unambiguous 
clusters seem to represent two major dimensions: a stress on methodology 
per se and a stress on subject matter. Among those who stress subject 
matter, most emphasize structure and a few prefer exploring cultural-social 
perceptions. These factors seem sensible. They represent long-standing 
traditions in the field and add some nuance to the recent typology suggested 
by Ritzer. Clustering, however, also identified four groups of theorists 
who stand midway between the three factors. This disparity between factor 
analysis and clustering results illustrates the multidimensional relation-
ships between theoretical works; even in the most "similar" groups, the core 
of similar trait variables shifts from work to work leaving only a small 
number of traits held in common by all group members. Clearly no one para-
digm perspective dominates a theory cluster let alone sociology itself. 
Nonetheless, these core similarity traits become very important in 
reformulation exercises combining or expanding theoretical perspectives. 
For example, I compared }~rx, Blalock, and Goffman. Each theorist is an 
outstanding exponent of a different type perspective; each wrote about 
stratification problems. By comparing their common traits and their dis-
tinguishing ones, I suggested how the three distinctly different perspect-
ives could be worked into a common framework--Blalock's causal models of 
attitudinal change as a test of growing class consciousness among ~~rxian 
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cohorts, Goffman's work on the false self front as an-explanation of how 
true and false class consciousness develop through interaction. In other 
reformulation exercises I compared works on religious asceticism, role 
theory, and reductionism. Each time using the trait variables for guide-
lines to the various possibilities of theoretical reformulation. 
Man1 exercises in theory reformulation can prove useful quite inde-
pendently of the typology classification. To examine a handful of works 
we need only their trait codings not the entire matrix of similarities. 
Thus, we can choose theorists who explore some entertaining topic and com-
pare their various views on the common concern. Most sociologists have 
been trained in a few techniques, in one or two perspectives; but we 
research a topic rather than a perspective and develop subject-based 
theories rather than theories about technique. Theory reformulation with 
trait variables provides a quick insight into different perspectives on the 
same topic, an insight into the assumptions and orientation of a "different" 
theorist as well as the substantive findings that happen to relate to our 
work. A truly intelligent combination of different theoretical views must 
rest on this kind of insight (Sherman, 1974; Merton, 1975:43-52). 
One of the key assumptions behind the sociology of sociology is that 
colleague circles--theory groups, invisible colleges, and the like--coin-
cide with paradigm perspectives. So I have used the types as a limited 
test of this idea selecting works from the same social circle to see if 
they share the high similarity of many common traits. Most of the 
hypotheses proved false. Not a surprising finding given the loosely 
structured nature of trait similarity within paradigm groups. However, 
with a different set of trait variables, ones chosen to reflect the 
v' 
important issues for key groups we could probably find sharp cognitive 
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differences between circle groups. The variables used here measure 
abstract, universal categories in sociological theory. In biological 
terms, these traits are like the general categories separating one mammal 
from another. If we were working in biological systematics and wanted to 
distinguish between primates, we would refine the mammal traits to develop 
more specialized primate variables. For sociology systematics we could 
choose variables to reflect nuances in the "interpretive" property, for 
example, and provide a better base for statistical tests about specialized 
circles in interpretive sociology. 
With a different set of traits, we could also examine links between 
sociology and other aspects of culture. Crane (1972:129-47) argues for a 
sociology of culture including science, artistic expression, and other 
intellectual phenomenon. Long ago Max Weber (1904-05:17-26) named a 
common element in \vestern civilization called rationality and numbered its 
effects in music, religion, architecture, business, science. With care-
fully chosen trait variables, we could cover the same cultural fields see-
ing indices of rationality or other cultural characteristics in more 
detail. 
Even if we cannot test some hypotheses directly with the present 
typology, the trait variables prove useful in other approaches. One of my 
hypotheses predicted differences between sociologists who have prophetic 
or priestly political orientations. But when Marx, who is clearly a 
prophet, shares high similarity with such priestly thinkers as Comte, 
Cooley, Parsons, and Weber, we cannot argue that prophetic theories of 
conflict differ greatly from priestly theories of consensus. Instead, 
returning to the trait variables for clues about the nature of overall 
similarity and the source of critical differences between these theorists, 
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I argued toward the same conclusion that others have reached with a more 
laborious literary approach: the conflict-consensus perspective unites 
when we define consensus as an object of conflict. 
As I have demonstrated, numerical taxonomy examines the nature of 
soci~logical thought in new ways. It generates a numerically based 
typology of cognitive paradigm tendencies based on methodology, social 
perceptions, and structural constraints. The trait variables form a check 
list for theory reformulation exercises. Similarity relationships in the 
types can test hypotheses about the links between social circles and cog-
nitive structures. In effect, the taxonomy approach forms a kind of para-
digm, not a Kuhn paradigm of scientific gestalt but a ~ertonian paradigm 
of procedures for codifying some theory perspective (Boudon, 1970; 
Merton 1967:69-72). Although I have not fully outlined this paradigm-
for-paradigms, my theory reformulation suggests some lines of procedure: 
examining one subject from several points of view, as I did in the strati-
fication example; searching for differences in the "same" perspective like 
the different kinds of reductionism; and finding common elements in such 
"divergent" perspectives as the conflict-consensus controversey. In each 
instance, I looked for assumptions behind an author's approach as well as 
the ideas in a specific work. This style for reformulation efforts may 
well be the most promising result of theory classification via numerical 
taxonomy. 
r 
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THEORETICAL TRAITS FOR THE INITIAL CLASSIFICATION 
Dimension One: The Abstract Subject Focus of Sociology 
Variables 
1) Interpretive conceptions of social-science subject matter 
2) Positivistic conceptions of social-science subject matter 
3) Social levels for explanatory variables 
4) Psychological levels for explanatory variables 
5) Holistic-synthetic conceptualizations of social life 
6) Relational-analytic conceptualizations of social life 
7) The study of equilibrium in social life 
8) The study of development in social life 
Dimension Two: Abstract Methodological Strategies 
Variables 
9) Analytic-inductive strategies 
10) Formal-deductive strategies 
11) Typical sampling 
12) Sampling from universal conditions 
13) Analysis with type concepts 
14) Directly propositional analysis 
15) Focus on prediction 
16) Focus on explanation 
Dimension Three: Groups Used as Sites of Analysis 
Variables used as units of analysis 
17) The primary group 
19) The complex or large-scale organization 
21) The community 
23) The total society 
Variables used as objects of analysis 
18) The primary group 
20) The complex or large-scale organization 
22) The community 
24) The total society 
' 
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Dimension Four: Group Process-Problems Analyzed 
Variables 
25) Group formation 
26) Differentiation 
27) Socialization 
28) Deviation 
29) Coordination 
30) Stratification 
31) Innovation 
32) Social change 
Dimension Five: Principal Data-Gathering Techniques 
Variables 
33) Direct studies of institutional structures 
34) Interviews/questionnaires 
35) Observations 
36) Experiments 
Dimension Six: Observational Categories 
Variables 
37) Material environment 
38) Spatial location 
39) Population base 
40) Structural characteristics 
41) Social characteristics 
42) Cultural products 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS FOR THEORETICAL WORKS* 
Blak Hubert Blalock--on "Status inconsistency" (1967) 
Comt August Comte--on "Modern history" (1820) 
Cool Charles Horton Cooley--from Social Organization (1909) 
·DK12 Emile Durkheim--from Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912) 
DK97 Emile Durkheim--from Suicide (1897) 
Goff Erving Goffman--on "Deferenceand demeanor" (1956) 
Bo74 George C. Romans--from Social Behavior (1974) 
Bo50 George C. Romans--from The Human Group (1950) 
Lund George A. Lundberg--on "Interethnic relations" (1952) 
Marx Karl Marx--on "The Eighteenth Brumarie of Louis Bonaparte" (1852) 
Mr48 Robert K. Merton--on "The self-fulfilling prophecy" (1948) 
Mr36 Robert K. Merton--on "Puritanism Pietism and Science" (1936) 
Pare Vilfredo Pareto--from The Rise and Fall of the Elites (1901) 
Plc.36 Robert Ezra Park--on "Succession" (1936) 
Plc.28 Robert Ezra Park--on "Human migration and the marginal man" (1928) 
Pr71 Talcott Parsons--from The System of Modern Societies (1971) 
Pr53 Talcott Parsons--on "Stratification" (1953) 
Pr37 Talcott Parsons--from The Structure of Social Action (1937) 
Sehu Alfred Schutz-on "The homecomer" (1945) 
SimC Georg Sinunel--on "Conflict and the structure of the group" (1908) 
SimP Georg Simmel--on "The poor" (1908) 
Sumn William Graham Sumner--from Folkways (1906) 
Tard Gabriel Tarde--on "The public and the crowd" (1901) 
We22 Max Weber--from The City (1922) 
We4S Max Weber--from The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism (1904-05) 
*See Appendix B for the complete bibliography. 
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CODING GUIDE FOR TRAIT VARIABLES 
Variables 1 and 2: interpretive and positivistic conceptions of subject 
aatter 
1 0 Basic stress on interpretations made by social actors. E.g., 
Goffman' s "self" and Schutz's ideal-type "homecomer." 
0 1 Behavior taken at face value although a psychological motive may 
be posited as a given. E.,g., Simmel' s types of "poor." 
1 1 Both cultural-subjective meaning and institutional structure 
crucial to analysis. E.g., Weber's Protestant Ethic and Park's 
"marginal man. " 
Ritzer, 1975; Wagner, 1963; Wallace, 1969. 
Variables 3 and 4: social and psychological levels for explanatory 
variables 
1 0 Activity completely explained in terms of social environment 
(Goff-.n's explanation of social pressures in a mental ward) or 
in terms of the social environment and a psychological given 
(Simmel's "poor"). 
0 1 Psychological state is the principle explanatory variable. E.g., 
Romans' Elementary Forms. 
1 1 Psychological state alternates with social environment as part of 
an explanatory chain. E.g., Tarde's view of crowd behavior. 
Buckley, 1967; Rex, 1961; Wallace, 1971. 
Variables 5 and 6: holistic-synthetic conceptualizations and relational-
analytic ones 
1 0 Stress on system qua system, total and intermeshing parts. E.g., 
Parsons' discussion of the development of N.W. Europe. 
0 1 Stress on parts without explicit regard for the givens of the 
system as a whole. Analysis could easily shift to a different 
system and still apply. E.g., Romans in Human Group, Blalock. 
1 1 Certain relationships are singled out for inspection. But analysis 
performed in terms of how the selected relationship fit with the 
system. E.g., Marx, Weber's Protestant Ethic. 
Budkley, 1967; Rex, 1961; Wallace, 1971. 
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Variables· 7 and 8: the study of equilibrium and development 
1 0 Stress on balance, changes are recurrent cycles. E.g., Pareto. 
Or emphasis on specific balanced times; even though change has 
occurred from one balance to another, the mechanism is not 
detailed. Simmel's "poor" or Merton's work on Puritanism and 
science. 
0 1 Main point is how a development originated or shifted. E.g., 
Weber's Protestant Ethic, Marx. 
1 1 Two (or more) stable systems explored with some mechanisms that 
account for the shift between them. E.g., Tarde, Weber's work on the 
city. 
Blalock, 1969; Nadel, 1957. 
Variables 9 and 10: analytic-inductive and formal-deductive strategies 
1 0 A search for patterns in the data. Patterns defining a concept, e.g., 
Simlllel's "poor." Patterns of a specific relationship, e.g., Romans' 
Human Group. Patterns of systems, e.g., Parsons in System of Modern 
Societies. 
0 1 Theory explicitly set up to "test," sets of statements to be falsi-
fied or verified (in some aspect, at least) by the "test." E.g., 
Blalock, Merton's study of Puritans and science, Pareto. 
1 1 Both discovery of patterns in data and tests of relationships either 
within the pattern or between the pattern and other variables. E.g., 
Weber's Protestant Ethic, Parsons on stratification. 
Kaplan, 1964; Reynolds, 1971. 
Variables 11 and 12: typical sampling and sampling from universal condi-
tions 
1 0 Underlying assumption that conditions "average out" in any random 
sample. E.g., Blalock; Park on neighborhood succession. 
· 0 1 Underlying assumption that a combination of historical, temporal 
conditions affect other variables. An "extreae" sample may be 
chosen to highlight these conditions. E.g., Veber in Protestant 
Ethic, Simmel on the "poor." 
1 1 Use of "universal" historical conditions for part of the research 
but not all, e.g., Tarde, Pareto. Or use of a "typical" sample to 
build to universal conditions, e.g., Romans in Human Group, Merton 
on "self-fulfilling prophecy." 
Rex, 1961; Willer, 1967. 
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Variables 13 and 14: analysis with type concepts and direct propositional 
analysis 
1 0 One type (or constellation of variables) related to another type, 
e.g., Weber's Protestant Ethic. Both types also explored 
internally. 
0 1 No "types" involved, direct comparison of two variables, e.g., 
Blalock. Or types incidental to the analysis in question, e.g., 
Pareto's analysis of elites (who have residues). Or analysis of 
the inner workings of a type in terms of its variable relation-
ships. 
1 1 Exploring a developed type in terms of certain variable relation-
ships, e.g., Tarde, Merton on Puritans and science. Using types as 
part of a broader analysis, e.g., Durkheim in Elementary Forms. 
Kaplan, 1964; Stinchcombe, 1968. 
Variables 15 and 16: prediction and explanation 
1 0 Stress on prediction. Possibilities under given conditions, e.g., 
Simmel on conflict. Necessities under certain conditions, e.g., 
Parsons on stratification. 
0 1 Stress on the process of change, mechanisms that shift from one set 
of conditions to another, e.g., Cooley. 
1 1 Stress on both outcome and mechanisms, structure and means for 
producing the structure, e.g., Weber in Protestant Ethic, Pareto. 
Dubin, 1969; Gibbs, 1972; Kaplan, 1964. 
Variables 17 to 24: groups used as sites of analysis--units (independent 
variables) and objects (dependent variables). 
Primary group: group in which relations are based on the quality of per-
son qua person. 
17 Unit: the primary group or its relations creates or shapes the 
action, e.g., Cooley. 
18 Object: the structure or quality of group relations is affected by 
other variables, e.g., Goffman. 
Broom and Selznick, 1973. 
Complex or large-scale organization: group designed to accomplish 
explicitly stated goals (even if the group has other goals as well). 
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19 Unit: the complex organization structure affects other action, 
e.g., Goffman. 
20 Object: the complex organization structure is affected by other 
variables, e.g., Simmel on how conflict changes organizations. 
Perrow, 1972. 
Community: group based, at least to some degree, on residence in a 
small geographical area, integrated social relations, and a sense of 
common membership beyond family ties. 
21 Unit: the quality of community life is used as an independent vari-
able, e.g., Weber in Protestant Ethic. 
22 Object: the quality of community life is affected by some other 
Yariables, e.g., Weber on life in ancient and medieval cities. 
21-
22 Park on succession within the community 
Bernard, 1973. 
Total society: self-sufficient system with allegiance to a common "system 
of action" which lasts longer than the individual and recruits largely 
through birth in the system. In modern systems society tends to be coter-
minous with the nation state, in old systems with the community. 
23 Unit: the variables originate in the structure or cultural mileu of 
the society, including the societally defined background traits of 
people, e.g., Weber on societal influences affecting city life. 
24 Object: societal structures affected by other forces, e.g., Simmel 
on conflict relations and societal cohesiveness. 
23-
24 Blalock on how traits of people affect their position and attitudes 
within the society. 
Inkles, 1964. 
Variables 25 to 32: group processes analyzed 
25 Group formation--the establishment of boundaries with norms and 
goals, e.g., Simmel on conflict. 
26 Differentiation--of specialized skills and values distributed in 
the group; the creation and sustaining of roles and performances, 
e.g., Goffman, Park on "marginal man." 
27 Socialization--for the transmission of patterns; process of learn-
ing identity and performance, internalization, e.g., Durkheim in 
Elementary Forms. 
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28 Deviation--both individual departures and group challenges to the 
system; either applauded or deplored, e.g., Park on "marginal man," 
Goffman. 
29 Coordination--to repress some deviance, to sustain some patterns, to 
enforce authority, e.g., Pareto, Parsons in System of Modern Societies, 
Parsons on stratification, Marx. 
30 Stratification--systems of rewards and opportunities segregating 
different segments of the population, e.g., Blalock, Parsons on 
stratification, Marx, Goffman. 
31 Innovation--technical, valuational, associational; new forms that do 
not start as "challenges" (deviation), e.g., Parsons in Structure of 
Social Action, Weber on the Protestant Ethic. 
32 Social change--collective effects of innovation or deviance as felt in 
the social system, e.g., Pareto on cyclical change (circulation of the 
elites), Weber on developmental change in the Protestant Ethic. 
Bosko££, 1972. 
Variables 33 to 36: principle data-gathering techniques 
33 Comparative or contextural study of institutional structures. 
Examining the behavior of a group, the patterns of behavior most 
characteristic within a group or the distribution of social traits 
characteristic of a group. E.G., Marx, Pareto, Park on urban 
8Uccession. 
34 InterYiews/questionnaires. 
Asking the person about himself, his opinions, including asking 
dead persons by reviewing documents. E.g., Homans and Blalock using 
the questionnaire/interview material of others. Weber in Protestant 
Ethic and Parsons in Structure of Social Action. 
35 Observations of behavior. 
Observing behavior of individuals in interaction. E.g., Goffman, 
Homans (who used observational material collected by others). 
36 Experiments. 
Deliberately manipulating a social structure to see the effects of 
.anipulated variables. No examples in this typology. Homans used 
the experimental work of others, but not in the pieces used here. 
B.itzer, 1975. 
Variables 37 to 42: observational categories 
37 Material environment (available materials, limiting climatic condi-
tions). Material environment used as a limit set on interaction. 
E.g., Cooley and Tarde on modern technology, Marx on material-
econCIIJlic limits. 
38 Spatial location (ecological patterns, social distance). E.g., 
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Marx on organization among peasants, Park on urban succession for 
geographical space; Park on "marginal man" and Goffman on social 
space. 
39 Population base (demographic variables as preconditions). Popula-
tion defining the base of social interaction. E.g., Park on urban 
succession. 
40 Structural characteristics (technology level, age distribution, 
social mobility, power distribution, and other features of the 
group). Structural items involved in interaction, not just limits 
on the whole system, for example, technology as a variable that 
determines action between specific groups (as used by }~rx in 
explaining social class). E.g., Durkheim on the relations between 
sacred and profane areas in Elementary Forms, Simmel on structural 
changes during conflict. 
41 Social characteristics (class, ethnicity, religious 
other background traits of individuals or groups). 
on attitudes and social-class membership, l1erton on 
ation and scientific activity. 
identification, 
E.g. , Blalock 
religious affili-
42 Cultural products (symbols, inventions, laws, beliefs). Thought 
structures and ideas. E.g., Weber on the nature and effect of inner-
worldly asceticism, Goffman on the symbolic meaning of gestures, 
Park on the cultural marginality of immigrants. 
No specific reference. 
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COMPUTATIONAl, FORMULAS* 
1. Simple matching coefficient (for a pair of works) 
ssm.. m 
m+u 
m is the number of matched (similarly coded) trait variables. 
u is the number of unmatched trait variables. 
Sokal and Sneath, 1963:133. 
/ 
2. Standard error of the simple matching coefficient (which approximates 
a conservative binomial distribution) 
S is the simple matching coefficient. 
N is the number of trait variables. 
Sokal and Sneath, 1963:313-15. 
3. The t-test for comparisons between sub-group means and the total group 
mean 
t = X - _;l~ N is the number of trait variables. 
Se8 /Vif-l 
4. Total possible high-similarity connections between pairs in a given 
group 
connections = n (n-1) n is the number of works in the group. 
2 
Beauchamp, 1970:33-34. 
5. Cophenetic similarity ~orrelation coefficient 
res =a normal Pearson's r between coded similarity levels rather than 
just raw scores 
Sokal and Sneath, 1963:312-13. 
6. Elementary matrix analysis 
The similarity matrix comparing work pairs can be arranged to cluster 
similar work pairs together. Place the most related pairs (in this 
instance, those with similarities of .81 and above) close to the 
diagonal of the matrix and surround them with the next related pairs. 
*Formulas only included if they are unusual or if they deviate in some 
way from standard statistical procedures. 
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In the .ideal situation, this procedure should yield a final matrix 
with all highly related pairs clustered along the diagonal, all 
minimally related pairs in the left-hand corner. 
Sokal and Sneath, 1963:178-80. 
7. Modified single-linkage clustering procedure 
Begin with groups of highly related pairs (those of .81 and above, then 
the next similarity level). In this instance, there are seven exclusive 
groups (the seven defined by elementary matrix analysis). Enlarge 
each nucleus by adding works from the next lower similarity level that 
are related to those already in the group. Proceed until reaching .71, 
the cut-off point used in the elementary matrix procedure. In this 
example, it included about 20 per cent of all pairs. One cluster had 
23 (of a possible 25) works before the clustering was completed. 
Bailey. 1975:116-19. 
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APPENDIX F 
SPECIAL COMPUTER PROCEDURES (OTHER THAN SPSS MATERIAL) 
1) Calculation of the total similarity matrix from raw data scores (on cards 
for each theorist). Program also punches similarity matrix on cards for 
later use. 
/1 MSGLEVEL=(l,l),TIME•2, CLASS•L 
II EXEC PLIXCL2,PARM.LKED• 
IIPLI.SYSIN DD * 
EF: PROCEDURE OPTIONS(MAIN); 
DCL X1(25) BIT(42); 
X5(25,42) BIT(l) DEF Xl 
X4 BIT(42), 
* 
X3(42) BIT(l) DEF X4, 
SIMILARITY(25); 
GET EDIT(X5)(COL(20},(4)((8)B(l},X(l)),(4)B(l},X(l),(6)B(l)); 
DO I=l ,,to 25; 
DO J=l to 25; 
MATCH=O 
X4=BOOL(Xl(I),Xl(J),'1001'B); 
DO K=l to 42; 
IF X3 (K) THEN MATCH=MATCH+l; 
END; 
SIMILARITY(J)=MATCHI42.; 
END; 
PUT EDIT((SIMILARITY(K} DO K•l to 25)) (COL(1),(25)F(5,2); 
PUT FILE(SYSPUNCH) EDIT(SIMILARITY)(COL(l),(8)F(l0,7)); 
END; 
END EF; 
GO.SYSP DD SYSOUT•B, DCB•BLKSIZE•80 
GO.SYSIN DD * 
(Insert data cards punched 0 for absent trait, 1 for present one.) 
* 
APPENDIX F--(Cont) 
2) Calculation of the similarity matrix for sixteen trait variables. 
EF: PROCEDURE OPTIONS(MAIN); 
DCL Xl(25) BIT(42), 
X4 BIT(42), 
X5(42) BIT(l) DEF X4 
SIMILARITY(25): 
GET EDIT(XS)(COL(20),(4)((8)B(l),X(l)),(4)B(l),X(l),(6)B(l)); 
Xl(I)=X4; . 
DO J=l to I; 
MATCH=O 
X4=BOOL(Xl(I),Xl(J),'l001B); 
IF X5(K) THEN MATCH=MATCH+l; 
END' 
SIMILARITY(J)=MATCH/16.; 
END~ -, 
PUT EDIT((SIMILARITY(K) DO K•l to I) (COL(l),(25)F(5,2)); 
END; 
END EF; 
I* 
//GO.SYSIN DD * 
(Insert data cards as above.) 
I* 
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